## Summary A electron run as node vulnerability was identified in `actual` (macOS application, version `25.x (Electron 39.2.7)`). **Vulnerability Type:** Electron Run As Node ## Description ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE fuse enabled (Electron 39.2.7) — app can be converted to Node.js REPL for arbitrary code execution ## Impact An attacker who can place a file on disk or control command-line arguments can invoke the signed Actual.app binary with ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 to execute arbitrary Node.js code inheriting the apps entitlements and code signature. This bypasses macOS Gatekeeper review of the payload: the Node.js script runs as Actual, under Actuals bundle ID and signed identity, and has access to any entitlements the app carries (network, file access, keychain, automation). Combined with any downloader (browser, mail attachment, Slack link) this becomes a signed-binary-abuse primitive on every Mac with Actual installed.
Update actual to 26.5.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanactual Allows Electron to Run As Node affects actual (npm). Severity is medium. ## Summary A electron run as node vulnerability was identified in `actual` (macOS application, version `25.x (Electron 39.2.7)`). **Vulnerability Type:** Electron Run As Node ## Description ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE fuse enabled (Electron 39.2.7) — app can be converted to Node.js REPL for arbitrary code execution ## Impact An attacker who can place a file on disk or control command-line arguments can invoke the signed Actual.app binary with ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 to execute arbitrary Node.js code inheriting the apps entitlements and code signature. This bypasses macOS Gatekeeper review of the payload: the Node.js script runs as Actual, under Actuals bundle ID and signed identity, and has access to any entitlements the app carries (network, file access, keychain, automation). Combined with any downloader (browser, mail attachment, Slack link) this becomes a signed-binary-abuse primitive on every Mac with Actual installed.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range |
|---|
## Summary A electron run as node vulnerability was identified in `actual` (macOS application, version `25.x (Electron 39.2.7)`). **Vulnerability Type:** Electron Run As Node ## Description ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE fuse enabled (Electron 39.2.7) — app can be converted to Node.js REPL for arbitrary code execution ## Impact An attacker who can place a file on disk or control command-line arguments can invoke the signed Actual.app binary with ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 to execute arbitrary Node.js code inheriting the apps entitlements and code signature. This bypasses macOS Gatekeeper review of the payload: the Node.js script runs as Actual, under Actuals bundle ID and signed identity, and has access to any entitlements the app carries (network, file access, keychain, automation). Combined with any downloader (browser, mail attachment, Slack link) this becomes a signed-binary-abuse primitive on every Mac with Actual installed.
Update actual to 26.5.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanactual Allows Electron to Run As Node affects actual (npm). Severity is medium. ## Summary A electron run as node vulnerability was identified in `actual` (macOS application, version `25.x (Electron 39.2.7)`). **Vulnerability Type:** Electron Run As Node ## Description ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE fuse enabled (Electron 39.2.7) — app can be converted to Node.js REPL for arbitrary code execution ## Impact An attacker who can place a file on disk or control command-line arguments can invoke the signed Actual.app binary with ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 to execute arbitrary Node.js code inheriting the apps entitlements and code signature. This bypasses macOS Gatekeeper review of the payload: the Node.js script runs as Actual, under Actuals bundle ID and signed identity, and has access to any entitlements the app carries (network, file access, keychain, automation). Combined with any downloader (browser, mail attachment, Slack link) this becomes a signed-binary-abuse primitive on every Mac with Actual installed.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range |
|---|
| Fixed version |
|---|
| actualnpm | <26.5.0 | 26.5.0 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard| Fixed version |
|---|
| actualnpm | <26.5.0 | 26.5.0 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard