Answer in brief
CVE-2026-43023 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=70a13b1e25fef37c87c8a1228ddb8900efbca7cf <dabf22269242e2f2bf44c43fcdc2fa763df7f9cc || >=9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3 <adb90cd0f9f7a8d438fcb93354040fbafc5ae2a0 || >=9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3 <7e296ffdab5bdab718dff7c14288fdcb9154fa27 || >=9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3 <98c8d3bfdaa657d8f472dbbebd7ea8cd816d8a8d || >=9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3 <d002bd11024bd231bcb606877e33951ffb7bed14 || >=9a8ec9e8ebb5a7c0cfbce2d6b4a6b67b2b78e8f3 <8a5b0135d4a5d9683203a3d9a12a711ccec5936b || >=6.1.109 <6.1.168 | dabf22269242e2f2bf44c43fcdc2fa763df7f9cc, adb90cd0f9f7a8d438fcb93354040fbafc5ae2a0, 7e296ffdab5bdab718dff7c14288fdcb9154fa27, 98c8d3bfdaa657d8f472dbbebd7ea8cd816d8a8d, d002bd11024bd231bcb606877e33951ffb7bed14, 8a5b0135d4a5d9683203a3d9a12a711ccec5936b, 6.1.168 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 6.3 | Not reported |
Published upstream
May 1, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 16, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect() sco_sock_connect() checks sk_state and sk_type without holding the socket lock. Two concurrent connect() syscalls on the same socket can both pass the check and enter sco_connect(), leading to use-after-free. The buggy scenario involves three participants and was confirmed with additional logging instrumentation: Thread A (connect): HCI disconnect: Thread B (connect): sco_sock_connect(sk) sco_sock_connect(sk) sk_state==BT_OPEN sk_state==BT_OPEN (pass, no lock) (pass, no lock) sco_connect(sk): sco_connect(sk): hci_dev_lock hci_dev_lock hci_connect_sco <- blocked -> hcon1 sco_conn_add->conn1 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: conn1->sk = sk sk->conn = conn1 sk_state=BT_CONNECT release_sock hci_dev_unlock hci_dev_lock sco_conn_del: lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_del: sk->conn=NULL conn1->sk=NULL sk_state= BT_CLOSED SOCK_ZAPPED release_sock hci_dev_unlock (unblocked) hci_connect_sco -> hcon2 sco_conn_add -> conn2 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: sk->conn=conn2 sk_state= BT_CONNECT // zombie sk! release_sock hci_dev_unlock Thread B revives a BT_CLOSED + SOCK_ZAPPED socket back to BT_CONNECT. Subsequent cleanup triggers double sock_put() and use-after-free. Meanwhile conn1 is leaked as it was orphaned when sco_conn_del() cleared the association. Fix this by: - Moving lock_sock() before the sk_state/sk_type checks in sco_sock_connect() to serialize concurrent connect attempts - Fixing the sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET check to actually return the error instead of just assigning it - Adding a state re-check in sco_connect() after lock_sock() to catch state changes during the window between the locks - Adding sco_pi(sk)->conn check in sco_chan_add() to prevent double-attach of a socket to multiple connections - Adding hci_conn_drop() on sco_chan_add failure to prevent HCI connection leaks
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.