Answer in brief
CVE-2026-12905 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly <= 27.7 - Authenticated (Staff+) Insecure Direct Object Reference to Sensitive Information Exposure via 'params[id]' Parameter. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ladela/Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-12905 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly <= 27.7 - Authenticated (Staff+) Insecure Direct Object Reference to Sensitive Information Exposure via 'params[id]' Parameter. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ladela/Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ladela/Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ladela/Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Booklygeneric | 0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 16, 2026
The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 27.7 via the appointment() method of the Mobile Staff Cabinet API (resource=appointment, action=bookly_mobile_staff_cabinet) in frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php. This is due to the handler loading an Appointment by the attacker-supplied params[id] without verifying that the appointment's staff_id matches the authenticated staff member, whereas sibling operations (deleteAppointment, saveAppointment, appointments list) correctly scope to $this->staff->getId() when $this->role === ROLE_STAFF. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with staff-level mobile cabinet access (any valid access_key token bound to a Staff entity), to read appointment details — including the internal note and the full customer_appointments collection (customer full_name, email, phone, notes, custom_fields, extras, payment_total, payment_type, payment_status) — belonging to other staff members by enumerating sequential appointment IDs.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ladela/Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ladela/Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Booklygeneric | 0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 16, 2026
The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 27.7 via the appointment() method of the Mobile Staff Cabinet API (resource=appointment, action=bookly_mobile_staff_cabinet) in frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php. This is due to the handler loading an Appointment by the attacker-supplied params[id] without verifying that the appointment's staff_id matches the authenticated staff member, whereas sibling operations (deleteAppointment, saveAppointment, appointments list) correctly scope to $this->staff->getId() when $this->role === ROLE_STAFF. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with staff-level mobile cabinet access (any valid access_key token bound to a Staff entity), to read appointment details — including the internal note and the full customer_appointments collection (customer full_name, email, phone, notes, custom_fields, extras, payment_total, payment_type, payment_status) — belonging to other staff members by enumerating sequential appointment IDs.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.