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Back to active CVEs
Medium · CVSS 5.3CVE-2026-34786GHSA-Q4QF-9J86-F5MH

Rack:: Static header_rules bypass via URL-encoded pathsCVE-2026-34786

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-34786 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in Rack:: Static header_rules bypass via URL-encoded paths. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps rack (rubygems), rack (rubygems), rack (rubygems). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Apr 2, 2026Updated Sep 10, 2026Source checked Oct 25, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 7, 2026Material review Sep 10, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Medium · CVSS 5.3
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
3 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 5.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps rack (rubygems), rack (rubygems), rack (rubygems). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
rackrubygems>=0 <2.2.232.2.23
rackrubygems>=3.0.0.beta1 <3.1.213.1.21
rackrubygems>=3.2.0 <3.2.63.2.6

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for rack, rack, rack.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update rack to 2.2.23; rack to 3.1.21; rack to 3.2.6 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Apr 2, 2026

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Sep 10, 2026

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Aug 7, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
Upstream source description

## Summary `Rack::Static#applicable_rules` evaluates several `header_rules` types against the raw URL-encoded `PATH_INFO`, while the underlying file-serving path is decoded before the file is served. As a result, a request for a URL-encoded variant of a static path can serve the same file without the headers that `header_rules` were intended to apply. In deployments that rely on `Rack::Static` to attach security-relevant response headers to static content, this can allow an attacker to bypass those headers by requesting an encoded form of the path. ## Details `Rack::Static#applicable_rules` matches rule types such as `:fonts`, `Array`, and `Regexp` directly against the incoming `PATH_INFO`. For example: ```ruby when :fonts /\.(?:ttf|otf|eot|woff2|woff|svg)\z/.match?(path) when Array /\.(#{rule.join('|')})\z/.match?(path) when Regexp rule.match?(path) ``` These checks operate on the raw request path. If the request contains encoded characters such as `%2E` in place of `.`, the rule may fail to match even though the file path is later decoded and served successfully by the static file server. For example, both of the following requests may resolve to the same file on disk: ```text /fonts/test.woff /fonts/test%2Ewoff ``` but only the unencoded form may receive the headers configured through `header_rules`. This creates a canonicalization mismatch between the path used for header policy decisions and the path ultimately used for file serving. ## Impact Applications that rely on `Rack::Static` `header_rules` to apply security-relevant headers to static files may be affected. In affected deployments, an attacker can request an encoded variant of a static file path and receive the same file without the intended headers. Depending on how `header_rules` are used, this may bypass protections such as clickjacking defenses, content restrictions, or other response policies applied to static content. The practical impact depends on the configured rules and the types of files being served. If `header_rules` are only used for non-security purposes such as caching, the issue may have limited security significance. ## Mitigation * Update to a patched version of Rack that applies `header_rules` to a decoded path consistently with static file resolution. * Do not rely solely on `Rack::Static` `header_rules` for security-critical headers where encoded path variants may reach the application. * Prefer setting security headers at the reverse proxy or web server layer so they apply consistently to both encoded and unencoded path forms. * Normalize or reject encoded path variants for static content at the edge, where feasible.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
OSV
Source checked
Oct 25, 2026
References
4 linked sources
Open source record