Answer in brief
CVE-2026-34219 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.9) vulnerability in libp2p-gossipsub: Remote crash via unchecked Instant overflow in heartbeat backoff expiry handling. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps libp2p-gossipsub (crates.io), libp2p-gossipsub (crates.io). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.9. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps libp2p-gossipsub (crates.io), libp2p-gossipsub (crates.io). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| libp2p-gossipsubcrates.io | >=0.0.0-0 <0.49.4 | 0.49.4 |
| libp2p-gossipsubcrates.io | >=0 <0.49.4 | 0.49.4 |
Published upstream
Mar 27, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 13, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 13, 2026
## Description ### Summary The Rust libp2p Gossipsub implementation contains a remotely reachable panic in `backoff` expiry handling. After a peer sends a crafted `PRUNE` control message with an attacker-controlled, near-maximum `backoff` value, the value is accepted and stored as an `Instant` near the representable upper bound. On a later heartbeat, the implementation performs unchecked `Instant + Duration` arithmetic (`backoff_time + slack`), which can overflow and panic with: `overflow when adding duration to instant` This issue is reachable from any Gossipsub peer over normal `TCP + Noise + mplex/yamux` connectivity and requires no further authentication beyond becoming a protocol peer. ### Attack Scenario An attacker that can establish a libp2p Gossipsub session with a target node can crash the target by sending crafted `PRUNE` control data: 1. Establish a standard libp2p session (`TCP + Noise`) and negotiate a stream multiplexer (`mplex`/`yamux`). 2. Open a Gossipsub stream and send an RPC containing `ControlPrune` with a very large `backoff` (chosen near boundary conditions, e.g. `~ i64::MAX - victim_uptime_seconds`; example observed: `9223372036854674580` for ~28h uptime). 3. The value is parsed from protobuf and passed through `Behaviour::handle_prune()` into mesh/backoff update logic. 4. Initial storage path uses checked addition (`Instant::now().checked_add(...)`), so the malicious near-max value is retained. 5. On the next heartbeat (typically within ~43–74s), expiry logic computes `backoff_time + slack` using unchecked addition, which overflows and panics. ### Impact Remote unauthenticated denial of service (critical). Any application exposing an affected `libp2p-gossipsub` listener can be crashed by a network-reachable peer that sends crafted `PRUNE` backoff values. The crash is triggered during heartbeat processing (not immediately at PRUNE parse time), and can be repeated by reconnecting and replaying the message. ### Differences from CVE-2026-33040 This advisory is related to CVE-2026-33040 but it is not the same defect. CVE-2026-33040 addressed overflow during backoff insertion by adding checked arithmetic when converting PRUNE backoff into an Instant. The issue in this advisory occurs at a different location and at a different time: a near-maximum backoff can still be stored successfully, and the crash happens later in the heartbeat path when slack is added to that stored Instant using unchecked arithmetic. This report covers a distinct secondary overflow path in heartbeat expiry handling that remained reachable after the original insertion-side hardening. This vulnerability was originally reported by the Security team of the Ethereum Foundation.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.