Answer in brief
CVE-2026-22610 records a High severity vulnerability in Angular has XSS Vulnerability via Unsanitized SVG Script Attributes. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps @angular/compiler (npm), @angular/compiler (npm), @angular/compiler (npm), @angular/compiler (npm) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps @angular/compiler (npm), @angular/compiler (npm), @angular/compiler (npm), @angular/compiler (npm) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| @angular/compilernpm | >=19.0.0-next.0,<19.2.18 | 19.2.18 |
| @angular/compilernpm | <=18.2.14 | Not reported |
| @angular/compilernpm | >=21.1.0-next.0,<21.1.0-rc.0 | 21.1.0-rc.0 |
| @angular/compilernpm | >=21.0.0-next.0,<21.0.7 | 21.0.7 |
| @angular/compilernpm | >=20.0.0-next.0,<20.3.16 | 20.3.16 |
| @angular/corenpm | >=21.0.0-next.0,<21.0.7 | 21.0.7 |
| @angular/corenpm | >=20.0.0-next.0,<20.3.16 | 20.3.16 |
| @angular/corenpm | >=19.0.0-next.0,<19.2.18 | 19.2.18 |
| @angular/corenpm | <=18.2.14 | Not reported |
| @angular/corenpm | >=21.1.0-next.0,<21.1.0-rc.0 | 21.1.0-rc.0 |
Published upstream
Jan 9, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Jun 9, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 11, 2026
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability has been identified in the Angular Template Compiler. The vulnerability exists because Angular’s internal sanitization schema fails to recognize the `href` and `xlink:href` attributes of SVG `<script>` elements as a **Resource URL** context. In a standard security model, attributes that can load and execute code (like a script's source) should be strictly validated. However, because the compiler does not classify these specific SVG attributes correctly, it allows attackers to bypass Angular's built-in security protections. When template binding is used to assign user-controlled data to these attributes for example, `<script [attr.href]="userInput">` the compiler treats the value as a standard string or a non-sensitive URL rather than a resource link. This enables an attacker to provide a malicious payload, such as a `data:text/javascript` URI or a link to an external malicious script. ### Impact When successfully exploited, this vulnerability allows for **arbitrary JavaScript execution** within the context of the victim's browser session. This can lead to: - **Session Hijacking:** Stealing session cookies, localStorage data, or authentication tokens. - **Data Exfiltration:** Accessing and transmitting sensitive information displayed within the application. - **Unauthorized Actions:** Performing state-changing actions (like clicking buttons or submitting forms) on behalf of the authenticated user. ### Attack Preconditions 1. The victim application must explicitly use SVG `<script>` elements within its templates. 2. The application must use property or attribute binding (interpolation) for the `href` or `xlink:href` attributes of those SVG scripts. 3. The data bound to these attributes must be derived from an untrusted source (e.g., URL parameters, user-submitted database entries, or unsanitized API responses). ### Patches - 19.2.18 - 20.3.16 - 21.0.7 - 21.1.0-rc.0 ### Workarounds Until the patch is applied, developers should: - **Avoid Dynamic Bindings**: Do not use Angular template binding (e.g., `[attr.href]`) for SVG `<script>` elements. - **Input Validation**: If dynamic values must be used, strictly validate the input against a strict allowlist of trusted URLs on the server side or before it reaches the template. ### Resources - https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/66318
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.