Answer in brief
CVE-2026-26007 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.5) vulnerability in cryptography Subgroup Attack Due to Missing Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps pyca/cryptography (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-26007 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.5) vulnerability in cryptography Subgroup Attack Due to Missing Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps pyca/cryptography (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 6.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps pyca/cryptography (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pyca/cryptographygeneric | < 46.0.5 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Feb 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Jul 27, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 1, 2026
cryptography is a package designed to expose cryptographic primitives and recipes to Python developers. Prior to 46.0.5, the public_key_from_numbers (or EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()), EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key(), load_der_public_key() and load_pem_public_key() functions do not verify that the point belongs to the expected prime-order subgroup of the curve. This missing validation allows an attacker to provide a public key point P from a small-order subgroup. This can lead to security issues in various situations, such as the most commonly used signature verification (ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the victim computes the shared secret as S = [victim_private_key]P via ECDH, this leaks information about victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order). For curves with cofactor > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of the private key. When these weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's easy to forge signatures on the small subgroup. Only SECT curves are impacted by this. This vulnerability is fixed in 46.0.5.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
CVSS is 6.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps pyca/cryptography (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pyca/cryptographygeneric | < 46.0.5 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Feb 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Jul 27, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 1, 2026
cryptography is a package designed to expose cryptographic primitives and recipes to Python developers. Prior to 46.0.5, the public_key_from_numbers (or EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()), EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key(), load_der_public_key() and load_pem_public_key() functions do not verify that the point belongs to the expected prime-order subgroup of the curve. This missing validation allows an attacker to provide a public key point P from a small-order subgroup. This can lead to security issues in various situations, such as the most commonly used signature verification (ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the victim computes the shared secret as S = [victim_private_key]P via ECDH, this leaks information about victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order). For curves with cofactor > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of the private key. When these weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's easy to forge signatures on the small subgroup. Only SECT curves are impacted by this. This vulnerability is fixed in 46.0.5.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.