Answer in brief
CVE-2026-43017 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=b338d91703fae6f6afd67f3f75caa3b8f36ddef3 <24fa32369cf15d8fc918bdfe94097b12e6acada0 || >=b338d91703fae6f6afd67f3f75caa3b8f36ddef3 <244b639e6a3a8e26241e201004a3a9f764476631 || >=b338d91703fae6f6afd67f3f75caa3b8f36ddef3 <0b706fb2294aff3adfd54653bda1b5e356ad4566 || >=b338d91703fae6f6afd67f3f75caa3b8f36ddef3 <edb5898cfa91afe7e8f83eda18d93034c953d632 || >=b338d91703fae6f6afd67f3f75caa3b8f36ddef3 <562ed1954f0c1bff3422b7b752bd3dacf185edbf || >=b338d91703fae6f6afd67f3f75caa3b8f36ddef3 <bda93eec78cdbfe5cda00785cefebd443e56b88b | 24fa32369cf15d8fc918bdfe94097b12e6acada0, 244b639e6a3a8e26241e201004a3a9f764476631, 0b706fb2294aff3adfd54653bda1b5e356ad4566, edb5898cfa91afe7e8f83eda18d93034c953d632, 562ed1954f0c1bff3422b7b752bd3dacf185edbf, bda93eec78cdbfe5cda00785cefebd443e56b88b |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.1 | Not reported |
Published upstream
May 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Nov 6, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length mesh_send() currently bounds MGMT_OP_MESH_SEND by total command length, but it never verifies that the bytes supplied for the flexible adv_data[] array actually match the embedded adv_data_len field. MGMT_MESH_SEND_SIZE only covers the fixed header, so a truncated command can still pass the existing 20..50 byte range check and later drive the async mesh send path past the end of the queued command buffer. Keep rejecting zero-length and oversized advertising payloads, but validate adv_data_len explicitly and require the command length to exactly match the flexible array size before queueing the request.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.