### Impact OctoPrint versions up to and including 1.11.7 as well as 2.0.0rc1 and 2.0.0rc2 are affected by a vulnerability that allows injection of arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into Suppressed Command notifications popups generated by the printer. An attacker who successfully convinces a victim to print a specially crafted file could exploit this issue to disrupt ongoing prints, extract information (including sensitive configuration settings, if the targeted user has the necessary permissions for that), or perform other actions on behalf of the targeted user within the OctoPrint instance. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in version 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3. ### Workaround OctoPrint administrators can mitigate the risk by disabling popups: - for Action Command notifications, set _OctoPrint Settings -> Serial Connection -> Behaviour -> Sanity Checking -> Display notifications for suppressed commands_ to _Never show notifications_ It is also strongly recommended to ensure that files being printed originate from trusted sources, and, whenever possible, are sliced with an application's own slicer. ### Credits This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by [Jacopo Tediosi](https://github.com/jacopotediosi). ### Timeline 2026-03-18: Report received 2026-04-01: Report verified 2026-04-01: Fix ready for 2.0.0 2026-06-22: Fix backported to 1.11.x 2026-06-23: Fix released with 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3
### Impact OctoPrint versions up to and including 1.11.7 as well as 2.0.0rc1 and 2.0.0rc2 are affected by a vulnerability that allows injection of arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into Suppressed Command notifications popups generated by the printer. An attacker who successfully convinces a victim to print a specially crafted file could exploit this issue to disrupt ongoing prints, extract information (including sensitive configuration settings, if the targeted user has the necessary permissions for that), or perform other actions on behalf of the targeted user within the OctoPrint instance. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in version 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3. ### Workaround OctoPrint administrators can mitigate the risk by disabling popups: - for Action Command notifications, set _OctoPrint Settings -> Serial Connection -> Behaviour -> Sanity Checking -> Display notifications for suppressed commands_ to _Never show notifications_ It is also strongly recommended to ensure that files being printed originate from trusted sources, and, whenever possible, are sliced with an application's own slicer. ### Credits This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by [Jacopo Tediosi](https://github.com/jacopotediosi). ### Timeline 2026-03-18: Report received 2026-04-01: Report verified 2026-04-01: Fix ready for 2.0.0 2026-06-22: Fix backported to 1.11.x 2026-06-23: Fix released with 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3
Update OctoPrint to 1.11.8; OctoPrint to 2.0.0rc3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanOctoPrint has XSS in its Suppressed Command Notifications affects OctoPrint (pip), OctoPrint (pip). Severity is medium. ### Impact OctoPrint versions up to and including 1.11.7 as well as 2.0.0rc1 and 2.0.0rc2 are affected by a vulnerability that allows injection of arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into Suppressed Command notifications popups generated by the printer. An attacker who successfully convinces a victim to print a specially crafted file could exploit this issue to disrupt ongoing prints, extract information (including sensitive configuration settings, if the targeted user has the necessary permissions for that), or perform other actions on behalf of the targeted user within the OctoPrint instance. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in version 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3. ### Workaround OctoPrint administrators can mitigate the risk by disabling popups: - for Action Command notifications, set _OctoPrint Settings -> Serial Connection -> Behaviour -> Sanity Checking -> Display notifications for suppressed commands_ to _Never show notifications_ It is also strongly recommended to ensure that files being printed originate from trusted sources, and, whenever possible, are sliced with an application's own slicer. ### Credits This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by [Jacopo Tediosi](https://github.com/jacopotediosi). ### Timeline 2026-03-18: Report received 2026-04-01: Report verified 2026-04-01: Fix ready for 2.0.0 2026-06-22: Fix backported to 1.11.x 2026-06-23: Fix released with 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| OctoPrintpip | <=1.11.7 | 1.11.8 |
| OctoPrintpip | >=2.0.0rc1,<=2.0.0rc2 | 2.0.0rc3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate OctoPrint to 1.11.8; OctoPrint to 2.0.0rc3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanOctoPrint has XSS in its Suppressed Command Notifications affects OctoPrint (pip), OctoPrint (pip). Severity is medium. ### Impact OctoPrint versions up to and including 1.11.7 as well as 2.0.0rc1 and 2.0.0rc2 are affected by a vulnerability that allows injection of arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into Suppressed Command notifications popups generated by the printer. An attacker who successfully convinces a victim to print a specially crafted file could exploit this issue to disrupt ongoing prints, extract information (including sensitive configuration settings, if the targeted user has the necessary permissions for that), or perform other actions on behalf of the targeted user within the OctoPrint instance. ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in version 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3. ### Workaround OctoPrint administrators can mitigate the risk by disabling popups: - for Action Command notifications, set _OctoPrint Settings -> Serial Connection -> Behaviour -> Sanity Checking -> Display notifications for suppressed commands_ to _Never show notifications_ It is also strongly recommended to ensure that files being printed originate from trusted sources, and, whenever possible, are sliced with an application's own slicer. ### Credits This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by [Jacopo Tediosi](https://github.com/jacopotediosi). ### Timeline 2026-03-18: Report received 2026-04-01: Report verified 2026-04-01: Fix ready for 2.0.0 2026-06-22: Fix backported to 1.11.x 2026-06-23: Fix released with 1.11.8 and 2.0.0rc3
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| OctoPrintpip | <=1.11.7 | 1.11.8 |
| OctoPrintpip | >=2.0.0rc1,<=2.0.0rc2 | 2.0.0rc3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard