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  4. CVE 2026 41583 zebra vulnerable to consensus divergence in
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Back to active CVEs
Critical · CVSS 9.1CVE-2026-41583GHSA-8M29-FPQ5-89JJ

Zebra Vulnerable to Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type HandlingCVE-2026-41583

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-41583 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.1) vulnerability in Zebra Vulnerable to Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps zebrad (rust), zebra-script (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Apr 18, 2026Updated Nov 17, 2026Source checked Nov 17, 2026First seen by HOL Oct 28, 2026Material review Nov 17, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Critical · CVSS 9.1
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
4 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 9.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps zebrad (rust), zebra-script (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Affected products and reported versions
ProductAffected versionsFixed versions
cpe:2.3:a:zfnd:zebrad:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*Not reportedNot reported
cpe:2.3:a:zfnd:zebra-script:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*Not reportedNot reported
Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
zebradrust<4.3.14.3.1
zebra-scriptrust<5.0.25.0.2

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for zebrad, zebra-script.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update zebrad to 4.3.1; zebra-script to 5.0.2 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Apr 18, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Nov 17, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Oct 28, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
Upstream source description

# CVE-2026-41583: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling ## Summary After a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. ## Severity **Critical** - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes. Note that the impact is currently alleviated by the fact that currently most miners run `zcashd`. ## Affected Versions All Zebra versions prior to version 4.3.1. (Some older versions are not impacted but are no longer supported by the network.) ## Description Verification of transparent transactions inherits the Bitcoin Script verification code in C++. Since it is consensus-critical, this code was called from Zebra through foreign function interface (FFI). That interface was clunky because it required parsing the whole transaction in C++ code, which would then pull Rust libraries which could get in conflict with Zebra code. A refactoring was done so that only the verification itself was done in C++, and the rest done by Rust code, using a callback. However, in this refactoring, it was not noticed that a particular consensus rule - only accepting known hash types in transparent transaction signatures - was being enforced in C++ code and thus had to be enforced by the Rust caller. An attacker could exploit this by: - Submitting a V4 or V5 transaction with an invalid hash type - The V5 transaction would be accepted by Zebra nodes but not by `zcashd` nodes (and vice-versa for V4), creating a consensus split in the network. ## Impact **Consensus Failure** - **Attack Vector:** Network. - **Effect:** Network partition/consensus split. - **Scope:** Any Zebra affected Zebra node ## Fixed Versions This issue is fixed in Zebra 4.3.1. The fix adds the consensus check in the caller of the C++ verification code. It also uses the raw hash type for V4 sighash computations. ## Mitigation Users should upgrade to Zebra 4.3.1 or later immediately. There are no known workarounds for this issue. Immediate upgrade is the only way to ensure the node remains on the correct consensus path and is protected against malicious chain forks. ## Credits Thanks Alex “Scalar” Sol for finding and reporting the issue, and to @sangsoo-osec who independently found the same issue and demonstrated that the V4 variant was also exploitable.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-573
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Nov 17, 2026
References
4 linked sources
Open source record