We found a chain of combining multiple weaknesses in the product that could allow an attacker to become any user in the backend and access any data: * The payment integration plugins Stripe (included in the core system), pretix-mollie, pretix-oppwa, pretix-bitpay, pretix-payone, pretix-secuconnect, pretix-sofort, and pretix-saferpay contain a code path that is intended for the transport of session parameters from a tab with isolated cookies (e.g. in the pretix widget) to a new tab. For this purpose, a set of session parameters is cryptographically signed and then passed to the new tab as a URL parameter. The plugins perform no further validation of the session parameters, other than the cryptographic signature being valid. This is fixed with the releases issued today by strictly validating that no session parameters outside of the scope of the respective plugin may be set. * An unrelated feature in the core system is used to generate redirect links that obfuscate any Referer headers for outgoing links to prevent leakage of secrets in URLs. This redirect page also requires cryptographically signed parameters. Unfortunately, it uses the same key and salt for the signature as the previously mentioned feature in the payment integration plugins. A motivated attacker with access to at least one event in the backend can trick the system into cryptographically signing arbitrary content using specially crafted links. In combination with the previous issue, the attacker could use this to set and modify arbitrary parameters on their user session by injecting the signed parameters into the feature of the payment providers. This is fixed with the releases issued today by using different salts for the signature for each plugin and feature. * A third, unrelated feature in the core system is used for admin users to act on behalf of another user, mostly for debugging purposes. With being able to insert arbitrary parameters into a session, an attacker can abuse this feature to change their session from their actual user to any user in the system by guessing a valid user ID. This is fixed with the release today by requiring unguessable information to be contained in the session of the user to switch to.
We found a chain of combining multiple weaknesses in the product that could allow an attacker to become any user in the backend and access any data: * The payment integration plugins Stripe (included in the core system), pretix-mollie, pretix-oppwa, pretix-bitpay, pretix-payone, pretix-secuconnect, pretix-sofort, and pretix-saferpay contain a code path that is intended for the transport of session parameters from a tab with isolated cookies (e.g. in the pretix widget) to a new tab. For this purpose, a set of session parameters is cryptographically signed and then passed to the new tab as a URL parameter. The plugins perform no further validation of the session parameters, other than the cryptographic signature being valid. This is fixed with the releases issued today by strictly validating that no session parameters outside of the scope of the respective plugin may be set. * An unrelated feature in the core system is used to generate redirect links that obfuscate any Referer headers for outgoing links to prevent leakage of secrets in URLs. This redirect page also requires cryptographically signed parameters. Unfortunately, it uses the same key and salt for the signature as the previously mentioned feature in the payment integration plugins. A motivated attacker with access to at least one event in the backend can trick the system into cryptographically signing arbitrary content using specially crafted links. In combination with the previous issue, the attacker could use this to set and modify arbitrary parameters on their user session by injecting the signed parameters into the feature of the payment providers. This is fixed with the releases issued today by using different salts for the signature for each plugin and feature. * A third, unrelated feature in the core system is used for admin users to act on behalf of another user, mostly for debugging purposes. With being able to insert arbitrary parameters into a session, an attacker can abuse this feature to change their session from their actual user to any user in the system by guessing a valid user ID. This is fixed with the release today by requiring unguessable information to be contained in the session of the user to switch to.
Review the upstream advisory, identify the affected product in your inventory, and apply the vendor update when one is available.
CVE-2026-13602 is listed in the HOL Guard supply-chain feed, but affected software is not mapped to a package. Review the upstream advisory for the affected product and vendor guidance. We found a chain of combining multiple weaknesses in the product that could allow an attacker to become any user in the backend and access any data: * The payment integration plugins Stripe (included in the core system), pretix-mollie, pretix-oppwa, pretix-bitpay, pretix-payone, pretix-secuconnect, pretix-sofort, and pretix-saferpay contain a code path that is intended for the transport of session parameters from a tab with isolated cookies (e.g. in the pretix widget) to a new tab. For this purpose, a set of session parameters is cryptographically signed and then passed to the new tab as a URL parameter. The plugins perform no further validation of the session parameters, other than the cryptographic signature being valid. This is fixed with the releases issued today by strictly validating that no session parameters outside of the scope of the respective plugin may be set. * An unrelated feature in the core system is used to generate redirect links that obfuscate any Referer headers for outgoing links to prevent leakage of secrets in URLs. This redirect page also requires cryptographically signed parameters. Unfortunately, it uses the same key and salt for the signature as the previously mentioned feature in the payment integration plugins. A motivated attacker with access to at least one event in the backend can trick the system into cryptographically signing arbitrary content using specially crafted links. In combination with the previous issue, the attacker could use this to set and modify arbitrary parameters on their user session by injecting the signed parameters into the feature of the payment providers. This is fixed with the releases issued today by using different salts for the signature for each plugin and feature. * A third, unrelated feature in the core system is used for admin users to act on behalf of another user, mostly for debugging purposes. With being able to insert arbitrary parameters into a session, an attacker can abuse this feature to change their session from their actual user to any user in the system by guessing a valid user ID. This is fixed with the release today by requiring unguessable information to be contained in the session of the user to switch to.
Affected software not mapped. Review the upstream record for vendor-specific product and version guidance.
Reported by NVD (nvd).
HOL Guard can help your team monitor supply-chain activity while the upstream record is clarified.
Explore HOL GuardReview the upstream advisory, identify the affected product in your inventory, and apply the vendor update when one is available.
CVE-2026-13602 is listed in the HOL Guard supply-chain feed, but affected software is not mapped to a package. Review the upstream advisory for the affected product and vendor guidance. We found a chain of combining multiple weaknesses in the product that could allow an attacker to become any user in the backend and access any data: * The payment integration plugins Stripe (included in the core system), pretix-mollie, pretix-oppwa, pretix-bitpay, pretix-payone, pretix-secuconnect, pretix-sofort, and pretix-saferpay contain a code path that is intended for the transport of session parameters from a tab with isolated cookies (e.g. in the pretix widget) to a new tab. For this purpose, a set of session parameters is cryptographically signed and then passed to the new tab as a URL parameter. The plugins perform no further validation of the session parameters, other than the cryptographic signature being valid. This is fixed with the releases issued today by strictly validating that no session parameters outside of the scope of the respective plugin may be set. * An unrelated feature in the core system is used to generate redirect links that obfuscate any Referer headers for outgoing links to prevent leakage of secrets in URLs. This redirect page also requires cryptographically signed parameters. Unfortunately, it uses the same key and salt for the signature as the previously mentioned feature in the payment integration plugins. A motivated attacker with access to at least one event in the backend can trick the system into cryptographically signing arbitrary content using specially crafted links. In combination with the previous issue, the attacker could use this to set and modify arbitrary parameters on their user session by injecting the signed parameters into the feature of the payment providers. This is fixed with the releases issued today by using different salts for the signature for each plugin and feature. * A third, unrelated feature in the core system is used for admin users to act on behalf of another user, mostly for debugging purposes. With being able to insert arbitrary parameters into a session, an attacker can abuse this feature to change their session from their actual user to any user in the system by guessing a valid user ID. This is fixed with the release today by requiring unguessable information to be contained in the session of the user to switch to.
Affected software not mapped. Review the upstream record for vendor-specific product and version guidance.
Reported by NVD (nvd).
HOL Guard can help your team monitor supply-chain activity while the upstream record is clarified.
Explore HOL Guard