Answer in brief
CVE-2026-44223 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.5) vulnerability in vLLM: extract_hidden_states speculative decoding crashes server on any request with penalty parameters. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps vllm (pip), vllm (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 6.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps vllm (pip), vllm (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| vllmpip | >=0.18.0,<0.20.0 | 0.20.0 |
| vllmpypi | >=0.18.0 <0.20.0 | 0.20.0 |
Published upstream
May 6, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 4, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 11, 2026
### Summary The `extract_hidden_states` speculative decoding proposer in vLLM returns a tensor with an incorrect shape after the first decode step, causing a `RuntimeError` that crashes the EngineCore process. The crash is triggered when any request in the batch uses sampling penalty parameters (`repetition_penalty`, `frequency_penalty`, or `presence_penalty`). A single request with a penalty parameter (e.g., `"repetition_penalty": 1.1`) is sufficient to crash the server. The crash is deterministic and immediate — no concurrency, race condition, or special workload is required. ### Details In vLLM v0.17.0, the `extract_hidden_states` proposer's `propose()` method returned `sampled_token_ids.unsqueeze(-1)`, producing a tensor of shape `(batch_size, 1)`. In [PR #37013](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/37013) (first released in v0.18.0), the KV connector interface was refactored out of `propose()`. The return type changed from `tuple[Tensor, KVConnectorOutput | None]` to `Tensor`, and the `.unsqueeze(-1)` call was removed along with the KV connector output: ```python # Before (v0.17.0): return sampled_token_ids.unsqueeze(-1), kv_connector_output # shape (batch_size, 1) # After (v0.18.0+): return sampled_token_ids # shape (batch_size, 2) after first decode step ``` The refactor missed that `sampled_token_ids` changed semantics between the first and subsequent decode steps. After the first decode step, the rejection sampler allocates its output as `(batch_size, max_spec_len + 1)`. With `num_speculative_tokens=1`, this produces shape `(batch_size, 2)` instead of the expected `(batch_size, 1)`, causing a broadcast shape mismatch during penalty application. ### Impact Any vLLM deployment between v0.18.0 and v0.19.1 (inclusive) configured with `extract_hidden_states` speculative decoding is affected. A single API request containing any penalty parameter immediately and permanently crashes the EngineCore process, resulting in complete loss of service availability. ### Patches Fixed in [PR #38610](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/38610), first included in vLLM v0.20.0. The fix slices the return value to `sampled_token_ids[:, :1]`, ensuring the correct `(batch_size, 1)` shape regardless of the rejection sampler's output dimensions. ### Workarounds - Upgrade to vLLM v0.20.0 or later. - If upgrading is not possible, avoid using `extract_hidden_states` as the speculative decoding method on affected versions. - Alternatively, reject or strip penalty parameters (`repetition_penalty`, `frequency_penalty`, `presence_penalty`) from incoming requests at an API gateway before they reach vLLM.
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