Answer in brief
CVE-2026-35457 records a High severity (CVSS 8.2) vulnerability in libp2p-rendezvous: Unbounded rendezvous DISCOVER cookies enable remote memory exhaustion. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps libp2p-rendezvous (crates.io), libp2p-rendezvous (crates.io). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.2. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps libp2p-rendezvous (crates.io), libp2p-rendezvous (crates.io). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| libp2p-rendezvouscrates.io | >=0.0.0-0 <0.17.1 | 0.17.1 |
| libp2p-rendezvouscrates.io | >=0 <0.17.1 | 0.17.1 |
Published upstream
Apr 2, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 13, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 13, 2026
### Summary The rendezvous server stores pagination cookies without bounds. An unauthenticated peer can repeatedly issue `DISCOVER` requests and force unbounded memory growth. ### Details Pagination state is stored in: ```rs HashMap<Cookie, HashSet<RegistrationId>> ``` On `Message::Discover`: ``` remote peer → DISCOVER → handle_request → registrations.get(...) → new cookie generated → cookie inserted into Registrations::cookies ``` There is **no upper bound or eviction policy**, so repeated DISCOVER requests grow this map indefinitely. ### PoC A reproduction test and minimal harness will be provided in a private fork in a follow-up comment. ### Impact **Remote state amplification leading to memory exhaustion.** Properties: - etwork reachable - no authentication required - low attack complexity - protocol-compliant traffic Impacts rendezvous nodes exposed to untrusted peers. --- ### Possible Fixes 1. **Global cap + eviction** Bound cookie storage (`MAX_COOKIES_TRACKED`) with FIFO/expiry aware eviction. Tradeoff: attacker can churn cookies and evict legitimate pagination state. 2. **Stateless cookies** Encode pagination state in authenticated cookies instead of storing server-side state. Tradeoff: more complex implementation. 3. **Rate limiting / per-peer quotas** Limit cookie creation per peer. Tradeoff: requires peer tracking.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.