### Impact A malicious network peer can crash any Nimiq full node by publishing a crafted Kademlia DHT record containing a `TaggedSigned<ValidatorRecord, KeyPair>` with a signature field whose byte length is not exactly 64. When the victim node's DHT verifier calls `TaggedSigned::verify`, execution reaches `Ed25519Signature::from_bytes(sig).unwrap()` in the `TaggedPublicKey` implementation for `Ed25519PublicKey`. The `from_bytes` call fails because `ed25519_zebra::Signature::try_from` rejects slices not 64 bytes, and the `unwrap()` panics. The BLS `TaggedPublicKey` implementation correctly returns `false` on error; only the Ed25519 implementation panics. ### Patches [The patch for this vulnerability](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3708) is formally released as part of [v1.4.0](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.4.0). ### Workarounds No known workarounds. ### Resources See [PR](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3708).
### Impact A malicious network peer can crash any Nimiq full node by publishing a crafted Kademlia DHT record containing a `TaggedSigned<ValidatorRecord, KeyPair>` with a signature field whose byte length is not exactly 64. When the victim node's DHT verifier calls `TaggedSigned::verify`, execution reaches `Ed25519Signature::from_bytes(sig).unwrap()` in the `TaggedPublicKey` implementation for `Ed25519PublicKey`. The `from_bytes` call fails because `ed25519_zebra::Signature::try_from` rejects slices not 64 bytes, and the `unwrap()` panics. The BLS `TaggedPublicKey` implementation correctly returns `false` on error; only the Ed25519 implementation panics. ### Patches [The patch for this vulnerability](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3708) is formally released as part of [v1.4.0](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.4.0). ### Workarounds No known workarounds. ### Resources See [PR](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3708).
### Impact A malicious network peer can crash any Nimiq full node by publishing a crafted Kademlia DHT record containing a `TaggedSigned<ValidatorRecord, KeyPair>` with a signature field whose byte length is not exactly 64. When the victim node's DHT verifier calls `TaggedSigned::verify`, execution reaches `Ed25519Signature::from_bytes(sig).unwrap()` in the `TaggedPublicKey` implementation for `Ed25519PublicKey`. The `from_bytes` call fails because `ed25519_zebra::Signature::try_from` rejects slices not 64 bytes, and the `unwrap()` panics. The BLS `TaggedPublicKey` implementation correctly returns `false` on error; only the Ed25519 implementation panics. ### Patches [The patch for this vulnerability](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3708) is formally released as part of [v1.4.0](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.4.0). ### Workarounds No known workarounds. ### Resources See [PR](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3708).
### Impact A malicious network peer can crash any Nimiq full node by publishing a crafted Kademlia DHT record containing a `TaggedSigned<ValidatorRecord, KeyPair>` with a signature field whose byte length is not exactly 64. When the victim node's DHT verifier calls `TaggedSigned::verify`, execution reaches `Ed25519Signature::from_bytes(sig).unwrap()` in the `TaggedPublicKey` implementation for `Ed25519PublicKey`. The `from_bytes` call fails because `ed25519_zebra::Signature::try_from` rejects slices not 64 bytes, and the `unwrap()` panics. The BLS `TaggedPublicKey` implementation correctly returns `false` on error; only the Ed25519 implementation panics. ### Patches [The patch for this vulnerability](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3708) is formally released as part of [v1.4.0](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.4.0). ### Workarounds No known workarounds. ### Resources See [PR](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3708).
Monitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scannimiq-keys: Unchecked Ed25519 signature length in TaggedPublicKey::verify causes remote node panic via DHT affects nimiq-keys (rust). Severity is high. ### Impact A malicious network peer can crash any Nimiq full node by publishing a crafted Kademlia DHT record containing a `TaggedSigned<ValidatorRecord, KeyPair>` with a signature field whose byte length is not exactly 64. When the victim node's DHT verifier calls `TaggedSigned::verify`, execution reaches `Ed25519Signature::from_bytes(sig).unwrap()` in the `TaggedPublicKey` implementation for `Ed25519PublicKey`. The `from_bytes` call fails because `ed25519_zebra::Signature::try_from` rejects slices not 64 bytes, and the `unwrap()` panics. The BLS `TaggedPublicKey` implementation correctly returns `false` on error; only the Ed25519 implementation panics. ### Patches [The patch for this vulnerability](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3708) is formally released as part of [v1.4.0](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.4.0). ### Workarounds No known workarounds. ### Resources See [PR](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3708).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in rust. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| nimiq-keysrust | <=0.2.0 | Not reported |
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardMonitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scannimiq-keys: Unchecked Ed25519 signature length in TaggedPublicKey::verify causes remote node panic via DHT affects nimiq-keys (rust). Severity is high. ### Impact A malicious network peer can crash any Nimiq full node by publishing a crafted Kademlia DHT record containing a `TaggedSigned<ValidatorRecord, KeyPair>` with a signature field whose byte length is not exactly 64. When the victim node's DHT verifier calls `TaggedSigned::verify`, execution reaches `Ed25519Signature::from_bytes(sig).unwrap()` in the `TaggedPublicKey` implementation for `Ed25519PublicKey`. The `from_bytes` call fails because `ed25519_zebra::Signature::try_from` rejects slices not 64 bytes, and the `unwrap()` panics. The BLS `TaggedPublicKey` implementation correctly returns `false` on error; only the Ed25519 implementation panics. ### Patches [The patch for this vulnerability](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3708) is formally released as part of [v1.4.0](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.4.0). ### Workarounds No known workarounds. ### Resources See [PR](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3708).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in rust. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| nimiq-keysrust | <=0.2.0 | Not reported |
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard