Answer in brief
CVE-2026-133163 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in MISP: External Sync User Can Modify Protected Events Without Signature via Multiple Write Routes. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps misp/misp (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps misp/misp (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| misp/mispgeneric | >=0 <=2.5.51 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Nov 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 19, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 19, 2026
MISP contains an authorization bypass affecting the event protection mechanism. In MISP, a protected event is designed to be modifiable only through the events/edit endpoint with a valid cryptographic signature. However, the protection check was enforced solely on that single route. All other write endpoints that operate on an event—attributes (add, edit, delete), objects (delete), events (populate, publish, unprotect, upload_sample, upload_analysis_file), tags (attach, detach), event reports (edit, delete), galaxy clusters (attach, detach), and cryptographic keys (add, delete)—lacked the equivalent check. As a result, an authenticated user holding the sync permission (perm_sync) who is neither a site administrator nor an internal sync user (perm_sync_internal), and who belongs to the same organization as the event's creator (orgc_id), could modify, delete, or add data to a protected event without providing a valid signature. This included the ability to unprotect the event entirely, publish it to other instances, and add cryptographic signing keys that would subsequently permit signed edits, effectively nullifying the protection mechanism. The vulnerability requires an authenticated sync user account within the event's creator organization. No user interaction or special network conditions are required; standard API calls to the affected endpoints are sufficient. The security impact is a loss of integrity over protected threat-intelligence events: an attacker can inject, alter, or remove attributes, objects, tags, reports, and galaxy cluster associations, and can remove the protection flag or add signing keys to enable persistent unauthorized modification.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.