Answer in brief
CVE-2026-44213 records a Medium severity security vulnerability in OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana bypasses TLS certificate validation when a proxy is configured. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 1 affected package is mapped in the feed.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-44213 records a Medium severity security vulnerability in OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana bypasses TLS certificate validation when a proxy is configured. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 1 affected package is mapped in the feed.
Update OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana to 1.1.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanVulnerability describes the vulnerability class recorded for this advisory. The current record does not mark CVE-2026-44213 as known exploited; continue to monitor the source for status changes. The feed includes package mappings that can be checked against lockfiles and deployed manifests.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instananuget | <=1.0.7 | 1.1.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
CVE-2026-44213 records a Medium severity security vulnerability in OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana bypasses TLS certificate validation when a proxy is configured. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 1 affected package is mapped in the feed.
The source record does not mark it as known exploited.
Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana.
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana to 1.1.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanVulnerability describes the vulnerability class recorded for this advisory. The current record does not mark CVE-2026-44213 as known exploited; continue to monitor the source for status changes. The feed includes package mappings that can be checked against lockfiles and deployed manifests.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instananuget | <=1.0.7 | 1.1.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
CVE-2026-44213 records a Medium severity security vulnerability in OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana bypasses TLS certificate validation when a proxy is configured. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 1 affected package is mapped in the feed.
The source record does not mark it as known exploited.
Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana.
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard### Summary The `OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana` NuGet package does not validate HTTPS/TLS certificates are valid when sending telemetry to a configured Instana back-end when a proxy is configured using the `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` environment variable. If a network attacker can Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) the proxy connection, all OpenTelemetry telemetry data and the Instana API key are exposed to the attacker. ### Details The [`Transport.ConfigureBackendClient()`](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/blob/b53b6a74fde21a4cee344e584b51a0fe5bf1f337/src/OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana/Implementation/Transport.cs#L132-L158) method creates an `HttpClient` instance that completely disables TLS server certificate validation if the `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` is configured with a valid proxy URL with no ability to re-enable it. ### Impact If the configured proxy is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker MitM the connection), or if it is possible for the process' configuration to be changed to add an attacker-provided value for `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` then all Instana telemetry could be read by an unauthorized party and the service's Instana API key compromised, potentially before being forwarded to Instana presenting no noticeable loss of telemetry data without a valid TLS server certificate being presented to the client that matches the expected hostname or IP address. ### Mitigation The proxy configured by the `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` environment variable must be malicious or be possible to be subject to a MitM attack. ### Workarounds Do not configure the `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` environment variable. ### Remediation [#4153](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/pull/4153) refactors `HttpClient` creation so that TLS certificate validation is no longer disabled by default when using a proxy. In environments where this capability is required, for example for local development, the previous behaviour can be restored using the `` option: ```csharp builder.AddInstanaExporter((options) => { options.HttpClientFactory = () => { var handler = new HttpClientHandler() { #if NET ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback = HttpClientHandler.DangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator, #else ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback = static (_, _, _, _) => true, #endif }; return new HttpClient(handler, disposeHandler: true); }; }); ``` ### Resources - [PR #4153](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/pull/4153)
### Summary The `OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana` NuGet package does not validate HTTPS/TLS certificates are valid when sending telemetry to a configured Instana back-end when a proxy is configured using the `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` environment variable. If a network attacker can Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) the proxy connection, all OpenTelemetry telemetry data and the Instana API key are exposed to the attacker. ### Details The [`Transport.ConfigureBackendClient()`](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/blob/b53b6a74fde21a4cee344e584b51a0fe5bf1f337/src/OpenTelemetry.Exporter.Instana/Implementation/Transport.cs#L132-L158) method creates an `HttpClient` instance that completely disables TLS server certificate validation if the `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` is configured with a valid proxy URL with no ability to re-enable it. ### Impact If the configured proxy is attacker-controlled (or a network attacker MitM the connection), or if it is possible for the process' configuration to be changed to add an attacker-provided value for `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` then all Instana telemetry could be read by an unauthorized party and the service's Instana API key compromised, potentially before being forwarded to Instana presenting no noticeable loss of telemetry data without a valid TLS server certificate being presented to the client that matches the expected hostname or IP address. ### Mitigation The proxy configured by the `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` environment variable must be malicious or be possible to be subject to a MitM attack. ### Workarounds Do not configure the `INSTANA_ENDPOINT_PROXY` environment variable. ### Remediation [#4153](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/pull/4153) refactors `HttpClient` creation so that TLS certificate validation is no longer disabled by default when using a proxy. In environments where this capability is required, for example for local development, the previous behaviour can be restored using the `` option: ```csharp builder.AddInstanaExporter((options) => { options.HttpClientFactory = () => { var handler = new HttpClientHandler() { #if NET ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback = HttpClientHandler.DangerousAcceptAnyServerCertificateValidator, #else ServerCertificateCustomValidationCallback = static (_, _, _, _) => true, #endif }; return new HttpClient(handler, disposeHandler: true); }; }); ``` ### Resources - [PR #4153](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet-contrib/pull/4153)