Answer in brief
CVE-2026-18089 records a High severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass by verifying responses against the response-embedded certificate in verify_xml when no trust anchor is configured. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps TIMLEGGE/Net::SAML2 (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-18089 records a High severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass by verifying responses against the response-embedded certificate in verify_xml when no trust anchor is configured. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps TIMLEGGE/Net::SAML2 (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps TIMLEGGE/Net::SAML2 (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| TIMLEGGE/Net::SAML2generic | >=0 <0.86 | 0.86 |
Published upstream
Aug 3, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 3, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 3, 2026
Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass by verifying responses against the response-embedded certificate in verify_xml when no trust anchor is configured. verify_xml in Net::SAML2::Role::VerifyXML runs "return if !$anchors && !$cacert;" as soon as the XML::Sig check succeeds, and that check uses the X.509 certificate taken from the response's own dsig:KeyInfo/dsig:X509Certificate element, so an unanchored response is checked only against the key it carries. Binding::POST declares cacert as an optional Maybe[Str] with no default, so a POST binding built without one takes that path, and _verify_encrypted_assertion returns early the same way with "return $xml unless $cacert;". Any caller that constructs Binding::POST or calls Assertion->new_from_xml without a cacert, cert_text, or anchors argument accepts a response signed by an attacker generated key whose self-signed certificate is embedded in that response, authenticating an arbitrary assertion.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
CVSS is 7.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps TIMLEGGE/Net::SAML2 (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| TIMLEGGE/Net::SAML2generic | >=0 <0.86 | 0.86 |
Published upstream
Aug 3, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 3, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 3, 2026
Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass by verifying responses against the response-embedded certificate in verify_xml when no trust anchor is configured. verify_xml in Net::SAML2::Role::VerifyXML runs "return if !$anchors && !$cacert;" as soon as the XML::Sig check succeeds, and that check uses the X.509 certificate taken from the response's own dsig:KeyInfo/dsig:X509Certificate element, so an unanchored response is checked only against the key it carries. Binding::POST declares cacert as an optional Maybe[Str] with no default, so a POST binding built without one takes that path, and _verify_encrypted_assertion returns early the same way with "return $xml unless $cacert;". Any caller that constructs Binding::POST or calls Assertion->new_from_xml without a cacert, cert_text, or anchors argument accepts a response signed by an attacker generated key whose self-signed certificate is embedded in that response, authenticating an arbitrary assertion.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.