Answer in brief
CVE-2026-14367 records a Low severity (CVSS 3.1) vulnerability in I3C IBI work-node free-list data race between ISR and workqueue thread. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps zephyrproject/zephyr (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 3.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps zephyrproject/zephyr (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject/zephyrgeneric | >=3.2.0 <4.4.2 | 4.4.2 |
Published upstream
Aug 31, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 31, 2026
The I3C IBI subsystem in drivers/i3c/i3c_ibi_workq.c hands out statically-allocated work nodes through a free-list i3c_ibi_work_nodes_free implemented as a plain sys_slist_t, which provides no synchronization. The allocation helpers (i3c_ibi_work_enqueue, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_target_irq, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_hotjoin, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_controller_request, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_cb) called sys_slist_get() directly from ISR context, while the workqueue handler i3c_ibi_work_handler() returned nodes with sys_slist_append() from the workqueue thread, with no lock on either side. Because sys_slist_get() and sys_slist_append() are neither atomic nor interrupt-safe, an IBI interrupt that fires while the workqueue thread is mid-append (or a truly parallel access under CONFIG_SMP) races on the shared list. This corrupts the list linkage: a node may be handed to two consumers, a node may be lost, or the head/tail pointers may be left inconsistent so sys_slist_get() returns a stale or garbage pointer. In the double-hand-out case the subsequent memcpy(ibi_node, ibi_work, sizeof(*ibi_node)) overwrites a node still in flight; a garbage pointer turns the same memcpy into an out-of-bounds write. The race is driven by I3C bus traffic — IBIs, hot-joins, and controller-role requests originate from target devices on the bus, and I3C supports hot-joining devices. An attacker controlling an I3C peripheral on the board's chip-to-chip bus can generate high-frequency interrupts timed to collide with the free operation. Exploitation requires physical access to the bus and winning a narrow timing window; the most realistic impact is a crash or hang (denial of service), with memory corruption possible but hard to control. The fix wraps all free-list sys_slist_get()/sys_slist_append() operations in the new ibi_work_alloc()/ibi_work_free() helpers, each guarded by a k_spinlock (ibi_work_lock), closing the race across ISR and thread contexts.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.