The mc_issue_update() function in MantisBT allows users having *update_bug_threshold* access (UPDATER, with default settings) to edit, change view state, and modify time tracking on bugnotes belonging to other users — bypassing the default DEVELOPER (level 55) threshold required by the dedicated mc_issue_note_update() function. ### Impact 1. UPDATER can edit notes by DEVELOPER/MANAGER/ADMIN — bypassing the DEVELOPER threshold 2. UPDATER can change private notes to public — exposing confidential internal discussion 3. UPDATER can change public notes to private — hiding information from reporters/viewers ### Patches - 6e58fae4f22efdc3987f903c8ba2611de17a9435 ### Workarounds None ### Credits Thanks to the following security researchers for independently discovering and responsibly reporting the issue. - Vishal Shukla - Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from Talence Security This advisory's contents was largely copied from Tristan's well-written report.
Update mantisbt/mantisbt to 2.28.2 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanMantisBT: Authorization Bypass in Bugnote Editing via Issue Update API affects mantisbt/mantisbt (composer). Severity is medium. The mc_issue_update() function in MantisBT allows users having *update_bug_threshold* access (UPDATER, with default settings) to edit, change view state, and modify time tracking on bugnotes belonging to other users — bypassing the default DEVELOPER (level 55) threshold required by the dedicated mc_issue_note_update() function. ### Impact 1. UPDATER can edit notes by DEVELOPER/MANAGER/ADMIN — bypassing the DEVELOPER threshold 2. UPDATER can change private notes to public — exposing confidential internal discussion 3. UPDATER can change public notes to private — hiding information from reporters/viewers ### Patches - 6e58fae4f22efdc3987f903c8ba2611de17a9435 ### Workarounds None ### Credits Thanks to the following security researchers for independently discovering and responsibly reporting the issue. - Vishal Shukla - Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from Talence Security This advisory's contents was largely copied from Tristan's well-written report.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
The mc_issue_update() function in MantisBT allows users having *update_bug_threshold* access (UPDATER, with default settings) to edit, change view state, and modify time tracking on bugnotes belonging to other users — bypassing the default DEVELOPER (level 55) threshold required by the dedicated mc_issue_note_update() function. ### Impact 1. UPDATER can edit notes by DEVELOPER/MANAGER/ADMIN — bypassing the DEVELOPER threshold 2. UPDATER can change private notes to public — exposing confidential internal discussion 3. UPDATER can change public notes to private — hiding information from reporters/viewers ### Patches - 6e58fae4f22efdc3987f903c8ba2611de17a9435 ### Workarounds None ### Credits Thanks to the following security researchers for independently discovering and responsibly reporting the issue. - Vishal Shukla - Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from Talence Security This advisory's contents was largely copied from Tristan's well-written report.
Update mantisbt/mantisbt to 2.28.2 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanMantisBT: Authorization Bypass in Bugnote Editing via Issue Update API affects mantisbt/mantisbt (composer). Severity is medium. The mc_issue_update() function in MantisBT allows users having *update_bug_threshold* access (UPDATER, with default settings) to edit, change view state, and modify time tracking on bugnotes belonging to other users — bypassing the default DEVELOPER (level 55) threshold required by the dedicated mc_issue_note_update() function. ### Impact 1. UPDATER can edit notes by DEVELOPER/MANAGER/ADMIN — bypassing the DEVELOPER threshold 2. UPDATER can change private notes to public — exposing confidential internal discussion 3. UPDATER can change public notes to private — hiding information from reporters/viewers ### Patches - 6e58fae4f22efdc3987f903c8ba2611de17a9435 ### Workarounds None ### Credits Thanks to the following security researchers for independently discovering and responsibly reporting the issue. - Vishal Shukla - Tristan Madani (@TristanInSec) from Talence Security This advisory's contents was largely copied from Tristan's well-written report.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|
| mantisbt/mantisbtcomposer | <=2.28.1 | 2.28.2 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|
| mantisbt/mantisbtcomposer | <=2.28.1 | 2.28.2 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard