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  4. CVE 2026 33027 nginx configuration directory vulnerable to
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Back to active CVEs
Unknown severity · Source severity not reportedCVE-2026-33027GHSA-M8P8-53VF-8357

Nginx Configuration Directory Vulnerable to Recursive Deletion via Improper Path ValidationCVE-2026-33027

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-33027 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Nginx Configuration Directory Vulnerable to Recursive Deletion via Improper Path Validation. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Mar 30, 2026Updated Sep 10, 2026Source checked Oct 25, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 10, 2026Material review Sep 10, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Unknown severitySource severity not reported
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Not reported

Why this deserves its current priority

A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UIgo>=0Not reported

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Monitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Mar 30, 2026

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Sep 10, 2026

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Sep 10, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
Upstream source description

## Summary The nginx-ui configuration improperly handles URL-encoded traversal sequences. When specially crafted paths are supplied, the backend resolves them to the base Nginx configuration directory and executes the operation on the base directory (/etc/nginx). In particular, this allows an authenticated user to remove the entire `/etc/nginx` directory, resulting in a partial Denial of Service. ## Details The file deletion logic fails to correctly validate and normalize paths containing URL-encoded traversal sequences such as `..%252F`. When such input is processed, the internal path resolution logic attempts to clamp the path into the allowed configuration directory. Instead of rejecting the traversal attempt, the clamping mechanism resolves the path to the base Nginx configuration directory itself. Because the deletion handler invokes `os.RemoveAll`, which recursively removes directories, this results in the deletion of the entire `/etc/nginx` directory. This behavior creates a dangerous interaction between path normalization and deletion logic: - Traversal sequences are not rejected. - Double-encoding (`..%252F`) is used to bypass initial shallow filters. - The clamping mechanism resolves malicious paths to the base configuration directory. - The deletion handler recursively deletes the resolved path. As a result, an attacker can trigger deletion of the entire Nginx configuration directory instead of being blocked by path validation logic. ### Root Cause The vulnerability results from a combination of design flaws: - **Improper Path Canonicalization**: URL-encoded traversal sequences are not properly rejected. - **Unsafe Fallback Logic**: The `GetConfPath` clamping mechanism returns the base configuration directory when traversal is detected instead of rejecting the request. - **Unsafe Deletion Primitive**: The deletion handler invokes `os.RemoveAll`, which recursively deletes directories without additional safeguards. (delete.go) ``` // Delete the file or directory err = os.RemoveAll(fullPath) if err != nil { cosy.ErrHandler(c, err) return } ``` This interaction causes the deletion operation to target the most sensitive directory when a traversal attempt occurs. ### Environment - **Server OS**: Kali Linux 6.17.10-1kali1 (6.17.10+kali-amd64) - **Nginx UI Version**: nginx-ui v2.3.3 - **Deployment**: Docker / Default installation ## Proof of Concept ### Steps to Reproduce 1. Log into nginx-ui. 2. Go to Manage Configs and create a Folder named *..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252Ftest* <img width="1608" height="559" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/738d7d65-7e13-48fa-affc-d5509c43900f" /> 3. Observe that the backend resolves the path to /etc/nginx.. 4. Now lets create a file called *testing*. 5. Save it and rename it to *..%252F..%252F..%252F..%252Ftest* (It is not possible to create it directly with the payload name so we have to rename it) 6. Go back to manage configs and Click Delete to remove the file we just created. 7. Check that there is an error: <img width="1578" height="696" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/51a36310-0676-4fe5-b80c-e0199498efbf" /> 8. Reload the website and check that the /etc/nginx folder has been completely removed: <img width="1313" height="722" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0a9ddd1b-786b-4cf2-8abd-1dc6f3a77807" /> ## Impact An authenticated user capable of invoking the configuration deletion endpoint can trigger the recursive deletion of the entire Nginx configuration directory (`/etc/nginx`). This results in: - Immediate failure of the Nginx service due to missing configuration files. - Loss of all Nginx configuration managed by nginx-ui. - Denial of Service for all web services relying on the affected Nginx instance. As the deletion operation uses a recursive filesystem call, the entire configuration directory is removed, leaving the system unable to restart Nginx until the configuration is manually restored. A patched version is available at https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.4.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
OSV
Source checked
Oct 25, 2026
References
4 linked sources
Open source record