Answer in brief
CVE-2026-42602 records a High severity (CVSS 8.1) vulnerability in Authenticate method auth bypass in github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/extension/azureauthextension. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/extension/azureauthextension (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/extension/azureauthextension (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:a:opentelemetry:opentelemetry_collector_contrib:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/extension/azureauthextensiongo | >=0.124.0 <0.151.0 | 0.151.0 |
Published upstream
May 13, 2026
Evidence: source:nvd:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 26, 2026
Evidence: source:nvd:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 1, 2026
azureauthextension is the Azure Authenticator Extension. From 0.124.0 to 0.150.0, a server-side authentication bypass in azureauthextension allows any party who holds a single valid Azure access token for any scope the collector's configured identity can mint for to authenticate to any OpenTelemetry receiver that uses auth: azure_auth. The extension's Authenticate method does not validate incoming bearer tokens as JWTs. Instead, it calls its own configured credential to obtain an access token and compares the client's token to the result with string equality — and the scope for that server-side token request is taken from the client-supplied Host header. As a result, a token minted for any Azure resource the service principal has ever been issued a token for (ARM, Graph, Key Vault, Storage, etc.) will authenticate to the collector if the attacker picks a matching Host. Tokens are replayable for the full issued lifetime (commonly several hours for managed identity tokens).
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.