### Summary The GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a "Pwn Request" vulnerability. **Steps to Reproduce:** 1. Fork the target repository. 2. In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the `paths` condition (e.g., `src/dummy.php` or `composer.json`) to trigger the workflow. 3. Modify the `bin/console` file (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload: ```bash #!/bin/bash echo "=== PWNED ===" echo "whoami:" whoami ``` 4. Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the `5.0` or `next` branch of the base repository. 5. The `Static Tests` workflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for the `Validate YAML` (or any step executing `bin/console`). 6. You will see the output of `whoami` (typically `runner`), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner's context. <img width="490" height="87" alt="スクリーンショット 2026-04-14 11 14 56" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94276033-b989-46dc-b4a1-3dafa1603235" /> **Impact:** Because `pull_request_target` runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., `PIMCORE_SECRET`, `PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY`) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner's computing resources. **Recommended Mitigation:** Do not checkout untrusted PR code (`head.ref`) when using `pull_request_target` if the code will be built or executed. Consider adopting a separated architecture using the `workflow_run` event: 1. Use the `pull_request` event to safely run the build/tests in an unprivileged sandbox and upload artifacts. 2. Use the `workflow_run` event (which is privileged) to download the artifacts and perform actions requiring secrets.
### Summary The GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a "Pwn Request" vulnerability. **Steps to Reproduce:** 1. Fork the target repository. 2. In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the `paths` condition (e.g., `src/dummy.php` or `composer.json`) to trigger the workflow. 3. Modify the `bin/console` file (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload: ```bash #!/bin/bash echo "=== PWNED ===" echo "whoami:" whoami ``` 4. Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the `5.0` or `next` branch of the base repository. 5. The `Static Tests` workflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for the `Validate YAML` (or any step executing `bin/console`). 6. You will see the output of `whoami` (typically `runner`), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner's context. <img width="490" height="87" alt="スクリーンショット 2026-04-14 11 14 56" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94276033-b989-46dc-b4a1-3dafa1603235" /> **Impact:** Because `pull_request_target` runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., `PIMCORE_SECRET`, `PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY`) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner's computing resources. **Recommended Mitigation:** Do not checkout untrusted PR code (`head.ref`) when using `pull_request_target` if the code will be built or executed. Consider adopting a separated architecture using the `workflow_run` event: 1. Use the `pull_request` event to safely run the build/tests in an unprivileged sandbox and upload artifacts. 2. Use the `workflow_run` event (which is privileged) to download the artifacts and perform actions requiring secrets.
### Summary The GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a "Pwn Request" vulnerability. **Steps to Reproduce:** 1. Fork the target repository. 2. In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the `paths` condition (e.g., `src/dummy.php` or `composer.json`) to trigger the workflow. 3. Modify the `bin/console` file (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload: ```bash #!/bin/bash echo "=== PWNED ===" echo "whoami:" whoami ``` 4. Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the `5.0` or `next` branch of the base repository. 5. The `Static Tests` workflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for the `Validate YAML` (or any step executing `bin/console`). 6. You will see the output of `whoami` (typically `runner`), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner's context. <img width="490" height="87" alt="スクリーンショット 2026-04-14 11 14 56" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94276033-b989-46dc-b4a1-3dafa1603235" /> **Impact:** Because `pull_request_target` runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., `PIMCORE_SECRET`, `PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY`) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner's computing resources. **Recommended Mitigation:** Do not checkout untrusted PR code (`head.ref`) when using `pull_request_target` if the code will be built or executed. Consider adopting a separated architecture using the `workflow_run` event: 1. Use the `pull_request` event to safely run the build/tests in an unprivileged sandbox and upload artifacts. 2. Use the `workflow_run` event (which is privileged) to download the artifacts and perform actions requiring secrets.
