Answer in brief
CVE-2026-41584 records a Critical severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in Zebra has rk Identity Point Panic in Transaction Verification. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps zebra-chain (rust), zebrad (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps zebra-chain (rust), zebrad (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| zebra-chainrust | <6.0.2 | 6.0.2 |
| zebradrust | <4.3.1 | 4.3.1 |
Published upstream
Apr 18, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 17, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 17, 2026
# rk Identity Point Panic in Transaction Verification ## Summary Orchard transactions contain a `rk` field which is a randomized validating key and also an elliptic curve point. The Zcash specification allows the field to be the identity (a "zero" value), however, the `orchard` crate which is used to verify Orchard proofs would panic when fed a `rk` with the identity value. Thus an attacker could send a crafted transaction that would make a Zebra node crash. ## Severity **Critical** - This is a Denial of Service Vulnerability that could allow an attacker to crash Zebra nodes. ## Affected Versions All Zebra versions prior to **version 4.3.1**. ## Description The vulnerability exists in the `circuits.rs` file of the `orchard` crate; it attempts to get the coordinates of the `rk` value and calls `unwrap()` on the results, which causes a panic if `rk` is the identity. Zebra parses `rk` as a byte vector; it creates an Orchard "bundle" using the `orchard` crate and then calls the same crate to verify it, triggering the panic. An attacker could exploit this by: 1. Creating a transaction with a identity `rk` 2. Submitting it to a Zebra node, making it crash ## Impact **Denial of Service** * **Attack Vector:** Network. * **Effect:** Node crash. * **Scope:** Any impacted Zebra node. ## Fixed Versions This issue is fixed in **Zebra 4.3.1**. The fix was agreed with `zcashd` developers (which has the same issue) to not allow the identity `rk` anymore and change the specification as such. Zebra now does this when parsing a transaction. This was deemed easier than fixing the issue in `orchard`, which would make the bug public before the nodes could be patched. ## Mitigation Users should upgrade to **Zebra 4.3.1** or later immediately. There are no known workarounds for this issue. Immediate upgrade is the only way to ensure the node remains not vulnerable to denial of service. ## Credits Thanks to Alex “Scalar” Sol for finding and reporting the issue.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.