The Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types ([email protected], [email protected]) did not check the User Presence flag. Signatures generated without physical touch were accepted, allowing unattended use of a hardware security key. To restore the previous behavior, return a "no-touch-required" extension in Permissions.Extensions from PublicKeyCallback.
Update golang.org/x/crypto to 0.52.0; golang.org/x/crypto/ssh to 0.52.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scangolang.org/x/crypto/ssh: FIDO/U2F security key physical presence check can be bypassed affects golang.org/x/crypto (go), golang.org/x/crypto/ssh (go). Severity is critical. The Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types ([email protected], [email protected]) did not check the User Presence flag. Signatures generated without physical touch were accepted, allowing unattended use of a hardware security key. To restore the previous behavior, return a "no-touch-required" extension in Permissions.Extensions from PublicKeyCallback.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| golang.org/x/cryptogo | <0.52.0 |
The Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types ([email protected], [email protected]) did not check the User Presence flag. Signatures generated without physical touch were accepted, allowing unattended use of a hardware security key. To restore the previous behavior, return a "no-touch-required" extension in Permissions.Extensions from PublicKeyCallback.
Update golang.org/x/crypto to 0.52.0; golang.org/x/crypto/ssh to 0.52.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scangolang.org/x/crypto/ssh: FIDO/U2F security key physical presence check can be bypassed affects golang.org/x/crypto (go), golang.org/x/crypto/ssh (go). Severity is critical. The Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types ([email protected], [email protected]) did not check the User Presence flag. Signatures generated without physical touch were accepted, allowing unattended use of a hardware security key. To restore the previous behavior, return a "no-touch-required" extension in Permissions.Extensions from PublicKeyCallback.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| golang.org/x/cryptogo | <0.52.0 |
| 0.52.0 |
| golang.org/x/crypto/sshgo | <0.52.0 | 0.52.0 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard| 0.52.0 |
| golang.org/x/crypto/sshgo | <0.52.0 | 0.52.0 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard