Answer in brief
CVE-2026-40258 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.1) vulnerability in gramps-webapi: Zip Slip Path Traversal in Media Archive Import. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps gramps-webapi (pip), gramps-webapi (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps gramps-webapi (pip), gramps-webapi (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| gramps-webapipip | >=1.6.0,<=3.11.0 | 3.11.1 |
| gramps-webapipypi | >=1.6.0 <3.11.1 | 3.11.1 |
Published upstream
Apr 10, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 27, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 27, 2026
## Summary A path traversal vulnerability (Zip Slip) exists in the media archive import feature. An authenticated user with owner-level privileges can craft a malicious ZIP file with directory-traversal filenames to write arbitrary files outside the intended temporary extraction directory on the server's local filesystem. ## Details When importing media archives as ZIP file, `MediaImporter._check_disk_space_and_extract()` in `gramps_webapi/api/media_importer.py` called `zipfile.extractall()` without validating ZIP entry names. Python's `zipfile` module does not sanitize entry names containing `../` sequences, allowing extraction to paths outside the target directory. Only users with **owner permission** can upload media ZIP archives, so the biggest risk is for multi-tree deployments, where tree owners are distinct from server administrators. For multi-tree deployments, the impact depends on deployment configuration. Assuming the standard docker-based deployment is used: - **SQLite family tree + local media**: An attacker can overwrite another tree's database file or media files, leading to cross-tree data corruption or replacement. - **Postgres family tree + S3 media**: No persistent tree data is stored on the local filesystem, so cross-tree impact is eliminated. The remaining risk is overwriting volume-mounted files such as the application config file. - **Postgres family tree + S3 media + environment-variable-only config**: No persistent files of value are present on the local filesystem. Impact is limited to writes to ephemeral container storage, which are lost on woker restart. ## Fix ZIP entry names are now validated against the resolved real path of the temporary directory before extraction. Any entry whose resolved path falls outside the temporary directory raises an error and aborts the import.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.