Answer in brief
CVE-2026-42306 records a High severity (CVSS 7.2) vulnerability in Docker: Race condition in docker cp allows bind mount redirection to host path. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/docker/docker (go), github.com/docker/docker (go), github.com/moby/moby (go), github.com/moby/moby (go) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.2. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps github.com/docker/docker (go), github.com/docker/docker (go), github.com/moby/moby (go), github.com/moby/moby (go) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/docker/dockergo | <=28.5.2 | Not reported |
| github.com/docker/dockergo | >=0 | Not reported |
| github.com/moby/mobygo | <=28.5.2 | Not reported |
| github.com/moby/mobygo | >=0 | Not reported |
| github.com/moby/moby/v2go | <2.0.0-beta.14 | 2.0.0-beta.14 |
| github.com/moby/moby/v2go | >=0 <2.0.0-beta.14 | 2.0.0-beta.14 |
Published upstream
May 18, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 10, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 19, 2026
## Summary A race condition during `docker cp` mount setup allows a malicious container to redirect a bind mount target to an arbitrary host path, potentially overwriting host files or causing denial of service. ## Details When copying files into a container, the daemon sets up a temporary filesystem view by bind-mounting volumes into a private mount namespace. During this setup, the mount destination is created inside the container root and then a bind mount is attached using the container-relative path resolved to an absolute host path. Between mountpoint creation and the `mount()` syscall, a process running inside the container can replace the destination (or a parent path component) with a symlink pointing to an arbitrary location on the host. The `mount()` syscall follows the symlink, causing the volume to be bind-mounted onto an arbitrary host path instead of the intended container path. ## Impact A malicious container can redirect a volume bind mount to an arbitrary host path. The impact depends on the volume content and mount options: - If the volume is writable, arbitrary host files at the redirected path could be overwritten with the volume's contents. - If the volume is read-only, the host path is masked by the mount for the duration of the operation, causing denial of service. - In all cases the mount is temporary (torn down after the `docker cp` completes), but the effects of any writes persist. ### Conditions for exploitation - A container must have at least one volume mount. - A process inside the container must be able to rapidly create and swap symlinks at the volume mount destination path. - An operator must initiate a `docker cp` into that container, or call the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or `HEAD /containers/{id}/archive` API endpoints. ### Not affected - Containers that do not have volume mounts are not affected, as the race occurs during volume bind-mount setup. ## Workarounds - Only run containers from trusted images. - Avoid using `docker cp` with untrusted running containers. - Use authorization plugins to restrict access to the archive API endpoints (`PUT /containers/{id}/archive`, `HEAD /containers/{id}/archive`).
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.