Answer in brief
CVE-2026-34204 records a High severity (CVSS 7.1) vulnerability in MinIO is Vulnerable to SSE Metadata Injection via Replication Headers in github.com/minio/minio. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/minio/minio (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps github.com/minio/minio (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/minio/miniogo | >=0.0.0-20240328174456-468a9fae83e9 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Mar 27, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 8, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 8, 2026
## Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ A flaw in `extractMetadataFromMime()` allows any authenticated user with `s3:PutObject` permission to inject internal server-side encryption metadata into objects by sending crafted `X-Minio-Replication-*` headers on a normal PutObject request. The server unconditionally maps these headers to `X-Minio-Internal-*` encryption metadata without verifying that the request is a legitimate replication request. Objects written this way carry bogus encryption keys and become **permanently unreadable** through the S3 API. Any authenticated user or service with `s3:PutObject` permission on any bucket can make objects permanently unreadable by injecting fake SSE encryption metadata. The attacker sends a standard PutObject request with `X-Minio-Replication-Server-Side-Encryption-*` headers but **without** the `X-Minio-Source-Replication-Request` header that marks legitimate replication traffic. The server maps these headers to internal encryption metadata (`X-Minio-Internal-Server-Side-Encryption-Sealed-Key`, etc.), causing all subsequent GetObject and HeadObject calls to treat the object as encrypted with keys that do not exist. This is a targeted denial-of-service vulnerability. An attacker can selectively corrupt individual objects or entire buckets. The `ReplicateObjectAction` IAM permission is never checked because the request is a normal PutObject, not a replication request. **Affected component:** `cmd/handler-utils.go`, function `extractMetadataFromMime()`. ## Affected Versions All MinIO releases through the final release of the minio/minio open-source project. The vulnerability was introduced in commit `468a9fae83e965ecefa1c1fdc2fc57b84ece95b0` ("Enable replication of SSE-C objects", [PR #19107](https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/19107), 2024-03-28). The first affected release is `RELEASE.2024-03-30T09-41-56Z`. ## Patches **Fixed in**: MinIO AIStor RELEASE.2026-03-26T21-24-40Z ### Binary Downloads | Platform | Architecture | Download | | -------- | ------------ | -------- | | Linux | amd64 | [minio](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-amd64/minio) | | Linux | arm64 | [minio](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-arm64/minio) | | macOS | arm64 | [minio](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/darwin-arm64/minio) | | macOS | amd64 | [minio](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/darwin-amd64/minio) | | Windows | amd64 | [minio.exe](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/windows-amd64/minio.exe) | ### FIPS Binaries | Platform | Architecture | Download | | -------- | ------------ | -------- | | Linux | amd64 | [minio.fips](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-amd64/minio.fips) | | Linux | arm64 | [minio.fips](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-arm64/minio.fips) | ### Package Downloads | Format | Architecture | Download | | ------ | ------------ | -------- | | DEB | amd64 | [minio_20260326212440.0.0_amd64.deb](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-amd64/minio_20260326212440.0.0_amd64.deb) | | DEB | arm64 | [minio_20260326212440.0.0_arm64.deb](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-arm64/minio_20260326212440.0.0_arm64.deb) | | RPM | amd64 | [minio-20260326212440.0.0-1.x86_64.rpm](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-amd64/minio-20260326212440.0.0-1.x86_64.rpm) | | RPM | arm64 | [minio-20260326212440.0.0-1.aarch64.rpm](https://dl.min.io/aistor/minio/release/linux-arm64/minio-20260326212440.0.0-1.aarch64.rpm) | ### Container Images ```bash # Standard docker pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-03-26T21-24-40Z podman pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-03-26T21-24-40Z # FIPS docker pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-03-26T21-24-40Z.fips podman pull quay.io/minio/aistor/minio:RELEASE.2026-03-26T21-24-40Z.fips ``` ### Homebrew (macOS) ```bash brew install minio/aistor/minio ``` ## Workarounds [Users of the open-source `minio/minio` project should upgrade to MinIO AIStor `RELEASE.2026-03-26T21-24-40Z` or later.](https://docs.min.io/enterprise/aistor-object-store/upgrade-aistor-server/community-edition/) If upgrading is not immediately possible: - **Restrict replication headers at a reverse proxy / load balancer.** Drop or reject any request containing `X-Minio-Replication-Server-Side-Encryption-*` headers that does not also carry `X-Minio-Source-Replication-Request`. This blocks the injection path without modifying the server. - **Audit IAM policies.** Limit `s3:PutObject` grants to trusted principals. While this reduces the attack surface, it does not eliminate the vulnerability since any authorized user can exploit it. ## References - Introducing commit: [`468a9fae8`](https://github.com/minio/minio/commit/468a9fae83e965ecefa1c1fdc2fc57b84ece95b0) ([PR #19107](https://github.com/minio/minio/pull/19107)) - [MinIO AIStor](https://min.io/aistor)
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.