Answer in brief
CVE-2026-17349 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.3) vulnerability in pgAdmin 4: Adhoc server clone leaks another user's stored database credentials and ownership to a non-owner. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps pgadmin.org/pgAdmin 4 (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps pgadmin.org/pgAdmin 4 (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:a:pgadmin:pgadmin_4:*:*:*:*:*:postgresql:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pgadmin.org/pgAdmin 4generic | >=9.0 <9.17 | 9.17 |
Published upstream
Jul 31, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 23, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 4, 2026
/misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server, part of the Workspaces feature introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.0, when passed the id of an existing server, clones that server via Server.clone(), which copies every column from the source row, including user_id, shared, shared_username, and the stored credential fields password, save_password, and tunnel_password. When a non-owner triggered an adhoc connect against another user's (in practice, typically an administrator's) shared server, the clone inherited that user's ownership, shared flag, and stored database credentials verbatim. pgAdmin persisted this cross-tenant, credential-bearing server row before the connection was even attempted, so it survived even when the connection subsequently failed. The non-owner could then open the newly-owned clone and pgAdmin would connect using the source user's stored database password on the non-owner's behalf, granting the non-owner use of database credentials -- and whatever database privileges they confer -- that were never their own. Fix forces the cloned adhoc record's ownership fields (user_id, shared, shared_username) and stored credential fields (password, save_password, tunnel_password) to belong to the calling user and be cleared/private before committing, regardless of the source server's ownership, sharing state, or stored credentials. A regression test asserts that an adhoc connect triggered by a non-owner against another user's shared server persists a row owned by the caller, not shared, and without the source's stored credentials. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.0 before 9.17.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.