Answer in brief
CVE-2026-42864 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.9) vulnerability in FireFighter has unauthenticated SSRF in its Raid jira_bot endpoint that allows IAM credential theft. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps firefighter-incident (pip), firefighter-incident (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.9. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps firefighter-incident (pip), firefighter-incident (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| firefighter-incidentpip | <0.0.54 | 0.0.54 |
| firefighter-incidentpypi | >=0 <0.0.54 | 0.0.54 |
Published upstream
May 5, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 27, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 27, 2026
### Impact The `POST /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot` endpoint (`CreateJiraBotView`) is reachable without authentication (`permission_classes = [permissions.AllowAny]`). Its `attachments` payload is fetched server-side via `httpx.get()` with no URL validation, then uploaded as an attachment on the Jira ticket that gets created. An unauthenticated caller able to reach the ingress can coerce the pod into fetching arbitrary URLs — including the cloud metadata endpoint at `http://169.254.169.254/` — and exfiltrate the response as a Jira attachment. On EC2/EKS deployments that do not enforce IMDSv2, this allows theft of the temporary AWS credentials attached to the pod's IAM role. The docstring on the view claims a Bearer token is required, but the code does not enforce it. Affected code paths: - `src/firefighter/raid/views/__init__.py` — `CreateJiraBotView` - `src/firefighter/raid/serializers.py` — `LandbotIssueRequestSerializer.attachments` - `src/firefighter/raid/client.py` — `RaidJiraClient.add_attachments_to_issue` ### Patches Fixed in `firefighter-incident` `0.0.54`: - `CreateJiraBotView` now enforces `BearerTokenAuthentication` + `IsAuthenticated`. - `attachments` URLs are validated: http(s) scheme only, max 10 URLs, rejection of any host resolving to a private, loopback, link-local, reserved, multicast or unspecified IP (IPv4 and IPv6). - Fixes an unrelated `KeyError('attachments')` surfaced during regression testing. Users should upgrade to `0.0.54` or later. ### Workarounds Until upgrade is possible, any one of the following blocks end-to-end exploitation: - Restrict ingress access to `/api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot` to trusted networks only (VPN, internal load balancer). - Rotate or revoke the Jira API token configured as `RAID_JIRA_API_PASSWORD`; this breaks `jira.create_issue()` before the vulnerable attachment fetch is reached (legitimate traffic is also blocked — emergency mitigation only). - Enforce IMDSv2 with `HttpPutResponseHopLimit=1` on EC2/EKS nodes. This does not fix the SSRF itself but neutralises the IAM-credential-theft path. ### Resources - CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery - CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.