## Summary The storage service's file upload handler trusts the client-provided `Content-Type` header without performing server-side MIME type detection. This allows an attacker to upload files with an arbitrary MIME type, bypassing any MIME-type-based restrictions configured on storage buckets. ## Affected Component - **Service**: `services/storage` - **File**: `services/storage/controller/upload_files.go` - **Function**: `getMultipartFile` (lines 48-70) ## Root Cause In `getMultipartFile`, if the client provides a non-empty `Content-Type` header that isn't `application/octet-stream`, the function returns it as-is without performing content-based detection: ```go contentType := file.header.Header.Get("Content-Type") if contentType != "" && contentType != "application/octet-stream" { return fileContent, contentType, nil // skip detection entirely } // mimetype.DetectReader only reached if client sends no Content-Type // or sends application/octet-stream mt, err := mimetype.DetectReader(fileContent) ``` ## Impact **Incorrect MIME type in file metadata.** The MIME type stored in file metadata reflects what the client claims rather than what the file actually contains. Any system consuming this metadata (browsers, CDNs, applications) may handle the file incorrectly based on the spoofed type. ## Suggested Fix Always detect MIME type from file content using `mimetype.DetectReader`, ignoring the client-provided `Content-Type` header entirely.
## Summary The storage service's file upload handler trusts the client-provided `Content-Type` header without performing server-side MIME type detection. This allows an attacker to upload files with an arbitrary MIME type, bypassing any MIME-type-based restrictions configured on storage buckets. ## Affected Component - **Service**: `services/storage` - **File**: `services/storage/controller/upload_files.go` - **Function**: `getMultipartFile` (lines 48-70) ## Root Cause In `getMultipartFile`, if the client provides a non-empty `Content-Type` header that isn't `application/octet-stream`, the function returns it as-is without performing content-based detection: ```go contentType := file.header.Header.Get("Content-Type") if contentType != "" && contentType != "application/octet-stream" { return fileContent, contentType, nil // skip detection entirely } // mimetype.DetectReader only reached if client sends no Content-Type // or sends application/octet-stream mt, err := mimetype.DetectReader(fileContent) ``` ## Impact **Incorrect MIME type in file metadata.** The MIME type stored in file metadata reflects what the client claims rather than what the file actually contains. Any system consuming this metadata (browsers, CDNs, applications) may handle the file incorrectly based on the spoofed type. ## Suggested Fix Always detect MIME type from file content using `mimetype.DetectReader`, ignoring the client-provided `Content-Type` header entirely.
Update github.com/nhost/nhost to 0.0.0-20260318074820-c4bd53f042d7 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanNhost Storage Affected by MIME Type Spoofing via Trusted Client Content-Type Header in Storage Upload affects github.com/nhost/nhost (go). Severity is low. ## Summary The storage service's file upload handler trusts the client-provided `Content-Type` header without performing server-side MIME type detection. This allows an attacker to upload files with an arbitrary MIME type, bypassing any MIME-type-based restrictions configured on storage buckets. ## Affected Component - **Service**: `services/storage` - **File**: `services/storage/controller/upload_files.go` - **Function**: `getMultipartFile` (lines 48-70) ## Root Cause In `getMultipartFile`, if the client provides a non-empty `Content-Type` header that isn't `application/octet-stream`, the function returns it as-is without performing content-based detection: ```go contentType := file.header.Header.Get("Content-Type") if contentType != "" && contentType != "application/octet-stream" { return fileContent, contentType, nil // skip detection entirely } // mimetype.DetectReader only reached if client sends no Content-Type // or sends application/octet-stream mt, err := mimetype.DetectReader(fileContent) ``` ## Impact **Incorrect MIME type in file metadata.** The MIME type stored in file metadata reflects what the client claims rather than what the file actually contains. Any system consuming this metadata (browsers, CDNs, applications) may handle the file incorrectly based on the spoofed type. ## Suggested Fix Always detect MIME type from file content using `mimetype.DetectReader`, ignoring the client-provided `Content-Type` header entirely.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A low vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/nhost/nhostgo | <0.0.0-20260318074820-c4bd53f042d7 | 0.0.0-20260318074820-c4bd53f042d7 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/nhost/nhost to 0.0.0-20260318074820-c4bd53f042d7 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanNhost Storage Affected by MIME Type Spoofing via Trusted Client Content-Type Header in Storage Upload affects github.com/nhost/nhost (go). Severity is low. ## Summary The storage service's file upload handler trusts the client-provided `Content-Type` header without performing server-side MIME type detection. This allows an attacker to upload files with an arbitrary MIME type, bypassing any MIME-type-based restrictions configured on storage buckets. ## Affected Component - **Service**: `services/storage` - **File**: `services/storage/controller/upload_files.go` - **Function**: `getMultipartFile` (lines 48-70) ## Root Cause In `getMultipartFile`, if the client provides a non-empty `Content-Type` header that isn't `application/octet-stream`, the function returns it as-is without performing content-based detection: ```go contentType := file.header.Header.Get("Content-Type") if contentType != "" && contentType != "application/octet-stream" { return fileContent, contentType, nil // skip detection entirely } // mimetype.DetectReader only reached if client sends no Content-Type // or sends application/octet-stream mt, err := mimetype.DetectReader(fileContent) ``` ## Impact **Incorrect MIME type in file metadata.** The MIME type stored in file metadata reflects what the client claims rather than what the file actually contains. Any system consuming this metadata (browsers, CDNs, applications) may handle the file incorrectly based on the spoofed type. ## Suggested Fix Always detect MIME type from file content using `mimetype.DetectReader`, ignoring the client-provided `Content-Type` header entirely.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A low vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/nhost/nhostgo | <0.0.0-20260318074820-c4bd53f042d7 | 0.0.0-20260318074820-c4bd53f042d7 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard