Answer in brief
CVE-2026-43038 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) security vulnerability in CVE-2026-43038. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. No package mapping is present, so exposure must be confirmed against the affected product and deployment inventory.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-43038 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) security vulnerability in CVE-2026-43038. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. No package mapping is present, so exposure must be confirmed against the affected product and deployment inventory.
Review the upstream advisory, identify the affected product in your inventory, and apply the vendor update when one is available.
Vulnerability describes the vulnerability class recorded for this advisory. The current record does not mark CVE-2026-43038 as known exploited; continue to monitor the source for status changes. This is a product-level record in the current feed, not a package-level dependency mapping.
Affected software not mapped. Review the upstream record for vendor-specific product and version guidance.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() Sashiko AI-review observed: In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2). IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO). This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao. Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end of the packet data into skb_shared_info? Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and ip6ip6_err() to prevent this? This patch implements the first suggestion. I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed. A separate patch would be better anyway.
Reported by NVD (nvd).
CVE-2026-43038 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) security vulnerability in CVE-2026-43038. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. No package mapping is present, so exposure must be confirmed against the affected product and deployment inventory.
The source record does not mark it as known exploited.
Confirm whether the product or interface named by this advisory exists in your inventory.
HOL Guard can help your team monitor supply-chain activity while the upstream record is clarified.
Explore HOL GuardReview the upstream advisory, identify the affected product in your inventory, and apply the vendor update when one is available.
Vulnerability describes the vulnerability class recorded for this advisory. The current record does not mark CVE-2026-43038 as known exploited; continue to monitor the source for status changes. This is a product-level record in the current feed, not a package-level dependency mapping.
Affected software not mapped. Review the upstream record for vendor-specific product and version guidance.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() Sashiko AI-review observed: In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2). IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO). This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao. Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end of the packet data into skb_shared_info? Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and ip6ip6_err() to prevent this? This patch implements the first suggestion. I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed. A separate patch would be better anyway.
Reported by NVD (nvd).
CVE-2026-43038 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) security vulnerability in CVE-2026-43038. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. No package mapping is present, so exposure must be confirmed against the affected product and deployment inventory.
The source record does not mark it as known exploited.
Confirm whether the product or interface named by this advisory exists in your inventory.
HOL Guard can help your team monitor supply-chain activity while the upstream record is clarified.
Explore HOL Guard