Answer in brief
CVE-2026-42048 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.6) vulnerability in Langflow Knowledge Bases API is Vulnerable to Path Traversal. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps langflow (pip), langflow (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.6. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps langflow (pip), langflow (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:a:langflow:langflow:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| langflowpip | <=1.8.4 | 1.9.0 |
| langflowpypi | >=0 <1.9.0 | 1.9.0 |
Published upstream
May 5, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 16, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 11, 2026
## Summary Langflow is vulnerable to Path Traversal in the Knowledge Bases API (`DELETE /api/v1/knowledge_bases`). This occurs because user-supplied knowledge base names are concatenated directly into file paths without proper sanitization or boundary validation. An authenticated attacker can exploit this flaw to delete arbitrary directories anywhere on the server's filesystem, leading to data loss and potential service disruption. ## Details The vulnerability exists in the `delete_knowledge_bases_bulk` function within `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/knowledge_bases.py`. This function constructs file paths directly from the user-supplied `kb_names` parameter. While other knowledge base endpoints safely route through standard path resolution (e.g., `_resolve_kb_path()`), the bulk delete handler bypasses this entirely. It builds the path manually and passes it directly to `shutil.rmtree()` without validating if the resulting path resolves outside the intended user directory. ## PoC (Proof of Concept) For the **Bulk Delete** endpoint, an authenticated attacker can supply a traversal sequence in the `kb_names` parameter: `../victim_user/kb_name` Because the path is passed directly to `shutil.rmtree()` without containment checks, this payload deletes directories outside the intended scope. ## Impact Any Langflow instance exposing this endpoint to authenticated users is vulnerable. This exposes the server to: * **Cross-user data compromise:** Deletion of directories within another tenant's knowledge base space. * **Arbitrary filesystem manipulation:** Directory deletion at any path on the server where the application has write permissions. * **Service disruption & Data Loss:** Deletion of critical application files or unrecoverable data loss if backups are co-located on the same filesystem. ## Fixes The issue was addressed in **PR #12243**, which applies `Path.resolve()` to normalize the supplied path and validates that it starts with the authenticated user's directory before deletion. Subsequent updates (backported from PR #12337) introduced robust containment checks using `Path.is_relative_to()` to prevent prefix-ambiguity bugs. ## Acknowledgements Thanks to the security researchers who responsibly disclosed this vulnerability: * @ddlxstudio * @nekros1xx
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.