## Summary When `ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION` is enabled, Gogs accepts the configured authentication header (default: `X-WEBAUTH-USER`) directly from client requests without validating that the request originated from a trusted reverse proxy. Any remote attacker who can reach the Gogs service can forge this header to impersonate any user or trigger automatic account creation, completely bypassing authentication. ## Root Cause The vulnerability exists because Gogs reads the authentication header directly from the incoming HTTP request without any verification that the header was set by a trusted reverse proxy. ### Vulnerable Code Flow In `internal/context/auth.go` lines 206-234: ```go func authenticatedUser(store AuthStore, ctx *macaron.Context, sess session.Store) (_ *database.User, isBasicAuth, isTokenAuth bool) { // ... existing auth checks ... if uid <= 0 { if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAuthentication { // Reads header DIRECTLY from client request - NO VALIDATION! webAuthUser := ctx.Req.Header.Get(conf.Auth.ReverseProxyAuthenticationHeader) if len(webAuthUser) > 0 { user, err := store.GetUserByUsername(ctx.Req.Context(), webAuthUser) if err != nil { if !database.IsErrUserNotExist(err) { log.Error("Failed to get user by name: %v", err) return nil, false, false } // Check if enabled auto-registration. if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAutoRegistration { // Creates new user with forged username! user, err = store.CreateUser( ctx.Req.Context(), webAuthUser, gouuid.NewV4().String()+"@localhost", database.CreateUserOptions{ Activated: true, }, ) if err != nil { log.Error("Failed to create user %q: %v", webAuthUser, err) return nil, false, false } } } // Returns user as authenticated without any verification! return user, false, false } } // ... fallback to basic auth ... } // ... } ``` The code has **zero validation** that: 1. The request came through a reverse proxy 2. The header was set by the proxy (not the client) 3. Gogs is actually behind a reverse proxy 4. The direct access to Gogs is restricted The vulnerability occurs when: - Gogs is publicly accessible (e.g., `0.0.0.0:3000`) - `ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = true` ## Proof of Concept ### Prerequisites Gogs instance with the following configuration in `custom/conf/app.ini`: ```ini [auth] ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = true ``` An attacker can impersonate any user including administrators: ```bash # Become admin instantly curl http://gogs.example.com/ -H "X-WEBAUTH-USER: <username>" ``` <img width="1835" height="1143" alt="impersonation_example" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bae60772-5eb3-4f54-9fe0-5db01595bd56" /> ## Recommended Fixes Add validation to ensure headers come from trusted sources: ```go func authenticatedUser(store AuthStore, ctx *macaron.Context, sess session.Store) (_ *database.User, isBasicAuth, isTokenAuth bool) { // ... existing code ... if uid <= 0 { if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAuthentication { // Validate request is from trusted proxy if !isRequestFromTrustedProxy(ctx.Req) { log.Warn("Reverse proxy auth header received from untrusted source: %s", ctx.RemoteAddr()) return nil, false, false } webAuthUser := ctx.Req.Header.Get(conf.Auth.ReverseProxyAuthenticationHeader) // ... rest of the code ... } } // ... } // New validation function func isRequestFromTrustedProxy(req *http.Request) bool { // Check if request is from localhost/trusted IPs remoteIP := getRemoteIP(req) // Only accept from localhost by default if remoteIP.IsLoopback() { return true } // Check against configured trusted proxy IPs for _, trustedIP := range conf.Auth.TrustedProxyIPs { if remoteIP.String() == trustedIP { return true } } return false } ``` Add configuration option: ```ini [auth] ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = false REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION_HEADER = X-WEBAUTH-USER ; Comma-separated list of trusted proxy IPs (default: 127.0.0.1) TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS = 127.0.0.1,::1 ; Whether to require trusted proxy validation (recommended: true) REQUIRE_TRUSTED_PROXY = true ``` ## References - [CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/290.html) - [OWASP: Authentication Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.html) - [OWASP Top 10 2021 - A07: Identification and Authentication Failures](https://owasp.org/Top10/A07_2021-Identification_and_Authentication_Failures/)
## Summary When `ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION` is enabled, Gogs accepts the configured authentication header (default: `X-WEBAUTH-USER`) directly from client requests without validating that the request originated from a trusted reverse proxy. Any remote attacker who can reach the Gogs service can forge this header to impersonate any user or trigger automatic account creation, completely bypassing authentication. ## Root Cause The vulnerability exists because Gogs reads the authentication header directly from the incoming HTTP request without any verification that the header was set by a trusted reverse proxy. ### Vulnerable Code Flow In `internal/context/auth.go` lines 206-234: ```go func authenticatedUser(store AuthStore, ctx *macaron.Context, sess session.Store) (_ *database.User, isBasicAuth, isTokenAuth bool) { // ... existing auth checks ... if uid <= 0 { if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAuthentication { // Reads header DIRECTLY from client request - NO VALIDATION! webAuthUser := ctx.Req.Header.Get(conf.Auth.ReverseProxyAuthenticationHeader) if len(webAuthUser) > 0 { user, err := store.GetUserByUsername(ctx.Req.Context(), webAuthUser) if err != nil { if !database.IsErrUserNotExist(err) { log.Error("Failed to get user by name: %v", err) return nil, false, false } // Check if enabled auto-registration. if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAutoRegistration { // Creates new user with forged username! user, err = store.CreateUser( ctx.Req.Context(), webAuthUser, gouuid.NewV4().String()+"@localhost", database.CreateUserOptions{ Activated: true, }, ) if err != nil { log.Error("Failed to create user %q: %v", webAuthUser, err) return nil, false, false } } } // Returns user as authenticated without any verification! return user, false, false } } // ... fallback to basic auth ... } // ... } ``` The code has **zero validation** that: 1. The request came through a reverse proxy 2. The header was set by the proxy (not the client) 3. Gogs is actually behind a reverse proxy 4. The direct access to Gogs is restricted The vulnerability occurs when: - Gogs is publicly accessible (e.g., `0.0.0.0:3000`) - `ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = true` ## Proof of Concept ### Prerequisites Gogs instance with the following configuration in `custom/conf/app.ini`: ```ini [auth] ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = true ``` An attacker can impersonate any user including administrators: ```bash # Become admin instantly curl http://gogs.example.com/ -H "X-WEBAUTH-USER: <username>" ``` <img width="1835" height="1143" alt="impersonation_example" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bae60772-5eb3-4f54-9fe0-5db01595bd56" /> ## Recommended Fixes Add validation to ensure headers come from trusted sources: ```go func authenticatedUser(store AuthStore, ctx *macaron.Context, sess session.Store) (_ *database.User, isBasicAuth, isTokenAuth bool) { // ... existing code ... if uid <= 0 { if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAuthentication { // Validate request is from trusted proxy if !isRequestFromTrustedProxy(ctx.Req) { log.Warn("Reverse proxy auth header received from untrusted source: %s", ctx.RemoteAddr()) return nil, false, false } webAuthUser := ctx.Req.Header.Get(conf.Auth.ReverseProxyAuthenticationHeader) // ... rest of the code ... } } // ... } // New validation function func isRequestFromTrustedProxy(req *http.Request) bool { // Check if request is from localhost/trusted IPs remoteIP := getRemoteIP(req) // Only accept from localhost by default if remoteIP.IsLoopback() { return true } // Check against configured trusted proxy IPs for _, trustedIP := range conf.Auth.TrustedProxyIPs { if remoteIP.String() == trustedIP { return true } } return false } ``` Add configuration option: ```ini [auth] ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = false REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION_HEADER = X-WEBAUTH-USER ; Comma-separated list of trusted proxy IPs (default: 127.0.0.1) TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS = 127.0.0.1,::1 ; Whether to require trusted proxy validation (recommended: true) REQUIRE_TRUSTED_PROXY = true ``` ## References - [CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/290.html) - [OWASP: Authentication Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.html) - [OWASP Top 10 2021 - A07: Identification and Authentication Failures](https://owasp.org/Top10/A07_2021-Identification_and_Authentication_Failures/)
Update gogs.io/gogs to 0.14.3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanGogs has an Authentication Bypass via Unvalidated Reverse Proxy Headers affects gogs.io/gogs (go). Severity is high. ## Summary When `ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION` is enabled, Gogs accepts the configured authentication header (default: `X-WEBAUTH-USER`) directly from client requests without validating that the request originated from a trusted reverse proxy. Any remote attacker who can reach the Gogs service can forge this header to impersonate any user or trigger automatic account creation, completely bypassing authentication. ## Root Cause The vulnerability exists because Gogs reads the authentication header directly from the incoming HTTP request without any verification that the header was set by a trusted reverse proxy. ### Vulnerable Code Flow In `internal/context/auth.go` lines 206-234: ```go func authenticatedUser(store AuthStore, ctx *macaron.Context, sess session.Store) (_ *database.User, isBasicAuth, isTokenAuth bool) { // ... existing auth checks ... if uid <= 0 { if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAuthentication { // Reads header DIRECTLY from client request - NO VALIDATION! webAuthUser := ctx.Req.Header.Get(conf.Auth.ReverseProxyAuthenticationHeader) if len(webAuthUser) > 0 { user, err := store.GetUserByUsername(ctx.Req.Context(), webAuthUser) if err != nil { if !database.IsErrUserNotExist(err) { log.Error("Failed to get user by name: %v", err) return nil, false, false } // Check if enabled auto-registration. if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAutoRegistration { // Creates new user with forged username! user, err = store.CreateUser( ctx.Req.Context(), webAuthUser, gouuid.NewV4().String()+"@localhost", database.CreateUserOptions{ Activated: true, }, ) if err != nil { log.Error("Failed to create user %q: %v", webAuthUser, err) return nil, false, false } } } // Returns user as authenticated without any verification! return user, false, false } } // ... fallback to basic auth ... } // ... } ``` The code has **zero validation** that: 1. The request came through a reverse proxy 2. The header was set by the proxy (not the client) 3. Gogs is actually behind a reverse proxy 4. The direct access to Gogs is restricted The vulnerability occurs when: - Gogs is publicly accessible (e.g., `0.0.0.0:3000`) - `ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = true` ## Proof of Concept ### Prerequisites Gogs instance with the following configuration in `custom/conf/app.ini`: ```ini [auth] ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = true ``` An attacker can impersonate any user including administrators: ```bash # Become admin instantly curl http://gogs.example.com/ -H "X-WEBAUTH-USER: <username>" ``` <img width="1835" height="1143" alt="impersonation_example" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bae60772-5eb3-4f54-9fe0-5db01595bd56" /> ## Recommended Fixes Add validation to ensure headers come from trusted sources: ```go func authenticatedUser(store AuthStore, ctx *macaron.Context, sess session.Store) (_ *database.User, isBasicAuth, isTokenAuth bool) { // ... existing code ... if uid <= 0 { if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAuthentication { // Validate request is from trusted proxy if !isRequestFromTrustedProxy(ctx.Req) { log.Warn("Reverse proxy auth header received from untrusted source: %s", ctx.RemoteAddr()) return nil, false, false } webAuthUser := ctx.Req.Header.Get(conf.Auth.ReverseProxyAuthenticationHeader) // ... rest of the code ... } } // ... } // New validation function func isRequestFromTrustedProxy(req *http.Request) bool { // Check if request is from localhost/trusted IPs remoteIP := getRemoteIP(req) // Only accept from localhost by default if remoteIP.IsLoopback() { return true } // Check against configured trusted proxy IPs for _, trustedIP := range conf.Auth.TrustedProxyIPs { if remoteIP.String() == trustedIP { return true } } return false } ``` Add configuration option: ```ini [auth] ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = false REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION_HEADER = X-WEBAUTH-USER ; Comma-separated list of trusted proxy IPs (default: 127.0.0.1) TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS = 127.0.0.1,::1 ; Whether to require trusted proxy validation (recommended: true) REQUIRE_TRUSTED_PROXY = true ``` ## References - [CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/290.html) - [OWASP: Authentication Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.html) - [OWASP Top 10 2021 - A07: Identification and Authentication Failures](https://owasp.org/Top10/A07_2021-Identification_and_Authentication_Failures/)
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| gogs.io/gogsgo | <=0.14.2 | 0.14.3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate gogs.io/gogs to 0.14.3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanGogs has an Authentication Bypass via Unvalidated Reverse Proxy Headers affects gogs.io/gogs (go). Severity is high. ## Summary When `ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION` is enabled, Gogs accepts the configured authentication header (default: `X-WEBAUTH-USER`) directly from client requests without validating that the request originated from a trusted reverse proxy. Any remote attacker who can reach the Gogs service can forge this header to impersonate any user or trigger automatic account creation, completely bypassing authentication. ## Root Cause The vulnerability exists because Gogs reads the authentication header directly from the incoming HTTP request without any verification that the header was set by a trusted reverse proxy. ### Vulnerable Code Flow In `internal/context/auth.go` lines 206-234: ```go func authenticatedUser(store AuthStore, ctx *macaron.Context, sess session.Store) (_ *database.User, isBasicAuth, isTokenAuth bool) { // ... existing auth checks ... if uid <= 0 { if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAuthentication { // Reads header DIRECTLY from client request - NO VALIDATION! webAuthUser := ctx.Req.Header.Get(conf.Auth.ReverseProxyAuthenticationHeader) if len(webAuthUser) > 0 { user, err := store.GetUserByUsername(ctx.Req.Context(), webAuthUser) if err != nil { if !database.IsErrUserNotExist(err) { log.Error("Failed to get user by name: %v", err) return nil, false, false } // Check if enabled auto-registration. if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAutoRegistration { // Creates new user with forged username! user, err = store.CreateUser( ctx.Req.Context(), webAuthUser, gouuid.NewV4().String()+"@localhost", database.CreateUserOptions{ Activated: true, }, ) if err != nil { log.Error("Failed to create user %q: %v", webAuthUser, err) return nil, false, false } } } // Returns user as authenticated without any verification! return user, false, false } } // ... fallback to basic auth ... } // ... } ``` The code has **zero validation** that: 1. The request came through a reverse proxy 2. The header was set by the proxy (not the client) 3. Gogs is actually behind a reverse proxy 4. The direct access to Gogs is restricted The vulnerability occurs when: - Gogs is publicly accessible (e.g., `0.0.0.0:3000`) - `ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = true` ## Proof of Concept ### Prerequisites Gogs instance with the following configuration in `custom/conf/app.ini`: ```ini [auth] ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = true ``` An attacker can impersonate any user including administrators: ```bash # Become admin instantly curl http://gogs.example.com/ -H "X-WEBAUTH-USER: <username>" ``` <img width="1835" height="1143" alt="impersonation_example" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bae60772-5eb3-4f54-9fe0-5db01595bd56" /> ## Recommended Fixes Add validation to ensure headers come from trusted sources: ```go func authenticatedUser(store AuthStore, ctx *macaron.Context, sess session.Store) (_ *database.User, isBasicAuth, isTokenAuth bool) { // ... existing code ... if uid <= 0 { if conf.Auth.EnableReverseProxyAuthentication { // Validate request is from trusted proxy if !isRequestFromTrustedProxy(ctx.Req) { log.Warn("Reverse proxy auth header received from untrusted source: %s", ctx.RemoteAddr()) return nil, false, false } webAuthUser := ctx.Req.Header.Get(conf.Auth.ReverseProxyAuthenticationHeader) // ... rest of the code ... } } // ... } // New validation function func isRequestFromTrustedProxy(req *http.Request) bool { // Check if request is from localhost/trusted IPs remoteIP := getRemoteIP(req) // Only accept from localhost by default if remoteIP.IsLoopback() { return true } // Check against configured trusted proxy IPs for _, trustedIP := range conf.Auth.TrustedProxyIPs { if remoteIP.String() == trustedIP { return true } } return false } ``` Add configuration option: ```ini [auth] ENABLE_REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION = false REVERSE_PROXY_AUTHENTICATION_HEADER = X-WEBAUTH-USER ; Comma-separated list of trusted proxy IPs (default: 127.0.0.1) TRUSTED_PROXY_IPS = 127.0.0.1,::1 ; Whether to require trusted proxy validation (recommended: true) REQUIRE_TRUSTED_PROXY = true ``` ## References - [CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/290.html) - [OWASP: Authentication Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.html) - [OWASP Top 10 2021 - A07: Identification and Authentication Failures](https://owasp.org/Top10/A07_2021-Identification_and_Authentication_Failures/)
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| gogs.io/gogsgo | <=0.14.2 | 0.14.3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard