Answer in brief
CVE-2026-17576 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.5) vulnerability in InfiniteWP Client <= 1.13.9 - Authenticated (Admin+) SQL Injection via 'iwp_get_comments_*' Array Key. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps revmakx/InfiniteWP Client (generic), revmakx/InfiniteWP Client (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 6.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps revmakx/InfiniteWP Client (generic), revmakx/InfiniteWP Client (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| revmakx/InfiniteWP Clientgeneric | >=0 <=1.13.9 | Not reported |
| revmakx/InfiniteWP Clientgeneric | 0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 18, 2026
The InfiniteWP Client plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the get_comments action in versions up to, and including, 1.13.9. This is due to insufficient escaping on the array-key names supplied in the JSON request body before use in a SQL statement: IWP_MMB_Comment::get_comments() calls extract() on $args (which silently skips keys that are not valid PHP variable names) but a second foreach($args as $checkbox => $checkbox_val) processes every key, strips the 'iwp_get_comments_' prefix with str_replace(), wraps the remainder in single quotes, and imploded it into an IN(...) clause that is executed via $wpdb->get_results() with no prepare(). Because the request body is read from php://input and JSON-decoded, wp_magic_quotes() never touches the data, so quote characters in keys pass through unaltered. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above (an administrator can register their own public key via add_site using the plugin's WP-admin-generated activation_key and then issue signed get_comments requests), to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.