## Summary The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the `load_from_url_async` method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client. ## Affected Component - **File**: `vllm/connections.py` - **Function**: `load_from_url_async` ## Vulnerability Details ### Root Cause The SSRF [fix](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/32746) uses `urllib3.util.parse_url()` to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, `load_from_url_async` uses `aiohttp` for making the actual HTTP requests, and `aiohttp` internally uses the `yarl` library for URL parsing. These two URL parsers handle backslash characters (`\`) differently: | Parser | Input URL | Parsed Host | Parsed Path | Behavior | |--------|-----------|-------------|-------------|----------| | `urllib3.parse_url()` | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `httpbin.org` | `/%[email protected]/` | URL-encodes `\` as `%5C`, treats `\@evil.com/` as part of the path | | `yarl` (via aiohttp) | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `evil.com` | `/` | Treats `\` as part of userinfo (`user: httpbin.org\`), the `@` acts as the userinfo/host separator | ### Attack Scenario ```python # Attacker provides this URL malicious_url = "https://httpbin.org\\@evil.com/" # 1. Validation layer (urllib3.parse_url) parsed = urllib3.util.parse_url(malicious_url) # parsed.host == "httpbin.org" ✅ Passes validation # 2. Actual request (aiohttp with yarl) async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session: async with session.get(malicious_url) as response: # Request actually goes to evil.com! ❌ Bypass! ``` ### Why This Happens 1. **yarl**: Interprets `httpbin.org\` as the userinfo component, and `@` as the userinfo/host separator, so the URL is parsed as `user=httpbin.org\`, `host=evil.com`, `path=/` 2. **urllib3**: URL-encodes the backslash as `%5C`, so `\@evil.com/` becomes `/%[email protected]/` which is treated as part of the path, leaving `host=httpbin.org` This inconsistency allows an attacker to: - Bypass the hostname allowlist check - Access arbitrary internal/external services - Perform full SSRF attacks ## Fixes - https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/34743
## Summary The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the `load_from_url_async` method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client. ## Affected Component - **File**: `vllm/connections.py` - **Function**: `load_from_url_async` ## Vulnerability Details ### Root Cause The SSRF [fix](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/32746) uses `urllib3.util.parse_url()` to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, `load_from_url_async` uses `aiohttp` for making the actual HTTP requests, and `aiohttp` internally uses the `yarl` library for URL parsing. These two URL parsers handle backslash characters (`\`) differently: | Parser | Input URL | Parsed Host | Parsed Path | Behavior | |--------|-----------|-------------|-------------|----------| | `urllib3.parse_url()` | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `httpbin.org` | `/%[email protected]/` | URL-encodes `\` as `%5C`, treats `\@evil.com/` as part of the path | | `yarl` (via aiohttp) | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `evil.com` | `/` | Treats `\` as part of userinfo (`user: httpbin.org\`), the `@` acts as the userinfo/host separator | ### Attack Scenario ```python # Attacker provides this URL malicious_url = "https://httpbin.org\\@evil.com/" # 1. Validation layer (urllib3.parse_url) parsed = urllib3.util.parse_url(malicious_url) # parsed.host == "httpbin.org" ✅ Passes validation # 2. Actual request (aiohttp with yarl) async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session: async with session.get(malicious_url) as response: # Request actually goes to evil.com! ❌ Bypass! ``` ### Why This Happens 1. **yarl**: Interprets `httpbin.org\` as the userinfo component, and `@` as the userinfo/host separator, so the URL is parsed as `user=httpbin.org\`, `host=evil.com`, `path=/` 2. **urllib3**: URL-encodes the backslash as `%5C`, so `\@evil.com/` becomes `/%[email protected]/` which is treated as part of the path, leaving `host=httpbin.org` This inconsistency allows an attacker to: - Bypass the hostname allowlist check - Access arbitrary internal/external services - Perform full SSRF attacks ## Fixes - https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/34743
Update vllm to 0.17.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanvLLM has SSRF Protection Bypass affects vllm (pip). Severity is high. ## Summary The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the `load_from_url_async` method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client. ## Affected Component - **File**: `vllm/connections.py` - **Function**: `load_from_url_async` ## Vulnerability Details ### Root Cause The SSRF [fix](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/32746) uses `urllib3.util.parse_url()` to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, `load_from_url_async` uses `aiohttp` for making the actual HTTP requests, and `aiohttp` internally uses the `yarl` library for URL parsing. These two URL parsers handle backslash characters (`\`) differently: | Parser | Input URL | Parsed Host | Parsed Path | Behavior | |--------|-----------|-------------|-------------|----------| | `urllib3.parse_url()` | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `httpbin.org` | `/%[email protected]/` | URL-encodes `\` as `%5C`, treats `\@evil.com/` as part of the path | | `yarl` (via aiohttp) | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `evil.com` | `/` | Treats `\` as part of userinfo (`user: httpbin.org\`), the `@` acts as the userinfo/host separator | ### Attack Scenario ```python # Attacker provides this URL malicious_url = "https://httpbin.org\\@evil.com/" # 1. Validation layer (urllib3.parse_url) parsed = urllib3.util.parse_url(malicious_url) # parsed.host == "httpbin.org" ✅ Passes validation # 2. Actual request (aiohttp with yarl) async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session: async with session.get(malicious_url) as response: # Request actually goes to evil.com! ❌ Bypass! ``` ### Why This Happens 1. **yarl**: Interprets `httpbin.org\` as the userinfo component, and `@` as the userinfo/host separator, so the URL is parsed as `user=httpbin.org\`, `host=evil.com`, `path=/` 2. **urllib3**: URL-encodes the backslash as `%5C`, so `\@evil.com/` becomes `/%[email protected]/` which is treated as part of the path, leaving `host=httpbin.org` This inconsistency allows an attacker to: - Bypass the hostname allowlist check - Access arbitrary internal/external services - Perform full SSRF attacks ## Fixes - https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/34743
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| vllmpip | >=0.15.1,<0.17.0 | 0.17.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate vllm to 0.17.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanvLLM has SSRF Protection Bypass affects vllm (pip). Severity is high. ## Summary The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the `load_from_url_async` method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client. ## Affected Component - **File**: `vllm/connections.py` - **Function**: `load_from_url_async` ## Vulnerability Details ### Root Cause The SSRF [fix](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/32746) uses `urllib3.util.parse_url()` to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, `load_from_url_async` uses `aiohttp` for making the actual HTTP requests, and `aiohttp` internally uses the `yarl` library for URL parsing. These two URL parsers handle backslash characters (`\`) differently: | Parser | Input URL | Parsed Host | Parsed Path | Behavior | |--------|-----------|-------------|-------------|----------| | `urllib3.parse_url()` | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `httpbin.org` | `/%[email protected]/` | URL-encodes `\` as `%5C`, treats `\@evil.com/` as part of the path | | `yarl` (via aiohttp) | `https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/` | `evil.com` | `/` | Treats `\` as part of userinfo (`user: httpbin.org\`), the `@` acts as the userinfo/host separator | ### Attack Scenario ```python # Attacker provides this URL malicious_url = "https://httpbin.org\\@evil.com/" # 1. Validation layer (urllib3.parse_url) parsed = urllib3.util.parse_url(malicious_url) # parsed.host == "httpbin.org" ✅ Passes validation # 2. Actual request (aiohttp with yarl) async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session: async with session.get(malicious_url) as response: # Request actually goes to evil.com! ❌ Bypass! ``` ### Why This Happens 1. **yarl**: Interprets `httpbin.org\` as the userinfo component, and `@` as the userinfo/host separator, so the URL is parsed as `user=httpbin.org\`, `host=evil.com`, `path=/` 2. **urllib3**: URL-encodes the backslash as `%5C`, so `\@evil.com/` becomes `/%[email protected]/` which is treated as part of the path, leaving `host=httpbin.org` This inconsistency allows an attacker to: - Bypass the hostname allowlist check - Access arbitrary internal/external services - Perform full SSRF attacks ## Fixes - https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/34743
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| vllmpip | >=0.15.1,<0.17.0 | 0.17.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard