Answer in brief
CVE-2026-43495 records a High severity (CVSS 8.8) vulnerability in net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-43495 records a High severity (CVSS 8.8) vulnerability in net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=da45d2566a1d4e260b894ff5d96be64b21c7fa79 <307c5d0f36a5c74042217136da5bfbd9f7504650 || >=da45d2566a1d4e260b894ff5d96be64b21c7fa79 <f94450ce5053b36002995b72d1fa1db3bb08c5bf || >=da45d2566a1d4e260b894ff5d96be64b21c7fa79 <9855e063e063158cc5bded576382599dc3133202 || >=da45d2566a1d4e260b894ff5d96be64b21c7fa79 <2b56d7903ab804481f5233a259d5f341e9fd513c || >=da45d2566a1d4e260b894ff5d96be64b21c7fa79 <dd4f4c93c1488d7100b9964f2da4c8b3c29652f1 || >=da45d2566a1d4e260b894ff5d96be64b21c7fa79 <0e7c074cfcd9bd93765505f9eb8b42f03ed2a744 | 307c5d0f36a5c74042217136da5bfbd9f7504650, f94450ce5053b36002995b72d1fa1db3bb08c5bf, 9855e063e063158cc5bded576382599dc3133202, 2b56d7903ab804481f5233a259d5f341e9fd513c, dd4f4c93c1488d7100b9964f2da4c8b3c29652f1, 0e7c074cfcd9bd93765505f9eb8b42f03ed2a744 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.19 | Not reported |
Published upstream
May 21, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 19, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes. Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header fields to guard against undersized messages. Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop. In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed integer overflow on offset. Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
CVSS is 8.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=da45d2566a1d4e260b894ff5d96be64b21c7fa79 <307c5d0f36a5c74042217136da5bfbd9f7504650 || >=da45d2566a1d4e260b894ff5d96be64b21c7fa79 <f94450ce5053b36002995b72d1fa1db3bb08c5bf || >=da45d2566a1d4e260b894ff5d96be64b21c7fa79 <9855e063e063158cc5bded576382599dc3133202 || >=da45d2566a1d4e260b894ff5d96be64b21c7fa79 <2b56d7903ab804481f5233a259d5f341e9fd513c || >=da45d2566a1d4e260b894ff5d96be64b21c7fa79 <dd4f4c93c1488d7100b9964f2da4c8b3c29652f1 || >=da45d2566a1d4e260b894ff5d96be64b21c7fa79 <0e7c074cfcd9bd93765505f9eb8b42f03ed2a744 | 307c5d0f36a5c74042217136da5bfbd9f7504650, f94450ce5053b36002995b72d1fa1db3bb08c5bf, 9855e063e063158cc5bded576382599dc3133202, 2b56d7903ab804481f5233a259d5f341e9fd513c, dd4f4c93c1488d7100b9964f2da4c8b3c29652f1, 0e7c074cfcd9bd93765505f9eb8b42f03ed2a744 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.19 | Not reported |
Published upstream
May 21, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 19, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as a loop bound over port_msg->data[] without checking that the message buffer contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes. Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header fields to guard against undersized messages. Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop. In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed integer overflow on offset. Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb->len at the DPMAIF path after skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.