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  4. CVE 2026 41508 coraza truncated multipart body bypasses
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Back to active CVEs
Medium · CVSS 5.8CVE-2026-41508GHSA-R3RM-QPHW-HH76

Coraza: Truncated multipart body bypasses MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR (rule 200003) via silent io.ErrUnexpectedEOF handlingCVE-2026-41508

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-41508 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.8) vulnerability in Coraza: Truncated multipart body bypasses MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR (rule 200003) via silent io.ErrUnexpectedEOF handling. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Oct 6, 2026Updated Oct 6, 2026Source checked Oct 7, 2026First seen by HOL Oct 6, 2026Material review Oct 6, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Medium · CVSS 5.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 5.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3go>=3.4.0,<=3.7.03.8.0

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3 to 3.8.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Oct 6, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 6, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Oct 6, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
Upstream source description

## Root Cause File: `internal/bodyprocessors/multipart.go` (since commit `3347961b`, PR #1453 *"feat: ignore unexpected EOF in MIME multipart request body processor"*, merged 2026-03-06, first shipped in `v3.4.0`). The multipart body processor treats `io.ErrUnexpectedEOF` as a benign condition. Three sites are affected; all mishandle the error the same way. ### File branch, filesystem-backed (lines 71–77) ```go sz, err := io.Copy(temp, p) if err != nil { if !errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) { v.MultipartStrictError().(*collections.Single).Set("1") return err } seenUnexpectedEOF = true // <-- flag never set for UnexpectedEOF } ``` ### File branch, TinyGo path (lines 82–88) ```go sz, err := io.Copy(io.Discard, p) if err != nil { if !errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) { v.MultipartStrictError().(*collections.Single).Set("1") return err } seenUnexpectedEOF = true // <-- same gap } ``` ### Field branch (lines 102–113) ```go data, err := io.ReadAll(p) if err != nil { if !errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) { v.MultipartStrictError().(*collections.Single).Set("1") return err } } ... if errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) { break // <-- exits loop with no flag set } ``` The function then returns `nil` at line 116 for any body that ended prematurely. Consequences: 1. `MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR` stays at its initial value `0`. 2. `REQBODY_ERROR` is not propagated either (since `ProcessRequest` returns `nil`). 3. Neither of the two canonical defensive rules shipped in `coraza.conf-recommended` fires: ```conf SecRule REQBODY_ERROR "!@eq 0" "id:200002,phase:2,deny,status:400,..." SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" "id:200003,phase:2,deny,status:400,..." ``` All other error branches in the same function (lines 27, 48, 66, 84, 104) correctly set `MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR` before returning; this is an inconsistency introduced in #1453, not a systemic issue. ## Context — why the error is swallowed PR #1453 was introduced to support `SecRequestBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial`: when a body is cut off because it hit the configured request-body limit, the parser should still surface the parts it did receive. The PR legitimately needs to avoid `return err` on `ErrUnexpectedEOF`. But it also silenced the strict-error flag, which is the wrong compromise — the flag is exactly how operators observe that something was incomplete. The fix should keep the non-fatal `break` and still set `MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR`, letting the operator decide (via rule 200003 or their own policy) whether partial processing is acceptable. ## Impact Rule 200003 is Coraza's blanket defense against **multipart parser-inconsistency evasions** — attack classes where the body is crafted so Coraza's Go `mime/multipart` reader and the backend's multipart parser (PHP, Node, Java, legacy libmodsecurity, etc.) disagree about where fields start or end. The rule fails-closed on *any* malformed body, so the operator does not need to enumerate every parser-disagreement trick. That defense is now void for any evasion that also truncates the body. Examples of what becomes reachable: - Smuggling a second field past the truncation boundary that the backend's more permissive parser still extracts. - Hiding payload bytes after a deliberately malformed `Content-Disposition` header that the Go parser refuses but the backend accepts. - Generic CRS evasion chains that depend on rule 200003 as a catch-all. The fix is tiny and low-risk. The impact is disproportionately large because rule 200003 is the *only* defense-in-depth rule for multipart in the recommended config — there is no secondary signal. ## Proof of Concept Start a Coraza-wrapped HTTP server shipping the canonical defensive rules from `coraza.conf-recommended`: ```conf SecRuleEngine On SecRequestBodyAccess On SecRule REQBODY_ERROR "!@eq 0" \ "id:200002,phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400,msg:'Failed to parse request body.'" SecRule MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR "!@eq 0" \ "id:200003,phase:2,t:none,log,deny,status:400,msg:'Multipart strict validation failed.'" ``` Three real-curl requests against the listener: | # | Body | Expected (with rule 200003) | Observed | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | Well-formed `field1=benign` + closing boundary | HTTP 200 | HTTP 200 (baseline) | | 2 | Two parts, **no closing boundary** (`...MALFORMED_NO_TRAILING_BOUNDARY`) | HTTP 400 | **HTTP 200** | | 3 | Mid-part cutoff: `name="x"\r\n\r\nabc` (no `\r\n`, no boundary) | HTTP 400 | **HTTP 200** | Server-side match log is empty for cases 2 and 3: neither rule 200002 nor rule 200003 fires. Example (case 2): ``` --PoCBoundary12345\r\n Content-Disposition: form-data; name="field1"\r\n\r\n benign\r\n --PoCBoundary12345\r\n Content-Disposition: form-data; name="truncated"\r\n\r\n MALFORMED_NO_TRAILING_BOUNDARY ``` → `HTTP 200`, no audit record, transaction.variables.multipartStrictError == 0. ## Mitigation A two-line change per site in `internal/bodyprocessors/multipart.go`: ```go if errors.Is(err, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF) { v.MultipartStrictError().(*collections.Single).Set("1") seenUnexpectedEOF = true // keep existing break semantics } ``` Apply at the three sites (lines 71–77, 82–88, 102–113 in the current code). No change to the `return err` control flow is needed — the fix only adds the flag-setter alongside the existing `seenUnexpectedEOF = true` / `break` path. PR #1453's ProcessPartial goal is preserved. Operators running in `ProcessPartial` mode who intentionally allow truncated bodies should pair this with a config-level change (downgrade rule 200003 to detection-only, or scope it with a secondary check on whether `SecRequestBodyLimit` was actually hit). The engine change above is safe by default — it restores the invariant that malformed multipart always raises `MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR`. ## Affected versions Introduced in PR #1453 (commit `3347961b`, merged 2026-03-06). First released in `v3.4.0` and still present on `main` at `599ae64a`. Affected: `>= 3.4.0, <= 3.7.0`. Releases prior to `v3.4.0` returned `err` on `io.ErrUnexpectedEOF` and so `REQBODY_ERROR` would propagate via rule 200002 even if `MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR` was not set — a different (arguably stricter) behavior that did not exhibit this bypass. ## References - `internal/bodyprocessors/multipart.go` lines 70–113 - `coraza.conf-recommended` rule `id:200003` (`MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR`) - PR #1453 — introduction of `ErrUnexpectedEOF` swallowing - `coraza.conf-recommended` rule `id:200002` (`REQBODY_ERROR`) — also not raised because `ProcessRequest` returns `nil`

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Related CVEs

  • Langflow OSS is affected by multiple vulnerabilitiesAlso CWE-693
  • Langflow OSS is affected by multiple vulnerabilitiesAlso CWE-693

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-20, CWE-693, CWE-755
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Oct 7, 2026
References
4 linked sources
Open source record