### Summary The GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a "Pwn Request" vulnerability. **Steps to Reproduce:** 1. Fork the target repository. 2. In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the `paths` condition (e.g., `src/dummy.php` or `composer.json`) to trigger the workflow. 3. Modify the `bin/console` file (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload: ```bash #!/bin/bash echo "=== PWNED ===" echo "whoami:" whoami ``` 4. Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the `5.0` or `next` branch of the base repository. 5. The `Static Tests` workflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for the `Validate YAML` (or any step executing `bin/console`). 6. You will see the output of `whoami` (typically `runner`), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner's context. <img width="490" height="87" alt="スクリーンショット 2026-04-14 11 14 56" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94276033-b989-46dc-b4a1-3dafa1603235" /> **Impact:** Because `pull_request_target` runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., `PIMCORE_SECRET`, `PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY`) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner's computing resources. **Recommended Mitigation:** Do not checkout untrusted PR code (`head.ref`) when using `pull_request_target` if the code will be built or executed. Consider adopting a separated architecture using the `workflow_run` event: 1. Use the `pull_request` event to safely run the build/tests in an unprivileged sandbox and upload artifacts. 2. Use the `workflow_run` event (which is privileged) to download the artifacts and perform actions requiring secrets.
Monitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanCoreShop Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure `pull_request_target` Configuration affects coreshop/core-shop (composer). Severity is high. ### Summary The GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a "Pwn Request" vulnerability. **Steps to Reproduce:** 1. Fork the target repository. 2. In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the `paths` condition (e.g., `src/dummy.php` or `composer.json`) to trigger the workflow. 3. Modify the `bin/console` file (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload: ```bash #!/bin/bash echo "=== PWNED ===" echo "whoami:" whoami ``` 4. Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the `5.0` or `next` branch of the base repository. 5. The `Static Tests` workflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for the `Validate YAML` (or any step executing `bin/console`). 6. You will see the output of `whoami` (typically `runner`), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner's context. <img width="490" height="87" alt="スクリーンショット 2026-04-14 11 14 56" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94276033-b989-46dc-b4a1-3dafa1603235" /> **Impact:** Because `pull_request_target` runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., `PIMCORE_SECRET`, `PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY`) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner's computing resources. **Recommended Mitigation:** Do not checkout untrusted PR code (`head.ref`) when using `pull_request_target` if the code will be built or executed. Consider adopting a separated architecture using the `workflow_run` event: 1. Use the `pull_request` event to safely run the build/tests in an unprivileged sandbox and upload artifacts. 2. Use the `workflow_run` event (which is privileged) to download the artifacts and perform actions requiring secrets.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| coreshop/core-shopcomposer | =5.0.0 | Not reported |
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardMonitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanCoreShop Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure `pull_request_target` Configuration affects coreshop/core-shop (composer). Severity is high. ### Summary The GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a "Pwn Request" vulnerability. **Steps to Reproduce:** 1. Fork the target repository. 2. In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the `paths` condition (e.g., `src/dummy.php` or `composer.json`) to trigger the workflow. 3. Modify the `bin/console` file (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload: ```bash #!/bin/bash echo "=== PWNED ===" echo "whoami:" whoami ``` 4. Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the `5.0` or `next` branch of the base repository. 5. The `Static Tests` workflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for the `Validate YAML` (or any step executing `bin/console`). 6. You will see the output of `whoami` (typically `runner`), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner's context. <img width="490" height="87" alt="スクリーンショット 2026-04-14 11 14 56" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94276033-b989-46dc-b4a1-3dafa1603235" /> **Impact:** Because `pull_request_target` runs in the context of the base repository, the runner has access to repository secrets (e.g., `PIMCORE_SECRET`, `PIMCORE_PRODUCT_KEY`) loaded in the environment. An attacker can exfiltrate these secrets, modify repository contents (if the token has write permissions), or abuse the runner's computing resources. **Recommended Mitigation:** Do not checkout untrusted PR code (`head.ref`) when using `pull_request_target` if the code will be built or executed. Consider adopting a separated architecture using the `workflow_run` event: 1. Use the `pull_request` event to safely run the build/tests in an unprivileged sandbox and upload artifacts. 2. Use the `workflow_run` event (which is privileged) to download the artifacts and perform actions requiring secrets.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| coreshop/core-shopcomposer | =5.0.0 | Not reported |
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard